Book Reviews

By Martin Blumenson, Richard Trefry, Dave Palmer, Ralph Peters . . .

Review Essays

By Victor Gray, Steven Metz, Norvell DeAtkine, Russell Ramsey

"NOT TO PROMOTE WAR, BUT TO PRESERVE PEACE . . ."

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE

PARAMETERS

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE QUARTERLY

Vol. XXIV, No. 4	Winter 1994-95

From the Editor

In This Issue...

Michael G. Roskin examines the challenges of converting national interests into policy. He identifies and analyzes factors that produce "warping effects" on national interest assessments, then demonstrates how misidentified interests can produce infeasible or insupportable national strategy options. One consequence of the latter, he opines, is application of force in regions or over issues which do not add to the nation's power or prestige.

Arthur H. Barber, III, posits a military structured to meet only one regional military conflict rather than the two assumed in the Bottom-Up Review. In that new context, he describes essential features of future joint military operations and a concept for determining service capabilities best suited to conduct such operations.

Allan R. Millett relentlessly catalogues incidents that contribute to misunderstanding between the Army and Marine Corps, pointing out how traditionalism can impede understanding and cooperation on truly significant matters of mutual concern. Both services, he concludes, must acknowledge that many more issues unite than divide them.

Sir Michael Howard introduces the feature on NATO with a synthesis of 200 years of European history. He examines the roles played by Great Britain, Germany, and France during the period, creating the context for exploring defense alternatives for a Europe whose strongest ally, the only superpower, is thousands of miles from the continent.

Pierre Shostal considers European stability—as do many of the authors in the NATO feature—while exploring evolving political, economic, and security relationships within Europe and between Europe and the United States. He concludes that while a devolution of responsibilities from the United States to Europe is inevitable, all parties must exercise due diligence in the process.

Massimo Dal Piaz looks at evolving European security concepts from a national perspective, analyzing competition among the supranational organizations seeking primacy in such matters. He notes the significance of political and economic strengths when deciding whether, and if so how, Europe should modify security structures that have endured for nearly half a century.

Michael Rühle and Nicholas Williams analyze NATO's Partnership for Peace program, setting straight possible misconceptions of its nature, purpose, and procedures. The authors acknowledge the opportunities and risks inherent in the concept as they candidly describe successes and shortcomings in implementation to date.

William T. Johnsen and Thomas-Durell Young use France's domestic political and national security policy bureaucracies to examine that nation's often enigmatic relationship with NATO. They portray clearly the reasons for many seeming contradictions in France's security policy as they assess the once and future role of France in the Alliance.

Graham S. Pearson provides a succinct analysis of the Chemical Weapons Treaty and of its key provision: the requirement to maintain national capabilities for protection. The discussion cautions against euphoria even as it offers hope for the elimination of an entire class of weapons.

M. W. Parker, W. A. Achenbaum, G. F. Fuller, and W. P. Fay follow interdisciplinary procedures as they examine the last years of Robert E. Lee's life. They find in Lee's responses to the challenges he faced after the Civil War a model for the millions of service members who have made or will make similar transitions on completion of their service.

Commentary and Reply features a lively exchange on "CNN Wars" between Frank J. Stech and several readers, as well as comments on the situation in the Balkans.

Book Reviews resume in two forms in this issue. Victor Gray's comprehensive essay "Strategic Reading on the New Europe" complements the NATO feature for those wanting more background on European affairs, while Iraq's October surprise makes Norvell B. DeAtkine's "The Middle East and US Interests" particularly relevant. Our engagement in the Carribean enhances the value of Russell W. Ramsey's "On Castro and Cuba: Rethinking the 'Three Gs,'" and Steven Metz's "A Wake for Clausewitz: Toward a Philosophy of 21st-Century Warfare" challenges conventional thinking about why and how wars may occur in the future.

Reviews include Martin Blumenson on two recent works about Bernard Montgomery, Richard G. Trefry on the evolution of the artillery in modern warfare, Dave R. Palmer on a new collection of essays on strategy, and Ralph Peters on English translations of Clausewitz.

Other Business...

Some readers may have observed that it has taken longer than usual to proceed from cover to cover in recent issues. The observation would be accurate; our page count has increased to accommodate new topics of interest and importance to those concerned with national security policy and national military strategy. The 28 pages added during the past year allow us to develop those new topics, respond to suggestions from the 1993 readership survey, and continue to address matters of enduring interest to all military professionals, in uniform and out, in this country and around the world.

Independently of the increase in the journal's size and scope, the Superintendent of Documents has increased the cost of subscriptions to *Parameters*. The new rates are $11.00 per year for domestic or APO addresses, $13.75 for foreign addresses. Recent single copies also are available from the Superintendent of Documents for $7.50 to domestic addresses, $9.38 to foreign addresses. Subscription forms are available from the *Parameters* editorial office (phone 717-245-4943).

Expanding our reach, *Parameters* now supports US initiatives in Central Europe with distribution to military educational and policy organizations in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Romania, Albania, and Slovenia. — JJM   ❏

National Interest:
From Abstraction to Strategy

MICHAEL G. ROSKIN

"We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests
are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow."
— Lord Palmerston, 1848

The student new to international relations is often at first intoxicated by the concept of "national interest." It seems crisp, clear, objective: what's good for the nation as a whole in international affairs. (What's good for the nation as a whole in domestic affairs is the *public* interest.) National interest lies at the very heart of the military and diplomatic professions and leads to the formulation of a national strategy and the calculation of the power necessary to support that strategy.

Upon reflection, however, one comes to realize how hard it is to turn concepts of national interest into working strategy. It requires one to perceive the world with undistorted clarity and even to anticipate the second- and third-order effects of policies. Few are so gifted. Instead of bringing clarity and cohesion, many quarrel over what the national interest is in any given situation. This essay will argue that the concept of national interest still has utility, not as an objective fact but as a philosophical argument in favor of limiting the number of crusades a country may be inclined to undertake.

Philosophical Background

"National interest" traces its roots at least back to the pessimistic realism of Machiavelli in the 15th century.[1] As such, it represents a repudiation of earlier Western sources in Hellenic idealism, Judeo-Christian biblical morality, and the teachings of medieval churchmen such as Thomas Aquinas. You may have splendid moral goals, argued Machiavelli, but without sufficient power and

the willingness to use it, you will accomplish nothing. Machiavelli's overriding aim: Italian unification and liberation from foreign occupiers. Nothing could be more moral than the interest of the Italian state; accordingly, seemingly immoral ends could be employed for its attainment. Power rather than morality is the crux of this school.

At least one element of the medieval churchmen survives in national-interest thinking. Humans have souls, and these are judged in an afterlife, they argued. Accordingly, humans can be held to exacting standards of behavior with curbs on beastly impulses. States, being artificial creations, have no souls; they have life only in this world. If the state is crushed or destroyed, it has no heavenly afterlife. Accordingly, states may take harsh measures to protect themselves and ensure their survival. States are amoral and can do things individual humans cannot do. It is in this context that churchmen such as Thomas Aquinas proposed theories of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*.[2]

Clausewitz also contributes to the national-interest approach. All state behavior is motivated by its need to survive and prosper. To safeguard its interests the state must rationally decide to go to war; there should be no other reason for going to war. Unlimited war, however, is foolish, for it serves no national interest.[3] By this time, concepts of *raison d'etat* or *Staatsraison* were long and firmly embedded in European thinking.

The Founding Fathers practiced a cautious realism in preserving and expanding the 13 original states, indicating they understood the concept of national interest. Washington's farewell address showed a shrewd appreciation of national interest: "Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns."[4]

During the 19th century the United States pursued its national interests by means of cash and force in ridding its continent of non-hemispheric powers. Less and less, however, it called its actions "national interest," and by the 20th century national interest in the United States took a back seat to ethical and normative approaches to international relations. If considered, it was given short shrift as distasteful German *Realpolitik* as practiced by Bismarck. As was typical of American political science in its first decades, Woodrow Wilson despised as

Dr. Michael G. Roskin is a professor of political science at Lycoming College (Pa.) and was a visiting professor of foreign policy in the Department of National Security and Strategy at the US Army War College from 1991 to 1994. He took his A.B. from the University of California (Berkeley), M.A. from the University of California (Los Angeles), and Ph.D. from American University. A former USIA Foreign Service officer, with postings in Munich and Bern, and a former AP world desk editor, Professor Roskin is the author of five books on international relations and comparative politics. He speaks Serbo-Croatian among his six languages, and has traveled extensively in the Balkans, including Bosnia-Herzegovina. The present article was published recently as a Strategic Studies Institute report.

> *"The concept of national interest still has utility, not as an objective fact but as a philosophical argument in favor of limiting the number of crusades a country may be inclined to undertake."*

amoral or even immoral approaches that used power, national interest, and recourse to violence as normal components of international relations.[5] America had a higher calling than that. Wilson's father was a minister, and Wilson trained as a lawyer; he was thus steeped in what George F. Kennan called the "legalistic-moralistic approach" prevalent in America.[6]

Realism Comes to America

With the flight of scholars from Europe in the 1930s, however, American universities became exposed to what were called "realist" approaches that used national interest as their primary building block. The man who more than any other acquainted Americans with the idea of national interest was the German émigré Hans Morgenthau (1904-1980; no relation to FDR's treasury secretary). He was the truly powerful mind of Realism, as he called his approach. Bringing the wisdom of Machiavelli and Clausewitz with him, Morgenthau told Americans that they must arm and oppose first the Axis and then the Soviet Union not out of any abstract love of liberty and justice, but because their most profound national interests were threatened. "International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power," he wrote.[7]

Morgenthau's writings immediately sparked controversy and to this day are not uniformly accepted. They go against the grain of the Wilsonian idealism that was and still is taught as international relations on some college campuses.[8] American scholars resisted what they perceived as Germanic amorality. Many American academics and decisionmakers still prefer "world order" approaches that posit peaceful, cooperative behavior as the international norm. Denunciations of Morgenthau circulated much as "anti-machiavells" had circulated to refute the wicked Florentine. McGeorge Bundy of Harvard, for example, during the late 1950s taught an international relations course devoted entirely to denouncing Morgenthau.

Actually, Morgenthau, a friend and collaborator of Reinhold Niebuhr, was deeply moral. His theory was, at bottom, a normative one, a philosophical argument for how states *ought* to behave. He argued that if states pursue only their rational self-interests, without defining them too grandly, they will collide with other states only minimally. In most cases,

their collisions will be compromisable; that is the function of diplomacy. It is when states refuse to limit themselves to protection of their rational self-interests that they become dangerous. They define their interests too broadly, leading to a policy of expansionism or imperialism, which in turn must be countered by the states whose interests are infringed upon, and this can lead to war. When states make national interest the guide of their policy, they are being as moral as they can be. We can't know what is good for the whole world or for country X; we can only know what is good for us.

Interest Defined As Power

Morgenthau supposed he had an objective standard by which to judge foreign policies: were they pursuing the national interest defined in terms of power?[9] That is, was the statesman making decisions that would *preserve and improve the state's power*, or was he squandering power in such a way that would ultimately weaken the state? The statesman asks, "Will this step improve or weaken my power?" The foreign policy of any state—no matter what its "values"—can thus be judged rationally and empirically. It matters little whether the national values are Christianity, Communism, Islam, or vegetarianism. Only one question matters: is the statesman acting to preserve the state and its power? If so, his policy is rational.

A policy of "improving" the state's power is not to be confused with territorial expansion, which is the hallmark of dangerous and disruptive imperialist powers, against whom the prudent statesman is always on guard.

With power as a yardstick Morgenthau had no trouble defining the national interest at any given time and under any circumstance. He was uncannily prescient. He also had no difficulty in reading the minds of statesmen both dead and alive. "Using national interest defined as power, we look over the states-man's shoulder when he writes his dispatches; we read and anticipate his very thoughts."[10] Did Morgenthau have this ability because he applied some formula of national interest or because he was tremendously intelligent? Lesser minds have tried to define certain policies as national interest and have thereby committed egregious errors. Overseas expansion, for example, might appear to enhance state power by the influx of new riches. But it may also drain state power by spreading it too thin and engaging too many enemies. A giant empire may actually ruin the state; the Spanish Habsburgs put themselves out of business. Hitler flung away German power and ruined the state.

There are times when the statesman must move decisively to engage his armed forces in the threat or practice of war. When the borders or existence of the state are threatened by an expansionist or imperialist neighboring state, one must arm and form alliances, and it is best to do so earlier rather than later. Accordingly, one of the great tasks of the statesman is to scan the horizon for expansionist or imperialist threats. Any state engaged in expanding its power is pursuing a "policy of imperialism," wrote Morgenthau. A

> *"Always back your interests with adequate power.*
> *If you don't have the power, don't declare*
> *something distant to be your interest.*
> *Thou shalt not bluff."*

state merely intent on preserving itself and conserving its power is pursuing a "policy of the status quo." The statesman is able to tell one from the other despite the imperialist's claim to be for the status quo. When you see a Hitler on the march, arm yourself and form alliances. Do not wait for him to flagrantly violate some point of international law, such as the invasion of Poland, for that might be too late. Britain and France, more intent on the details of international law, failed to understand the imperialist thrust behind German moves in the late 1930s.

Potentially the most dangerous policy is one of declaring certain interests to be vital but then not backing up your words with military power. This is a policy of bluff and tends to end badly, in one of two ways: either your adversary sees that you are bluffing and continues his conquests, or you belatedly attempt to back up your words, in which case you may have to go to war to convince him that you were not bluffing. One horrifying example is the US policy of angry words at Japan in the 1930s over its conquest of China, words unsupported by military power or any inclination to use it. Tokyo simply could not believe that China was a vital US interest; the Americans were bluffing. Was not poker, the game of bluff, the Americans' favorite card game?

Something similar occurred in Bosnia: many strong words from the United States and the West Europeans, unsupported by military power or the intent to use it. Quite reasonably, the Serbs concluded we were bluffing, and they were right. Always back your interests with adequate power. If you don't have the power, don't declare something distant to be your interest. Thou shalt not bluff.

Vital and Secondary Interests

Morgenthau saw two levels of national interest, the vital and the secondary.[11] To preserve the first, which concerns the very life of the state, there can be no compromise or hesitation about going to war. Vital national interests are relatively easy to define: security as a free and independent nation and protection of institutions, people, and fundamental values. Vital interests may at times extend overseas should you detect an expansionist state

that is distant now but amassing power and conquests that later will affect you. Imperialist powers that threaten your interests are best dealt with early and always with adequate power.

Secondary interests, those over which one may seek to compromise, are harder to define. Typically, they are somewhat removed from your borders and represent no threat to your sovereignty. Potentially, however, they can grow in the minds of statesmen until they seem to be vital. If an interest is secondary, mutually advantageous deals can be negotiated, provided the other party is not engaged in a policy of expansionism. If he is engaged in expansionism, compromises on secondary interests will not calm matters and may even be read as appeasement.

Additionally, Realists distinguish between temporary and permanent interests,[12] specific and general interests,[13] and between countries' complementary and conflicting interests.[14] Defense of human rights in a distant land, for example, might be permanent, general, and secondary; that is, you have a long-term commitment to human rights but without any quarrel with a specific country, certainly not one that would damage your overall relations or weaken your power. Morgenthau would think it absurd for us to move into a hostile relationship with China over human rights; little good and much harm can come from it. A hostile China, for example, offers the United States little help in dealing with an aggressive, nuclear-armed North Korea. Which is more important, human rights in China or restraining a warlike country which threatens US allies? More often than not, political leaders must choose between competing interests.

Two countries, even allies, seldom have identical national interests. The best one can hope for is that their interests will be complementary. The

Types of National Interest

		Examples
Importance	Vital	No Soviet missiles in Cuba
	Secondary	An open world oil supply
Duration	Temporary	Support for Iraq in opposing Iran
	Permanent	No hostile powers in W. hemisphere
Specificity	Specific	No Japanese trade barriers
	General	Universal respect for human rights
Compatibility	Complementary	Russian cooperation in Bosnia
	Conflicting	Russian support for Serbs

Figure 1. The Realists' Taxonomy of National Interests

United States and Albania, for instance, may have a common interest in opposing Serbian "ethnic cleansing," but the US interest is a general, temporary, and secondary one concerning human rights and regional stability. The Albanian interest is a specific, permanent, and possibly vital one of forming a Greater Albania that would include Serbian-held Kosovo with its Albanian majority. Our interests may run parallel for a time, but we must never mistake Albanian interests for US interests.

It's sometimes hard to anticipate how other countries will define their national interest. They see things through different eyes. Hungary in the 1990s has been very cooperative with the West and eager to join NATO. In 1994, however, when the United States and France proposed air strikes to curb Serbian artillery atrocities in Bosnia, Hungary stopped the US use of its territory for AWACS flights. An American looking at this refusal is puzzled: "But don't they want to be on our team?" A Hungarian looking at the refusal says, "We'll have to live with the Serbs for centuries; that border is a vital, permanent interest for us. Some 400,000 ethnic Hungarians live under Serbian control in Voivodina as virtual hostages. The Americans offer no guarantees of protection, but they expect us to join them in an act of war. Sorry, not a good deal." (The AWACS flights were quickly restored as the crisis passed.)

The diplomat's work is in finding and developing complementary interests so that two or more countries can work together. (Better diplomatic spadework would have signaled in advance the difference between Hungarian and US interests in 1994.) Often countries have some interests that are complementary and others that are conflicting, as when NATO members cooperate to block the Soviet threat but clash over who will lead the alliance. The French-US relationship can be described in this way. Where interests totally conflict, of course, there can be no cooperation. Here it is the diplomat's duty to say so and find ways to minimize the damage. Do not despair in this situation, as national interests can shift, and today's adversary may be tomorrow's ally.

Much national-interest thought has a geographical component; that is, a country, waterway, or resource may have a special importance for your national interest. Britain, for example, had a permanent, specific, and often vital interest in the Netherlands. Who controlled the Low Countries had the best invasion route to England. (For the blue-water types: the northerly winds that sweep between England and the Continent allow a sailing vessel to take a beam reach, the fastest point of sail, west from Holland to England. Here the winds, in facilitating rapid invasion, helped define England's national interest.) Whether the threat was Habsburg emperors, French kings, or German dictators, Britain felt it had to engage to secure this invasion springboard.

Morgenthau found much folly in US policy during the Cold War, some of it on geographical grounds. He thought it irrational that the United States could tolerate a Soviet puppet state, Cuba, near our continent while we

engaged in Vietnam on the other side of the globe. Cuba was a vital interest; Vietnam was not. Morgenthau spoke against the Vietnam War as an irrational crusade that did nothing but drain American power in an unimportant part of the world.[15] At this same time, many claimed Vietnam was a vital US interest. How can you tell at that moment who's right?

Morgenthau's favorite contemporary statesman was Charles de Gaulle of France, whom he called extraordinarily intelligent. De Gaulle indeed was able to pursue French national interests without undue sentimentality. When he realized that French colonies, especially Algeria, were a net drain on French power, he cut them free despite the howls of French imperialists. A richer, stronger France emerged from decolonization. De Gaulle also reasoned that no state willingly entrusts its security to foreigners, so he built a French nuclear force and kicked the Americans out of France. (In confining US forces to the narrow width of Germany, he also pushed them into an implied doctrine of early first use, thus assuring France precisely the US nuclear guarantee that it sought.)

Variations on Morgenthau

Gradually, Morgenthau's powerful arguments caught on. Operating independently of Morgenthau, the diplomatist-historian George F. Kennan came to essentially identical conclusions from his studies of US and Soviet foreign policies.[16] Protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr insisted that Christians must look at the this-worldly effect of aggression and be prepared to counter it; pacifism is a form of Christian heresy, for it requires the Christian to stand impotent in the face of evil.[17]

Perhaps the greatest damage done to Realism was by those who embraced it but misunderstood and misused it. By the 1960s, Realism was part of mainstream thinking, just in time to be used to support President Johnson's escalation of the Vietnam War. Vietnam hawks used Morgenthau's reasoning to justify the war: an expansionist power was swallowing one country after another and would not be stopped until defeated by force of arms. A communist victory in Southeast Asia would destabilize the US defense, economic, and political presence in all of Asia. Stop them there or stop them later. Here the great weakness of national-interest thinking came out with a vengeance: precisely how can you tell when a genuinely vital national interest is at stake?

National-interest thinking also has been misused by idealistic interventionists who wish to expand US interests so that they include some kind of "world interest." They would like to use US power to right wrongs the world over. A "crusade" may be thus defined as the use of one's power in causes unrelated to the national interest. In our day, for example, one hears many prominent people, in and out of government, claim that slaughter of civilians in a distant war is a vital US interest, for if allowed to spread such behavior will eventually threaten

US interests. They often use Nazi Germany and Munich as analogies. In defining national interest so broadly, however, they turn it into altruism: "By helping the victims of aggression, we make the world a safer, more stable place, and that redounds to our benefit," they argue. An altruist has been called someone who defines his self-interest so broadly that it includes everybody's interest. On such a basis, Morgenthau would argue, the United States could be engaged permanently in a half dozen wars around the globe, a frittering away of US power that could come to no good end.

True national-interest thinking is rather tightly limited to one's own nation. It is a constant temptation to expand your thinking beyond your nation's interest to include many nations' interests or the world's interest, and under certain circumstances you may wish to do this, but please do not call it "the national interest." If you do, you may soon be "fighting for peace" in many spots around the globe. The great utility of national-interest thinking is to tap the statesman on the shoulder and ask, "Is this proposed effort for the good of your country or to carry out an idealistic abstraction?"

Feasibility is linked to national interest; power is the connecting link. An infeasible strategy—where your power is insufficient to carry out your designs—is inherently a bad strategy. If the type of power is wrong for the setting (e.g., heavy tanks to counter Vietnamese or Afghan guerrillas; air power to stop a three-sided civil war), you are undertaking an infeasible strategy.

Further, remember that objectively any country's expansion of its power is a policy of imperialism. If you are expanding your power— even for the noblest of causes, to save the world or to save country X—other nations, even friendly ones, still see it as imperialism. Once we have sufficient power to stabilize conflicts, prevent aggression, and stop nuclear proliferation, we will have accumulated so much power that we are de facto king of the world. For some curious reason, other nations resent this; they can't understand that our power will be used only for good. This is the story of US power both during the Cold War (e.g., French resentment) and after it (e.g., Russian resentment).

One can make as many gradations and subdivisions in the national interest as one wishes. Donald Nuechterlein, for example, saw four levels rather than Morgenthau's two: survival, vital, major, and peripheral.[18] Examined more closely, though, survival interest concerns only destruction in nuclear war (a subset of vital), and peripheral interests are too minor to concern us. Thus we are back to Morgenthau's two: vital and secondary. You could devise a 10-point or 20-point scale of national interests if you wished, but its precision is spurious as it will soon reduce itself to the dichotomy of interests worth going to war for and interests upon which one may compromise. As William of Ockam put it, do not needlessly multiply entities.

Warping Effects on the National Interest

At any given time, the national interest may be difficult to define due to the warping effects of ideology, the global system, public and elite convictions, the mass media, and policy inertia.

Ideology

An ideology is a plan to improve society, or at least a claim to be able to do so. Ideology closely parallels religion, except the former aims to improve things in this world rather than in the next. People caught up in an ideology often exhibit religious-like fervor and disregard of empirical reality. The opposite of ideology is pragmatism. Morgenthau and other realist thinkers generally scoff at ideology and claim it is essentially a trick to justify dictatorship. The dictator himself generally takes ideology with a big grain of salt while pursuing a policy of national interests. Did Lenin withdraw Russia from World War I because it was a dirty imperialists' war or to save Russia from further dismemberment at the hands of the advancing Germans? In the 1936-39 Spanish Civil War, Stalin ordered the Comintern volunteers in Spain to adopt an extremely moderate, non-revolutionary line. Stalin was trying to convince Britain and France to join him in the struggle against Hitler. Without such an alliance, Soviet vital national interests were threatened. Communist ideology or Spanish democracy had nothing to do with it; the security of Soviet territory was all Stalin cared about.

Ideology can be changed at the drop of a hat. Stalin stopped excoriating Nazi Germany in 1939 because he couldn't get any cooperation out of Britain and France to secure his western borders; he turned to Hitler to get a deal for the same end. By the same token, Winston Churchill, a fire-breathing Conservative, explained why Britain was now in alliance with the Soviet Union: "If Hitler invaded hell, I would find a few good words to say about the devil in the House of Commons." Ideological differences or affinities do not matter, only safeguarding one's country matters. Later in the war, the redoubtable Brigadier Maclean reported back from Yugoslavia that Tito's Partisans were communists and would communize Yugoslavia after the war. Churchill took the news without surprise and asked Maclean, "Do you intend to make Yugoslavia your permanent residence after the war?" Maclean allowed as he did not. "Good," nodded Churchill, "neither do I." The ideology of postwar Yugoslavia was not uppermost in his mind, indicated Churchill; the survival of Britain in the war was.

But what of the true believer, the revolutionary who still acts on his ideology? Such people are extremely difficult to deal with because they ignore their own national interests and are thus unpredictable. Typically, their passion does not last long as they become acquainted with the burdens of governing and preserving their country. Lenin started switching from ideology to pragmatism almost immediately upon seizing power, for now he had

> *"Ideological differences or affinities do not matter,*
> *only safeguarding one's country matters."*

Russia to take care of. Ideologues who are unable to switch may destroy their entire region, including their own country, as Hitler did. Notice how after the death of Khomeini, Iranian policy has gradually become more pragmatic. Ideology and national interest are at odds; a country caught up in ideology is typically unable to pursue a policy of national interest, which requires a calm, uncluttered view of reality.

Global System

      The global configuration of power may also warp national-interest thinking. Late in the 19th century, with the globe largely carved up by European imperial powers, many countries felt compelled to grab the leftover pieces to prove themselves major powers. A kind of contagion or copycat effect warped the national interest, leading to the US seizure of the Philippines from Spain. Teddy Roosevelt engineered the move but some years later regretted it when he noticed that the Philippines had become a US vulnerability in the Pacific, one that had to be defended at great cost from the Japanese. It is easy to declare something to be your national interest but hard to back out afterward.

      A world divided by many powers is quite different from one divided by just two superpowers.[19] Probably the biggest distortions come in the latter case, that of Cold War bipolarity, a zero-sum game that tended to make everything important. Limited definitions of the national interest fall by the wayside, and the superpowers plunge ever deeper into obscure corners of the world as if one more client state proved they were winning. Laos, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, everything becomes the national interest. Only Antarctica remained outside the superpower competition. Like the Sherwin-Williams paint symbol, national interests "cover the Earth" and thus lose their utility. You must be able to discriminate and rank national interests lest you spread your power too thin and in areas of little importance.

      In a bipolar situation, the hegemonic superpower of each camp is forced, in order to hold its alliance together, to take on the national interests of each client state. One of the causes of the 1948 Tito-Stalin split, for example, was Tito's insistence that Trieste belonged to Yugoslavia. Trieste may have been a Yugoslav national interest, but it was not a Soviet national interest, and Stalin was reluctant to provoke the British and Americans over it. The United States was reluctant to come to French aid in the first Indochina

war; it was not a US national interest. To draw France into the common defense of Europe in the early 1950s, however, it was necessary to support French imperialism on the other side of the globe. US involvement in Indochina started as a bribe to get French cooperation in Europe. The care and feeding of the alliance became a dominant national interest, one that blotted out a careful review of military engagement in a distant swamp.

The clients, of course, feel little obligation to make the national interests of the hegemon their own. France did not come to the aid of the United States in Indochina; de Gaulle, in fact, told the Americans they were quite foolish. Aside from the Soviets, no members of the Warsaw Pact had any interest in Afghanistan. The bipolar world thus produces a tail-wags-dog effect in pushing the hegemon to defend the clients with no reciprocity implied. As such, bipolar systems come under great stress and have finite lifespans. This bothers a Realist not at all, for no alliance lasts forever; alliances change as the national interests of their members change. An alliance is not an end in itself; it is merely one device that, for a certain time, may support the national interest.

The collapse of the bipolar world of the Cold War now permits an un-warping or normalizing of national interests. Laos, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan now receive precisely the attention they merit. We are no longer so solicitous of our European friends, whose national interests may diverge from and even conflict with ours. We are not desperate to hold together NATO and may now tell the Europeans to feel free to do whatever they wish; we may or may not back them up, depending on our national interests involved. Notice how the end of the Cold War brought some very tough talk and inflexible positions in the GATT negotiations to lower trade barriers. There was no longer much reason for the United States to be especially nice to the West Europeans and East Asians on trade; it seemed to be high time for Washington to look out for US economic interests.

Public and Elite Convictions

While not as explicit as ideologies, the culture, values, and convictions of a country also can warp definitions of the national interest. Every country has national values, but the statesman who acts on them without reference to the national interest risks damaging the nation. The long American missionary experience in China convinced many Americans that China was our responsibility to uplift and defend, a conviction that contributed to war with Japan. The cultural and ethnic affinities of many Americans lead them to automatically support their country of origin and to define its national interests as America's. The Israeli and Greek lobbies are quite influential, even though Israeli and Greek interests sometimes diverge from US interests. The Greek lobby, for example, made Washington hesitate for years before officially recognizing Macedonia.

> *"It is easy to declare something to be your national interest, but hard to back out afterward."*

A lack of interest also can be warping. If left to itself, some analysts believe, US mass opinion tends toward isolationism; that is, it sees no important national interests anywhere. Americans are especially indifferent to Latin America, which is seen as having no influence on the United States except as a source of drugs and illegal immigrants. Americans mistakenly but deeply believe there are few US national interests there.

Elites—the top or most influential people—pay far more attention to foreign affairs than the public at large; therefore they are instrumental in defining national interests. The anglophilia of the WASP elite of the Northeast inclined America to enter two world wars to defend Britain. This inclination was not shared by the Midwest, where elites were more Irish and German in origin; hence the purported "isolationism" of the Midwest.

Economic elites may define US holdings abroad as the national interest. United Fruit saw Arbenz's reforms in Guatemala as a threat to their bananas and hence to the United States. ITT saw Allende's takeover of the ITT-owned Chilean telephone network as a threat to US interests. Some critics wonder if the US war against Iraq was a defense of national interests or of oil-industry interests.

Educational elites may awaken or keep alive issues that do not interest the public at large. By inculcating a "world order" view of global politics, educators may convince students that distant problems are vital US interests. As young officials these students may carry idealistic views with them into government agencies and news organizations. Some young State Department officials resigned when they could not get their way in defining Bosnia as a US interest.

Mass Media

Especially important in awakening the broader public to questions of national interest are the mass media. Unfortunately, they do so on a capricious basis little grounded in calm calculation. One noted columnist made the Kurds his pet national interest. Addicted to good visuals and action footage, television goes where the action is and brings back images of maimed or starving children—"If it bleeds it leads." Implicit in the images is the message that atrocities so terrible automatically become a US interest. But the media can be highly selective, giving extensive coverage to horrors in Bosnia but ignoring similar horrors in Peru, Sri Lanka, or Angola. South America would have to sink before

US television would cover it. To have the media set the national interest is to let show-biz take over the guidance of the nation.

Policy Inertia

Once a policy is set, it takes on a life of its own and may continue indefinitely.[20] It is the nature of bureaucracy to keep marching in the direction initially set, which may include definitions of the national interest. The situation may change over time, but not the bureaucracy. Dean Rusk testified that South Vietnam had become a vital US interest because we had sunk so much foreign aid into it. Henry Kissinger later said that even if Vietnam had not initially been a US interest, the commitment of American blood and treasure had put US credibility on the line and thus turned Vietnam into a vital interest. On this basis, you can create national interests anywhere in the world where previously you had none.

The Utility of National Interest

If the definition of the national interest can be warped in so many ways, what good is the concept? It's only as good as your ability to perceive reality accurately, a gift granted to few. For the rest of us, to get an accurate fix on the national interest it would be necessary to travel into the future in a time machine to see how things worked out under a given policy. The real national interest is sometimes knowable only many years after the fact. Second- and third-order effects of a policy are often wildly unpredictable.

In the mid-1960s, Vietnam seemed to most Americans to be a national interest; a decade later few thought it had been a national interest. The victorious communists in Vietnam, having impoverished their country, now seek to enter the capitalistic world market economy. Funny how things work out.

As noted above, the real problem is when reputedly intelligent, well-informed analysts come down on opposing sides in defining the national interest. Whom can the statesman trust? "National interest" is often used on a polemical basis, with each side claiming to have the true picture.

The utility of national interest is not in any formula that can untangle complex issues. Beware of anyone trying to sell you a formula or pat answer; there are none. National interest is useful in training the decisionmaker to ask a series of questions, such as: How are current developments affecting my nation's power? Are hostile forces able to harm my vital interests? Do I have enough power to protect my vital interests? Which of my interests are secondary? How much of my power am I willing to use to defend them? What kind of deals can I get in compromises over secondary interests? The net effect of these questions is to restrain impetuous types from embarking on crusades defined, again, as overseas military actions little related to national interest.

It is Morgenthau's argument that the world would be a much better place if all statesmen would consistently ask such questions, for that would

induce a sense of limits and caution into their strategies that might otherwise be lacking. For those who simply will not keep their national interests defined tightly and close to home but instead are intent on expanding their power (imperialism), Morgenthau's approach is also useful. The statesman is constantly scanning the horizon to detect the growth of hostile power centers, and if they seem likely to impinge on his national interests he formulates strategies to safeguard his interests, each step grounded in adequate power.

The national-interest approach is terribly old-fashioned, and some thinkers argue it has been or must be superseded by "world interest" or "world order" approaches, which go beyond the inherent selfishness of national interest. Empirically, however, one would still find national interest a better predictor of state strategy than world order. In a crisis, when it comes to putting their troops in harm's way, statesmen ask themselves, "What is my nation's interest in all this?" It's still not a bad question.

NOTES

1. The original is still perhaps the best: Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince and the Discourses* (New York: Random House, 1940). For more modern interpretations, see also the explication of 19th-century German scholar Friedrich Meinecke, *Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison d'Etat and Its Place in Modern History*, trans. Douglas Scott (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1957); and of Herbert Butterfield, *The Statecraft of Machiavelli* (New York: Macmillan, 1956).

2. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, 2-2ae, Quest. 40, Art. 1 in Aquinas, *Selected Political Writings*, trans. J. G. Dawson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1948), p. 159.

3. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1976), pp. 80-81, 87-88.

4. Henry Steele Commager and Milton Cantor, eds., *Documents of American History* (10th ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1988), I, 174.

5. For a review of the split in US academic thinking on international relations, see Grayson Kirk, *The Study of International Relations in American Colleges and Universities* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1947).

6. George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy* (expanded ed.; Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 95.

7. Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Within Nations* (6th ed.; New York: Knopf, 1985), p. 31.

8. See, for example, Robert E. Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1953).

9. Morgenthau, *Politics Within Nations*, p. 5.

10. Ibid.

11. Morgenthau, *The Impasse of American Foreign Policy* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 191.

12. Morgenthau, "Another Great Debate: The National Interest of the United States," *American Political Science Review*, 46 (1952), 973.

13. Morgenthau, "Alliances in Theory and Practice," in Arnold Wolfers, ed., *Alliance Policy in the Cold War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1959), p. 191.

14. Morgenthau, *The Restoration of American Politics* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 203.

15. Morgenthau, *A New Foreign Policy for the United States* (New York: Praeger, 1969).

16. In addition to Kennan's brilliant little *American Diplomacy*, see his *Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1961).

17. Reinhold Niebuhr, *Christian Realism and Political Problems* (New York: Scribner's, 1953).

18. Donald E. Nuechterlein, *America Overcommitted: United States National Interests in the 1980s* (Lexington: Univ. of Kentucky Press, 1985), p. 15.

19. For a discussion of the concept of international systems, see Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York: John Wiley, 1957).

20. Henry A. Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy," *Daedalus*, 95 (Spring 1966), 503-29.

Engagement through Deployment: Shaping America's Future Military

ARTHUR H. BARBER III

The collapse of Soviet-led communism changed the simple rules by which US security was planned during the Cold War. While the debate over the new rules proceeds, US forces are moving out of overseas bases and are demobilizing. The remaining forces are conducting temporary overseas deployments more frequently and to more places than ever before, mostly for what is now called "operations other than war" (OOTW). These are the day-to-day military operations of regional deterrence, stability, and humanitarian assistance that have long been critical to US global access and influence. They will continue to be critical to the nation's engagement in world affairs.

The Defense Department Bottom-Up Review established the requirement to fight two near-simultaneous "major regional conflicts" as the primary basis for US military force structure planning. Current reductions are reshaping the military both to meet this mission and to meet stringent budget limits. It is becoming clear that these budget limits are too small to support a future force large enough to fight two wars, yet still modern and ready enough to win them. Without a compelling global threat, the spending is unlikely to increase. America's military is faced with a mismatch between its requirements and its resources.

The United States has not faced more than one major war at a time in 50 years, but over this same period its national interests and influence have depended on a robust capability to conduct multiple OOTW. The nation's future military should be shaped to follow this same broad pattern: joint operations both in global OOTW and in a single regional war. This article will characterize the nature of future joint operations and will describe the capabilities and shape of the military best-suited to conduct them.

The Nature of Future Military Operations

America's national security strategy recognizes that the world's single superpower must remain involved in world affairs, and it commits the nation to such involvement: "Our nation can only address the era's dangers and opportunities if we remain actively engaged in global affairs. We are the world's greatest power, and we have global interests as well as responsibilities."[1]

During the Cold War, the United States built a global security system of alliances, bases, and forces to contain communism. The scope and durability of this system of voluntarily allied sovereign states, and the accompanying pattern of US base access and force deployments overseas, was unprecedented.[2] This historic luxury gave the nation great flexibility in its global use of the military instrument of national power, and the US leadership reached for this instrument frequently. Few of the events in which US forces were committed involved direct communist challenges; most were actions of engagement rather than containment. Only two of them—Korea and Vietnam—were large-scale wars.

The capability to fight and win a single major regional conflict is one of the two pillars of conventional military credibility on which the force structure for a US strategy of engagement must rest. The capability to fight two such conflicts nearly simultaneously, while desirable, should not be given undue weight at the expense of other requirements. When the United States was involved in each of the three regional wars it has fought since 1945, no second conflicts developed in other regions. Yet during two of these (Korea and Vietnam), the United States was facing a global threat with the potential to orchestrate such a challenge. During the third (Desert Storm), North Korea was ready for war but did not seize the opportunity.

The second pillar of credibility for future US force structure should be the capability to engage in what today's joint doctrine calls operations other than war. Such operations are a vital military contribution to the economic and political elements of a superpower's national security. Budgetary limits will not allow the United States to preserve force structure insurance for every possible future requirement while still leaving enough funds for modernization. The US military today must choose between maximizing the capability to refight yesterday's wars with today's forces, and building or preserving the capability to fight tomorrow's wars. The risks and pain of giving up conventional combat force structure today are real and

Captain Arthur H. Barber III is currently assigned to the Navy staff responsible for long-range assessments of Navy programs. He is a 1994 graduate of the US Army War College and a 1973 NROTC graduate of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Captain Barber is a Navy surface warfare officer who has commanded USS *Deyo* (DD 989) and has served on the Joint Staff.

immediate. The risks of reducing capability to conduct OOTW and of short-changing modernization are long-term, but taking them will inevitably put the military out of balance with national strategic requirements.

Current doctrine lists the following specific missions as part of operations other than war:[3]

- peacekeeping/peace enforcement
- counterterrorism
- humanitarian assistance
- counter-drug operations
- foreign internal defense
- sanction enforcement
- noncombatant evacuation operations
- deterrence
- raids and strikes

While such operations may look like wars to the participants, when viewed from a national perspective OOTW are ostensibly low-risk or short-duration affairs in which US forces operate under tight rules for limited aims. These aims include: defense of economic order, preservation of US political influence, support of international order, and unilateral actions supporting US interests. These are the exact aims of America's strategy of engagement, and operations other than war are the daily military means that execute this strategy.

Defense of Economic Order

Since 1945, America has pursued a policy of fostering global economic order and interdependence. It has succeeded, but as a result US prosperity now depends on an international economy that is vulnerable to many types of disruption: closure of an international trade route, restriction of market access to a vital raw material, or acts of piracy and terrorism. Such disruptions have occurred regularly around the globe over the last 50 years. Few were caused by the communist threat, and in fact the removal of bipolar bloc restraints has released many long-suppressed violent tensions around the world. This security environment will require a strong US capability to conduct both multinational and unilateral military action to defend its economic interests. In the words of one writer, "Today's economic openness has been associated with a global American military presence."[4]

Preservation of Political Influence

Because it can accompany diplomatic and economic actions with decisive military power wherever and whenever it chooses, America today has great political influence in shaping the course of international affairs. The presence of US military forces is viewed by nearly all nations in those regions of US vital interest as a welcome stabilizing factor. Without the umbrella of

deployed American forces, other nations might seek to become major military powers, destabilizing their regions and perhaps rivaling US global leadership. This nation's relative influence in the world would be weakened by abdicating its unique military role.

The presence of deployed US forces in turbulent regions extends US political influence by deterring those who might take actions unfavorable to US interests. Deterrence is the form of OOTW that links these operations to war; where it fails, war results. It is most likely to fail when the military forces behind it are not credible or visible. This occurs when the group being deterred believes that these forces will not be used, cannot remain engaged, or cannot exact an intolerable price in combat. Another writer has observed that "for future US conventional forces to deter, they must maintain some form of visibility in order to be perceived as credible and capable."[5] Temporary deployments rather than permanent basing are the future trend for US forces in the vital national missions of deterrence and preservation of influence.

Support of International Order

The number of sovereign political entities in the world appears to have no limit, but the number able to sustain themselves is harshly finite. As a result of this dichotomy, the United Nations will probably receive an increasing number of calls for humanitarian rescues or for peacekeeping in wars of survival. While the United Nations has shown the inclination to become more involved in such operations, it does not have an independent ability to execute them. United Nations operations to maintain international order will probably remain at a high level. Even if the United States declines to support these with combat forces, most UN operations will continue to involve some form of US military logistics, communications, or surveillance support.

Today's trend away from permanent alliances toward ad-hoc coalitions for major military operations increases the importance of broad multinational cooperation in US strategy. Whether for a regional war in defense of vital national interests, or for UN operations, future US forces will often need to integrate quickly with forces of other nations. The United States can best prepare for future international operations by deploying routinely for multinational exercises with other nations. Such exercises familiarize others with US doctrine while familiarizing our forces with their capabilities and equipment.

Defense of National Interests

The nation's warfighting forces will remain focused on the arc of vital national interests which extends from East Asia through the Persian Gulf to Western Europe. There are many points outside this arc, however, where America could have to use smaller military forces to protect national vulnerabilities. America's economic interests and its citizens continue to spread to

new regions of emerging opportunity, where they are highly vulnerable targets for those seeking leverage to influence the superpower's policies. The military capability to conduct OOTW anywhere in the world will remain an important national insurance policy for US citizens and interests abroad.

Where an operation involves strictly US interests, the allies of the Cold War will not necessarily follow America's lead. When they do not, the US bases or forces in these nations may not be accessible. Even if allies support the operation it may occur in an area distant from them, or where the existing infrastructure is of limited use. Future US military forces must maintain their capability to conduct OOTW with minimal dependence on overseas infrastructure.

Joint Force Capabilities

Regardless of the nature of the operation in which they are used, US military forces must be shaped and employed so that they can control the operation in four dimensions:

- *time*: the ability to act more quickly and endure longer than the adversary
- *reach*: the ability to overcome the distance from their bases
- *military capability*: the ability to accomplish the mission and neutralize any resistance
- *political agility*: the ability to maintain superiority in use of local and international politics for military advantage

Each of these dimensions affects the type of future joint force that the United States should field. The shape of this future military will depend heavily on the balance between warfighting and OOTW capabilities. The force and systems that are best-suited for OOTW are not necessarily the most effective or economic ones for warfighting. Both types are needed, but current planning gives too little attention to the unique requirements for OOTW. As the total force becomes smaller, the specific force requirements must be clearly identified and preserved. The processes for selecting which new capabilities to field and which existing ones to retain must also explicitly consider the unique missions and requirements of OOTW.

Dominating the dimension of *time* requires forces capable of a speedy response, or a sustained one, or both. Fast-breaking OOTW, such as counterterrorist actions or assistance to endangered US citizens, require forces that can apply a decisive capability promptly. Even for those operations where coalition action is appropriate, an initial US stabilizing response is likely to be required until a coalition force can be formed and fielded. To achieve time dominance, the United States will need a mix of ready, air-deployable units plus forces that are routinely deployed at sea near potential crisis scenes. The sea-based forces provide capabilities that are not air

deployable, support air-deployed forces, and provide an alternative if air base access is denied.

Other forms of OOTW—peacekeeping, postwar stability operations, deterrence, and humanitarian relief—may require US forces capable of remaining engaged indefinitely. When such a requirement develops in a place where US forces are not permanently based, this endurance will require extended forward deployments. The active US forces that are initially deployed must be backed up by a pool of other active units to serve as their rotation base. This pool must be large enough to provide the required endurance without an unbearable strain on people or equipment.

US forces can be effective militarily only if they have the *reach* to apply the needed capability at the place and time it is required. As former President Bush noted, "No amount of political change will alter the geographic fact that we are separated from many of our most important allies and interests by thousands of miles of water."[6] Reach depends on the location of the operation compared to the location of accessible supporting bases (afloat or ashore). American forces in OOTW will often be operating at a great distance from their supporting land bases; the reach capability to offset this is expensive but essential. The future combat and logistic reach of US forces must not become unduly constrained by dependence on access to foreign bases.

Military forces engage in most types of OOTW as much for political effect as they do to achieve a specific military objective. The success of the United States in OOTW depends on having forces that are properly shaped and employed in both the political and the military dimensions. Future forces must be *politically agile* in two forms of political operation: domestic and international.

The agility of US forces in the domestic political arena depends on the public's perception of mission cost versus mission importance. Operations that are perceived to have the risk of high human or dollar costs are unlikely to be sustainable unless the US public sees vital national interests immediately at stake. Without public and congressional support, mobilized reserve forces are unlikely to be available to help conduct an OOTW. The forces committed to many types of potentially risky OOTW will require low visibility to media, low vulnerability to casualties, and low dependence on reserve-component support. This form of agility is best provided by active-duty forces at sea and in the air, rather than forces on the ground within reach of protagonists and media.

International political agility in an operation depends on two factors: the depth of US commitment and the degree to which other nations participate. As the US increases its visibility and investment of prestige in an operation, its agility to change policy becomes more limited. Operations that achieve US objectives through multinational action or action in the air and sea offer more agility and less risk exposure than unilateral US actions or

those involving land operations. International agility depends on having a full range of military capabilities available, to permit choice of the one best-suited to complement other nations' contributions.

Shaping the Joint Force

The Bottom-Up Review defined a large force structure requirement for the strategy of engagement. The US defense budget has not provided enough funds to simultaneously support and modernize this force. Estimates of the shortfall range from $20 billion per year upward, primarily in modernization accounts and in support of the military's hard-to-shrink infrastructure.[7] This mismatch between requirements and resources will soon force further reductions in the size of America's military. The core capability of a modern force capable of decisive success in multiple global OOTW and a single major short-warning conflict must be identified and retained in this process.

The Bottom-Up Review identified other smaller force structure options, based on the number and time spacing of the major regional conflicts that each could cover. This report said that the ability of its preferred force to conduct OOTW was good.[8] The types of force reductions in its smaller options clearly demonstrated, however, that these options took proportional decreases in both warfighting and OOTW capabilities. This is not the best approach to shaping a smaller military force to support the national strategy. The capability for OOTW should not be slighted to support forces for fighting wars that this capability might prevent.

The nation's future military must be shaped to support OOTW as a primary mission, and two new principles should determine the size and type of the force structure maintained for this mission. First, the structure must be large enough to sustain reasonably likely levels of OOTW without crippling the initial-response force for a major war. Second, the structure must include those types and numbers of forces that economically deliver the mix of rapid response, reach, capability, and political agility appropriate to each OOTW mission. America does not need two separate military forces, one for war and the other for OOTW. Most of the *types* of forces needed for global OOTW will also be needed as part of the nation's warfighting force in a major regional conflict. The *size* of the active-component structure for each type of force, however, should be determined by integrating the requirements for rapid-response warfighting missions with the often larger day-to-day requirements for sustaining endurance in global OOTW.

Shaping for Endurance

Endurance is an expensive quality in OOTW. The recent major shift of US forces out of permanent overseas bases means that endurance will increasingly depend on having a pool of active units as a rotation base for temporary deployments. The smaller the pool compared to the deployment requirements,

> *"America does not need two separate military forces, one for war and the other for operations other than war."*

the longer each unit must stay away from its home base. The size of the pool required to keep a single unit on a rotational forward-deployment commitment depends on three considerations:

- PERSTEMPO (Personnel Tempo of Operations) limits
- time required for transit to and from the deployed location
- time required for training and maintenance between deployments

Based on these considerations, the support pool can range from just one active unit of a particular type to support a commitment, to as many as five or more. There is tremendous leverage in knowing where the threat will develop and permanently basing units there, but this solution costs flexibility and foreign exchange, both in short supply. Without such basing, any long-term deployment commitment can tie down a substantial force. This is an important factor to remember in matching future OOTW commitments to resources.

The military's people pay a high price in deployment time if the force is too small for its commitments. America's Navy learned this price in the late 1970s, when it experienced a sudden surge in commitments for ship deployments to the Indian Ocean while its force structure was at a post-Vietnam low. The resulting long, closely spaced deployments had catastrophic effects on the retention and quality of its force. Since then, the Navy has developed a strict "PERSTEMPO" policy[9] that is accepted by Congress as a valid factor in planning peacetime force structure. The PERSTEMPO policy focuses on *people* by establishing the concept of a "personnel tempo of operations" limit on their time away from home. It guarantees people in deployable units that they will not be deployed (in peacetime) for periods longer than six months, and that their units will on average spend at least half their time at their home station despite deployments and interdeployment training.

All services today are facing the dilemma of the 1970's Navy: steady or growing commitments for certain types of units, with a shrinking active-duty force as a rotation pool. There have been initiatives to use reserve component forces to augment the rotation pool. This has a high cost in domestic political agility, so the services have generally limited usage to individual volunteers and to small units on their annual training periods. No other service has yet articulated and enforced a formal policy with hard

quantitative limits similar to the Navy's PERSTEMPO. Until they do, the inevitable decline in retention of skilled and experienced personnel—the hidden cost of endurance in OOTW—will quietly hollow every capability of our military forces.

Shaping for the Missions

When the United States must fight a major war the nation's decisive capability is land combat forces, deployed primarily through naval power. When the mission is OOTW, the decisive capability depends as much on the political situation as the military one. It is important that the United States have a broad array of military capabilities from which to shape the best response in either instance. Where a firm statement of US commitment is required, deployment of land-based combat units is often the best answer if time permits and local access is available. For missions requiring more agility or less power, special operations forces (SOF) and land-based support units such as military police, logistical, medical, and engineer units can be deployed alone. Finally, naval forces and strategic air forces can provide a more politically agile and speedy capability than land-based combat forces, but with more combat power than SOF.

The Army today is relatively well structured to deploy decisive power to war. This Army relies heavily on its reserve components to provide combat service and support forces, based on the assumption that these forces will be used only when combat units are deployed for a major war. The day-to-day missions of the Army today, however, are OOTW. Their demands are pushing people in some types of active-duty SOF and support units—few of which remain—to very high PERSTEMPO levels. This will exact an inevitable price in personnel retention and readiness. There is little room for absorbing more cuts or more deployments in these portions of the Army. The combat forces of the Army—and their supporting Air Force tactical fighters—are under proportionally less demand for OOTW. Even if cut by an amount that would reflect reduction to single-war capability, they would be more than adequate in size to also support most OOTW tasking.

The traditional missions of US naval forces in peacetime are in fact OOTW: deterrence, sanction enforcement, counterdrug operations, and immediate availability for raids, strikes, and other operations. The core elements of naval forces, ranging from aircraft carriers to amphibious groups to Tomahawk-firing warships, can deliver both combat power and endurance in most of the missions of OOTW in the littoral areas of the world. Naval forces have been called upon for OOTW about twice as frequently since 1945 as land-based forces (air and ground),[10] more than 200 times through 1990.[11] The political agility and rapid in-theater availability of naval forces, as much as their military capability, have influenced decisions to use them so frequently. It is not cheap to maintain a naval force with the balance and size to sustain

this kind of global flexibility, but cheapness is relative: the most expensive force for a given mission is the one that does not have the flexibility or availability to be used when force is needed.

Naval forces that are continuously present in the littoral areas of a theater generally provide a stronger signal of deterrence than air or ground forces that are not deployed there. Beyond the littoral, or working with naval forces within it, long-range Air Force aircraft also can meet some of the surveillance and strike missions of OOTW. Both types of forces usually can be maneuvered to be as obtrusive as the situation in a crisis demands. And neither is as dependent for its success or endurance on reserve mobilization as the Army. Naval forces need and use virtually the same support forces in peacetime operations as in war, while the Air Force generally needs only readily available individual volunteers from its reserve components.

As a consequence of the world situation and America's policy of active engagement, forces of all the services are experiencing unprecedented levels of demand for OOTW today. Navy ships, Marine Expeditionary Units, Air Force surveillance and airlift units, and Army SOF, combat service support, and some light infantry forces have been deployed operationally in far more places and greater numbers than envisioned when the Bottom-Up Review was released. All these constitute the joint package of forces upon which America will continue to rely for the diverse OOTW missions of global engagement. The requirements for OOTW deployments are a principal factor determining the size and composition of these forces. If they are not large enough to meet the demands of OOTW without exhaustion, engagement will become an infeasible strategy.

Like the forces for warfighting, the forces for the future missions of OOTW will be shaped from every service. But the balance between the services, between the active and reserve components, and between the capabilities within each service often will be quite different from the balance for warfighting. As America's military becomes smaller, shaping it to maintain the balance for both of these vital missions will require a clear understanding and recognition of all the requirements it must meet.

Conclusion

America has adopted a strategy of engagement that is both appropriate and essential to its long-term security. The process of shaping the smaller joint force to execute this strategy in the future must fully implement what former Secretary of Defense Aspin recognized:

> While deterring and defeating major regional aggression will be the most demanding requirement of the new defense strategy, our emphasis on engagement, prevention, and partnership means that, in this new era, US military forces are more likely to be involved in operations short of declared or intense warfare."[12]

Today's military force structure, built primarily for warfighting, is being used heavily every day for OOTW. Such operations are the daily price of maintaining US engagement and influence. Based on their inherent characteristics and on current experience, Army active-duty support forces, certain Air Force aircraft units, and many types of Navy, Marine, and SOF forces provide the capabilities the US needs and deploys most frequently to conduct OOTW. These forces must remain large enough in America's future military to sustain this critical type of support.

The nation's strategy of engagement rests on two equal military pillars: the capability to conduct diverse global operations other than war, and the capability to deploy to a single major regional war and win. The military of the future must maintain a balance in both capabilities, while still sustaining a foundation of readiness and modernization. A smaller US military can be shaped which does this, if the reductions are focused on the force structure supporting the lower-priority capability for a second major war. America's joint military must demonstrate that it is smart enough to recognize the strategic needs of the future and joint enough to protect the forces that best meet them.

NOTES

1. Bill Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington: The White House, July 1994), ii.

2. Robert E. Harkavy, *Bases Abroad: The Global Foreign Military Presence* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1989), p. 293.

3. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Pub 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington: 9 September 1993), ch. 5.

4. Robert J. Art, "A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy After the Cold War," *International Security*, 15 (Spring 1991), 40.

5. Robert P. Haffa, Jr. "The Future of Conventional Deterrence," in *Conventional Forces and the Future of Deterrence*, ed. Gary L. Guertner and Robert P. Haffa, Jr. (Carlisle, Pa.: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), p. 15.

6. George Bush, "Remarks at the Aspen Institute Symposium, August 2, 1990," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 6 August 1990, pp. 1192-93.

7. Dov S. Zakheim and Jeffrey M. Ranney, "Matching Defense Strategies to Resources: Challenges for the Clinton Administration," *International Security*, 18 (Summer 1993), 51-77. See also Andrew F. Krepinevich, *The Bottom-Up Review: An Assessment* (Washington: Defense Budget Project, February 1994).

8. Les Aspin, *Report on the Bottom-Up Review* (Washington: Department of Defense, October 1993), sect. IV.

9. US Chief of Naval Operations, *Personnel Tempo of Operations*, OPNAV Instruction 3000.13A (Washington: US Department of the Navy, 21 December 1990).

10. Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1978), pp. 38-39. Also Philip D. Zelikow, "Force Without War 1975-82," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 7 (March 1984), 29-54.

11. Adam B. Siegel, *Use of Naval Forces in the Post-War Era*, CRM 90-246 (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analysis, February 1991), pp. 12-13.

12. Aspin, *Report on the Bottom-Up Review*, p. 8.

Why the Army and the Marine Corps Should Be Friends

ALLAN R. MILLETT

S oldiers and Marines are cowmen and sheepherders. Remember the cowmen and the sheepherders of the Old West? They battled one another with unbridled contempt and ferocity over the grasslands of the open range, strewing the bodies of their animals and drovers everywhere. In the meantime, the banks, the farmers, the railroads, and the Plains winters put the independent cowmen and sheepherders out of business, even though everyone knew that Americans wanted both beef and wool. The US Army and US Marine Corps should learn that your enemies are not necessarily your enemies when you get into a turf fight.

To address the current issues of roles, missions, and budgets for a strategic future that offers little more than regional conventional wars and lesser interventions, the Army and Marine Corps should call a truce, and they should form an alliance that stresses the complementary capabilities of the two services and their partnership in joint operations. To do so will require a retrograde movement down memory lane and some new thinking about the relations of the two services during the course of the 20th century. The Chief of Staff and the Commandant already have formed an effective association, but they should have the full support of the officer corps of both services. We have met the enemy, and it is not us—or you.

Why Real Soldiers Do Not Like Jarheads

The officer corps of the US Army sometimes fears that the Army exists only to make the Marine Corps look better to the public and Congress. They believe, as Brigadier General Frank A. Armstrong, Jr., said in a speech

in 1945, that the Marine Corps "is a small, bitched-up army talking Navy lingo. We are going to put those Marines in the regular Army and make efficient soldiers out of them." General Armstrong could be ignored—perhaps—but General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower thought the same thing. So did General of the Army George C. Marshall, and he, too, thought the Marine Corps should just fade away.

Why did these distinguished officers regard the Marine Corps with fear and loathing? The tension between the Army and Marine Corps started in the War with Spain, flamed in the Boxer Rebellion and Philippine Insurrection, and exploded in World War I. While Major General William R. Shafter's Eighth Corps fought, sickened, grumbled, and died in the trenches at Santiago de Cuba, a small Marine battalion waged a neat little campaign at Guantanamo Bay—reported brilliantly by Stephen Crane—and got off the island in time for a victory parade in Washington, D.C. The soldiers came home to quarantine camps. The Marines who fought for the legation quarter in Peking in 1900 also got plenty of ink—and later a Charlton Heston movie. No one was gentle with the kind folks of Samar after the Balangiga Massacre (1901), but the punitive campaign cost General Jacob H. Smith, USA, his career, not Marine Colonel L. W. T. Waller. When the State Department announced it wanted a legation guard in Peking, it chose Marines. The Army received the less glamorous task of keeping the transportation routes open from Tientsin. In the Philippines the soldiers moved on to fight the Moros while the Marines paraded about the new naval stations at Subic Bay and Cavite.

In World War I the senior officers of the American Expeditionary Forces, including General John J. Pershing, opposed the formation of the 4th Brigade (Marines) of the 2d Division and resisted additional plans to form an all-Marine division in 1918. When the four most experienced divisions of the AEF went into serious action in May 1918, the American press found high drama in the 4th Brigade's battle for Belleau Wood and gave pallid coverage to the stiff fights by the Army at Cantigny, Vaux, Chateau-Thierry, Seicheprey, and the south bank of the Marne. For the rest of the war General Headquarters AEF tried to minimize the role of the Marine brigade, regarded as publicity-crazed. Rela-

Dr. Allan R. Millett (Colonel, US Marine Corps Reserve) is the General Raymond E. Mason, Jr., Professor of Military History at The Ohio State University, where he is also Director of the Program in International Security and Military Affairs, and Associate Director of the Mershon Center. He is a graduate of DePauw University, received his M.A. and Ph.D. degrees at Ohio State, and has taught at Ohio State since 1969. Dr. Millett has held various command and staff assignments with the US Marine Corps Reserve and has periodically served as an adjunct faculty member of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Among his eight books is the acclaimed *Semper Fidelis: The History of the U.S. Marine Corps* (Macmillan, 1980; rev. 1991); his most recent work is *In Many a Strife: General Gerald C. Thomas and the U.S. Marine Corps, 1917-1956* (Naval Institute Press, 1993).

tions did not improve in peacetime, despite the gallant efforts of Major General James G. Harbord, USA, who had commanded the Marine brigade at Belleau Wood. During the Hoover Administration the War Department sent out at least one proposal to sink the Marine Corps as an economy move. The move died in Congress, again proving that Marines had too much influence on the Hill.

If Army-Marine relations had taken on a burned odor by 1941, they became absolutely noxious in World War II. The War Department, including General Marshall, resented FDR's close ties to the Corps, cemented by his son James, a Marine reserve officer, and his personal friendship with Commandant Thomas Holcomb. The Army did not want to share its scarce materiel with the Marines in the mobilization period, but FDR ruled otherwise. It did like having Marine staffs running the two ad hoc joint amphibious corps on both coasts, formed in 1941. The Army resented the fact that the Marine Corps took only volunteers in 1941 and 1942 when it was coping with draftees. The press again seemed prejudiced toward Marines and insensitive to Army performance in the South Pacific, 1942-1943. Guadalcanal became famous, but who cared about New Guinea except the MacArthur idolaters? Everyone knew the 3d Marine Division assaulted Bougainville and the 1st Marine Division took most of New Britain island, but what of the Army divisions that finished both conquests?

The focal point of Army-Marine hostility—for such it was—in the Pacific war became Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith, US Marine Corps, first commander of V Amphibious Corps and then Fleet Marine Force Pacific. A Marine partisan of terrible temper, Holland Smith treated almost everyone the same—including Marine officers—and that was not gently. He put himself at odds early with Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson, Jr. , USA, roughly his Army counterpart in the central Pacific theater. Holland Smith—so the Army thought—showed a wretched degree of incompetence and intolerance, which he inflicted upon Army units in operations in the Gilberts and Marshalls. He then relieved Major General Ralph C. Smith, USA, a very nice man and CG of the 27th Infantry Division, during the Saipan campaign. Always the cavalryman, Richardson rode to the rescue, but the relief stuck, and Smith vs. Smith boiled all the way to Washington for General Marshall, Commandant Holcomb, and Admiral Ernest J. King to adjudicate. The Army laid down the law: no more Army troops would serve under Holland M. Smith. The corollary became: no Marine general should or could command a corps or field army.

In the locust years of 1945-1950 the Army argued that (1) no future major war would require amphibious landings or that the nuclear threat made such ventures suicidal, a glowing Gallipoli; and (2) the Army could make any necessary amphibious landings since it had done so many times not only in the Pacific, but in the European theater as well. Although the Marines had made some minor doctrinal and equipment contributions, they no longer

"In Korea and Vietnam, the US Army found the Marines to be reluctant allies and uncharitable comrades."

monopolized expertise in the amphibious specialty. Whatever Marines thought they could do, good old infantrymen, combat engineers, and assault amphibious transportation battalions could do as well or better. General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chief of Staff and then Chairman, JCS, went on the record: the United States did not need even one division prepared for amphibious assaults. But once again the Marines struck back through Congress and arranged for their preferred roles and missions to be written into the National Security Act of 1947, an act of rank treason toward poor old Captain Harry S. Truman, the Commander in Chief. The President was right when he said the Marines and Russians had similar propaganda machines.

When hard-pressed by circumstances beyond its control to fight in Korea and Vietnam, the US Army found the Marines to be reluctant allies and uncharitable comrades. The Marines, as always, got too much unearned publicity. They saved the Pusan perimeter, seized Inchon, recaptured Seoul, and fought their way out of the Chosin reservoir area. The 1st Marine Division then became a focal point of criticism of 8th Army's conduct of the campaign of 1951. In Vietnam the Marines got to fight their war in the I Corps area and made too much of their hard service along the DMZ. In both wars the Marines did not want to share their tactical aviation for close air support, and their conduct of helicopter operations showed more hubris than skill. Marine generals like Victor H. Krulak made life miserable for General William C. Westmoreland because of their obsession with pacification and working with the Vietnamese military and paramilitary forces.

In both wars the Marines always seemed to require more logistical support from the Army: transportation, engineering equipment and supplies, communications equipment, and ordnance. They always went into battle without enough artillery and tanks. They took what appeared to be excessive casualties because of their aggressiveness and poor use of supporting arms. They seemed to measure success by their own dead, not the enemy's. A little Army joke took root in Vietnam: Why are Marines like bananas? Answer: they grow green, turn yellow, and die in bunches. Marine Corps field staffs plan with all the care and foresight of teenagers, and they expect instant miracles from a tactical approach that resembles a rugby scrum. Marine

battalions go into battle with too many flags (where's the next Suribachi?), cameras, and bodybags. In the operations large and small that followed in the 1980s and 1990s, soldiers thought they saw the same behavior in Lebanon, Grenada, Panama, and the Gulf War. Army officers knew that Marines studied maneuver warfare, talked the nuances of AirLand Battle, and even started to act like professionals in the fields of logistics and intelligence, but might it only be the Marine version of Russian deception operations?

Army officers—and I base my impression on 25 years of teaching them—often believe that the Marine Corps conducts a shameless guerrilla war upon the Army in Congress and extracts every additional budget increment from funds that should rightfully go to the Army. They resent the fact that the Douglas-Mansfield Act of 1952 mandates a Fleet Marine Force of three divisions and three aircraft wings. They wait each recurring cycle of defense reorganization as an opportunity to check Marine access to influential civilians in the executive branch and Congress. They do not like the current practice of rotating the job of Commander-in-Chief Central Command between the Army and the Marine Corps. (How can a Marine command a field army if he is not an honor graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College?) The generations of Army officers pass with the years, but the rap on the Marine Corps lives on. Why do the myths persist? In part, they exist because they are true. But whatever the unhappiness of the past, the Jarheads' sins are exaggerated and invariably overlook the fact that the Marine Corps has a good case against the US Army.

Why Real Marines Do Not Like Doggies

All real Marines know that the US Army would rather plan than fight and that when it comes to slaughter, it stays away from water. The Army has never seen an amphibious operation it likes—or at least can conduct with any degree of skill and ardor. Yet the Army is perfectly willing to throw its soldiers out of perfectly good airplanes or ferry them into hot LZs in mini-helicopters that cannot carry enough troops to give the grunts on the ground a fighting chance. The Army officer corps talks as if it reveres Patton and the panzer generals, but the soul of the Army is artillery-red and thrills only as the barrels of massed howitzers begin to glow. The perfect campaign is one that can be fought with a few FIST teams and battalions of mobile artillery. Marines think the Army really would like to fight a Verdun without the infantry.

Marines believe that the Army is paranoid and disingenuous in its criticism of Marine operations. Since late in the 19th century Marine officers have attended Army branch, intermediate, and senior schools, and they often learn their trade from Army manuals, from Army instructors, using Army-developed weapons and equipment. The only distinctive operational difference is the amphibious mission, which the Army never wanted and said so in writing

"All real Marines know that the US Army would rather plan than fight."

as early as 1927 in a joint action manual adopted by the Army and Navy. The Army knows how to criticize amphibious assaults whenever the Marines plan and execute them, but not its own landings. The Army has been fortunate that it had a few fine soldiers who could save such bungled operations as the landings at Salerno, Anzio, and Omaha Beach. The Army lost more dead at Omaha Beach in one day than the Marines lost on Tarawa in three.

Marines are suspicious that Army generals, under whom they have often served, are much too careless with Marines' lives. This suspicion started in World War I when General Harbord forgot about artillery and reconnaissance at Belleau Wood. The battle of Soissons and the Meuse-Argonne campaign simply reinforced this impression. (Just whose idea was it to attack across the Meuse on the morning of Armistice Day?) It continued in World War II. If Douglas MacArthur loved the 1st Marine Division, it did not reciprocate his admiration then or in Korea, and Marines pitied the soldiers who fought and died for the greater glory of the American Caesar. Holland Smith had no monopoly of disdain for the 27th Infantry Division, but Marines remember all the other Army divisions with whom they worked well: the Americal and 25th Infantry Divisions on Guadalcanal, the 37th Infantry Division on Bougainville, the 77th Infantry Division on Guam, the 81st Infantry Division on Peleliu, the whole XXIV Corps on Okinawa (except, again, the 27th Infantry Division). The aviation squadrons of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing relished the opportunity to provide close air support for the US 6th and 8th Armies in the Philippines. The biggest residual unhappiness left from World War II, in fact, has nothing to do with Smith vs. Smith, but the refusal of Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr., USA, to envelop the Naha-Shuri Castle-Yonabaru line on Okinawa. With the veteran 2d Marine Division available and willing to conduct an amphibious envelopment of the Japanese 32d Army, Buckner decided instead to plunge ahead in great AEF fashion and sent thousands of Marines and soldiers to their deaths, including his own.

If Major General Edward M. Almond had a difficult time in Korea as the X Corps commander, he had Buckner in part to blame for his tense relations with the 1st Marine Division. The fact that he was MacArthur's corps commander of choice did not help either. But the real difficulty was

that MacArthur and the rest of the Army would not accept Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., USMC, a star performer in the field since Belleau Wood, as the X Corps commander. Many Marine officers knew that Holland M. Smith was not a great corps commander and that he depended upon Brigadier General Graves B. "Bobby" Erskine to make things work. But what about the splendid World War II performance of Lieutenant General Roy S. Geiger, Jr., USMC, who proved in four campaigns that he could command anything that flew, walked, and shot, regardless of uniform? Lem Shepherd and Roy Geiger were certainly better than many of their Army counterparts in both wars.

In Vietnam and the Gulf War, Marine officers believed they saw the same callous Army generalship at work again and the same unfair criticism of Marine operations. "Search and destroy" and "body count" were created at MACV, not at the headquarters of the III Marine Amphibious Force. Holding Khe Sanh was not a Marine idea, but a requirement from General Westmoreland. The bloody operations along the DMZ in 1967 and 1968 came with Operation Dye Marker, the creation of the McNamara Line, a concept from a former Air Force officer who confused the PAVN with Algerian guerrillas. And whose brilliant idea was it to introduce the M-16 in the middle of a shooting war so the troops could get battlefield on-the-job training on rifle cleaning and disassembly? And if the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing did not fly enough close air support missions for *anyone* in South Vietnam, please check with the wizards of 7th Air Force and Washington who thought that air interdiction wins wars. As for the Gulf War, the I Marine Expeditionary Force accepted the grim task of fixing the Iraqi army in Kuwait while the 3d US Army (Patton lives!) drove to glory, only to be criticized by CINCCENTCOM because it did too good a job. (Don't let the Mother of All Briefings fool you about feelings!) Accounts of the war written by Army officers who should know better hardly admit that I MEF was in-theater, had tanks and heavy guns, and supported itself.

Marines believe that the Army refuses to acknowledge that it owes anything to Marine innovation. Although Army officers will concede that individual Marine officers with whom they've served can be quite clever and bold, they cannot accept the fact that the US Army has borrowed concepts from the Marine Corps, just as the Marine Corps has borrowed concepts (and much more) from the Army. For example, the Marine Corps first broke the infantry squad into fire teams in World War II. It championed the amphibian tractor, which worked well in European river crossings, if not landings. The Marine Corps developed doctrine for effective close air support; the problem for the Army is getting the Air Force to accept the doctrine. The Marine Corps made the first institutional commitment to make the helicopter an instrument of tactical mobility. The first tests of this experiment came in Korea in 1951 by Marines. It is now pioneering in tilt-rotor development with the V-22A

"Osprey." The Army even moved toward Marine concepts of recruit training and made its trainers wear the old "Smokey the Bear" campaign hat. It is not the Marine Corps' fault that the Army cannot apply the gentle personal touch known to the graduates of Parris Island.

The Army continues to grouse about Marine Corps political influence in Washington, but it badly exaggerates Marine clout. For example, Presidents and cabinet officers since FDR have been more pro-Army than anything else. The real problem is that they tend to be anti-military. The Army complains because George Shultz, Jim Baker, Don Regan, John Warner, John Chaffee, John Glenn, Bud McFarlane, Paul Douglas, Mike Mansfield, George Smathers, and many others are former Marines. What is one to make of the fact that former Army officers and enlisted men who held high places include Harry S. Truman, Louis Johnson, George C. Marshall, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Maxwell D. Taylor, Alexander Haig, Ronald Reagan, Caspar Weinberger, Henry Kissinger, James Wadsworth, Sonny Montgomery, Robert Dole, and many other distinguished members of Congress? The answer is quite simple: these men retain some service fondness, but their job descriptions do not allow them to advocate service positions. Was Les Aspin a special friend of the Army, Ron Dellums a great champion of the Marine Corps? Marines believe the key to effective lobbying is with members of Congress who have no military experience (or bias) at all, regardless of party affiliation.

Marines resent the fact that the Army is jealous of Marine aviation. The Marine Corps has paid a high price to preserve a fully capable fixed wing and helicopter force of around 1000 aircraft. This price is not paid just in dollars, but in personnel training and assignments, constant tension with the Navy's aviation leadership, constant conflict with Marine traditionalists who do not like fat aviation technicians and pilots who don't want to shoot rifles, and in dealing with an Air Force which will hardly concede any expertise to naval aviation, yet wants to control it in every operation, large or small. As long ago as the 1920s Marine planners saw that tactical aviation and ground forces could be integrated in combat to enhance each other's capabilities. Marines wonder why the Corps should be punished for discovering what is now a truism of modern warfare. The Marine Corps managed to hold on to its aviation force in the reorganization battles of the early Cold War, and it knows that the Army wishes it had, too.

In truth, there is much about the modern Army that Marines do not understand. One is the stress of mobilization and expansion. It is one thing to create six divisions for the Fleet Marine Force from two small brigades; it is quite another to field 89 divisions on an active-duty division base of 11 divisions. In 1941 the Army had about 130,000 officers with *any* peacetime training to lead a wartime Army (including the USAAF) of more than 11 million. The Marine Corps has a Select Reserve smaller than the active-duty force; the Army's is larger. The Marine Corps does not and never will deal

with a reserve component with the political influence of the Army National Guard. The number of Marine Reserve generals cannot even make up a squad, and the most influential of them in Congress is a staff director, not a Congressman. Marines do not fully appreciate how much of the Army is dedicated to administrative and logistical functions, some of which helps the Marine Corps—or used to. They also do not fully understand the feudal relationships between Army senior generals. In the Marine Corps the Commandant is the Pope, but in the Army the Chief of Staff is the king only by the grace of the nobles. Marines do not understand the Army fixation with planning and documentation. They do not appreciate that the Army's 19th-century icon is Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, while the favorite Marine general of the era is Stonewall Jackson. Marines seize the hour, and soldiers seize the week. The heart of the matter is that one service has always been seven to ten times larger than the other.

Marines actually know a great deal about the Army from joint service, schooling, and reading. They wish the Army knew more about the Marine Corps because almost every day they see Army officers saying things that clearly show that they haven't a clue about how the Fleet Marine Force is organized and does business. Instead they believe all the Army has to offer is tired Marine Corps jokes.

Why the Marine Corps and the Army Should Be Friends

Like the cattlemen and the sheepherders, the Army and the Marine corps have much more in common—win or lose—than they are ready to admit. The good health of both services depends upon a case for their mutual existence that cannot be made in Washington and at the headquarters of the unified and specified commands until the Army and the Marine corps band together *at every level*. Our shared problem at the end of the Cold War is much like that at the end of World War II. We are faced with a perceived strategic environment in which major war is unthinkable and conventional military forces in large numbers are too costly. Even though nuclear weapons are no longer the lethal currency of the hour, we are again being told that men with rifles on the ground, supported by tactical aviation and supporting arms, are as irrelevant as the knights of old. Advanced electronics, airframes and seaframes, and precision-guided munitions will do the job. The United Nations can provide the global police force.

Perhaps, but we have heard this siren's song through the ages, and it never quite works that way. The Army and the Marine Corps share a common insight about the nature of war, and since it tends to be the minority opinion, it needs constant and articulate expression. War is the collective expression of the will of people to fight for something they hold dear and for which they are willing to die. Who holds those values, what those values are, and just how much those values will call forth in sacrifice may vary with time, place, and people. Clearly,

the Iraqis are not the Somalis or the Serbians. Destroying places and people either with nuclear weapons or precision-guided munitions means nothing unless it destroys the enemy's will to wage war.

Most 20th-century American political leaders know nothing about the relationship of violence and politics, unless they have been big city mayors or represent a minority urban constituency. Some governors, but not many, might qualify. The average American politician, if faced with an inescapable decision on war and peace, would rather throw dollars than lives at the problem. It was no accident that the United States spent the most money and lost the fewest lives in World War II. Yet there are plenty of crises in which military force is the unavoidable option and in which we must be prepared to lose lives and to do so over an extended period of time. That was not the case in the Gulf War, but it was certainly the case in Korea, Vietnam, Central America, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa. The number of lives lost may not be large in absolute terms, but they may be proportionately large when compared with the number of people deployed. Such is a characteristic of counterinsurgency and peacekeeping operations. Who is ready to teach this lesson to American politicians if not the Army and the Marine Corps?

Another lesson that our political leadership needs to hear is that the American public needs constant reassurance and nurturing when it comes to matters military. The Army and the Marine Corps cannot dodge this problem in recruiting or any other phase of public relations by claiming that they are really only a place where young men and women learn technical skills without hazard, a sort of global technical institute in which the students only happen to wear uniforms. The Air Force and the Navy, at least in recent memory, expose only career-committed officers who fly to the threat of death on a routine basis. Even if every service death is tragic, it is somehow less traumatic if the deceased is a 30-year old captain, not a 20-year old PFC. If this observation seems callous, walk around Arlington National Cemetery and test your reaction. Army and Marine officers know what it is like to write many letters, not one or two, or to reconstitute a platoon that has disappeared in a firefight, not just rearrange a squadron flight schedule. American politicians have a way of forgetting about what war costs, and Army and Marine Corps senior officers are the best prepared to remind them. During the Missile Crisis of 1962 the Kennedy brothers had almost ordered an invasion of Cuba when Marine Commandant David M. Shoup conducted a little tutorial on Tarawa and the comparative vastness of the proposed objective area.

Together we face a political elite who act on the apparent belief that force is either anachronistic or, if necessary, can be applied cheaply and painlessly. We can only hope that the critical educational process now under-way, directed by the veterans of World War II and Korea, will have some influence on the politicians whose intellectual and emotional roots remain fixed in the illusions of the 1970s. Our problem is that we share the national

defense arena with two other services, the Air Force and the Navy, who are predisposed institutionally to represent a different vision of warfare. I think that as long as the Soviet Union was the principal threat, the Air Force and the Navy held the strategic high ground. We did not want to occupy Russia; we did not really want to reform Soviet society or dismember the Soviet empire. What we required was the deterrence or destruction of Soviet nuclear forces and those conventional forces poised to overrun western Europe. Unless the Air Force and the Navy assured that nuclear deterrence would hold, we could not hope to wage and win a conventional war in Europe. The Navy and the Air Force are now attempting to reposition their forte in strategic deterrence to a neo-romantic view that airpower and seapower can have equal effect on regional conflict.

For the Navy this strategic faith goes all the way back to the Mahanian era of the late 19th century, if not before. Much of the Navy's statement about the wonders of projecting military power inland from the sea sound like the musings of Rear Admiral Robert Shufeld in the 1880s. For the Air Force the time window is less dramatic, but no less decisive. In a 1943 version of the Army's manual of operational doctrine, the Army Air Forces asserted that airpower and land power were now co-equal, but this argument included some hopeful notions about the effect of strategic bombardment. For the first time during the Korean War—and echoed thereafter through the Gulf War—the Air Force has argued that tactical aviation could win wars with ground forces playing a subordinate role. Guilio Douhet lives, but he has returned without his strategic clothing. The inspired application of airpower in the Gulf War offers an interesting lesson: the destruction looked worse than it was when one balanced the actual reduction of Iraqi capability against the vivid images of exploding structures and mangled civilian bodies. Filtered through television, airpower has become a force for peace through premature negotiation.

At the moment American defense analysts have brought scenario-generation to a level of imagination we once reserved for Robert Heinlein and Stephen Spielberg. Such exercises have some value, but we must remember—and remind others—that the essential nature of war is its unpredictability. We are likely to fight next someone we do not now identify as a great threat. The only enemy we identified correctly in this entire century was Japan. However, one common thread runs through all our wars and lesser engagements in this century. None of them involved only air and naval forces, and none of them were decided by air and naval forces alone. If you are ready to show the flag, you had better be ready to show something else, too, since the street gangs of the globe are not easily impressed by air and naval parades. The Army and the Marine Corps learned these truths long ago; they must preserve the wisdom that only the dead have seen the end of war. ❏

A Europe of the Three: The Historical Context

SIR MICHAEL HOWARD

My task here is to trace the relationship between Britain, France, and Germany as it has developed over the past two hundred years—a relationship shaped, I am afraid, more by antagonism and jealousy than by any kind of mutual admiration or habit of cooperation.

French, British, and German national self-consciousness has been largely determined, indeed, by conflict and contrast with one another. Let us begin with France. We have to go back to the 17th century, the *grand siecle* of Louis XIV, to find the origins of French self-consciousness and self-confidence. At that period France was the strongest military and economic power in Europe and gave the law in matters of culture to the rest of the world. Other monarchs saw in the court of Versailles a model of how to reign, women looked to Paris to learn how to dress, artists and writers how to write or paint, and mankind in general how to live. France was in fact the first Great Nation—militarily, economically, and culturally—and has never forgotten it. Even today it is difficult to visit Paris without experiencing a sense of cultural inferiority. The French themselves have no doubt that it is the greatest city in the centre of the most civilized country in the world. Occasionally one has a sneaking suspicion that they might be right.

English national self-consciousness was older, as any reader of Shakespeare knows, but *British* self-awareness was developed largely during the century of continuous wars with France between 1689 and 1815. It was a religious and ideological confrontation as much as military and political. Initially France embodied the forces of authoritarian Catholicism that were trying to overthrow the Protestant Succession and thus threatened Britain's

very independence. Later, as British power and empire expanded, France was the adversary who contested the command of the seas, British settlement in North America and trade in the East and West Indies, and who throughout the period threatened physical invasion. Not until 1815, with the help of virtually every other power in Europe, did Britain succeed in definitively defeating France and reducing her to the rank of a second-class power. The French were never to forget it.

Finally Germany. Until the 18th century, Germany was a geographical expression. It was simply the region in Central Europe where Bourbon and Habsburg fought for dominance and whose minor princelings, the rulers of Mecklenburg, Prussia, Saxony, Bavaria and the rest, manoeuvred between them. The aspiration for Germany to become a Nation-State developed only at the beginning of the 19th century in reaction to the humiliation enforced upon the Germans by the French during the Napoleonic conquests. Prussia was then able to put herself at the head of a German alliance as the leader of a potential new German Nation in the great *Befreiungskrieg*, the War of Liberation of 1813-14. The whole concept of "Germany," even more than that of Britain, was based upon hostility to and fear of France. It was no accident that when in 1870 Bismarck needed to mobilise the forces of German nationalism so as to pre-empt Liberal attacks on the Prussian monarchy, he did so by provoking a war with France which was to be a triumph, not just for the Prussian army, but for Germany as a whole. The new German Empire was proclaimed in the very halls of Versailles. The French were not to forget that humiliation either.

The World Wars

The British watched the humiliation of France and the rise of Germany with understandable equanimity. The British and Germans seemed at the time to be natural allies. Both were Protestant monarchies, their royal families closely interrelated. Both shared the same enemies—not only France but Russia, the other threat to Britain's overseas possessions. Both recognised themselves, in those racist times, as consanguineous—industrious Teutons, as against the decadent Latins. Nevertheless the two nations drifted, at the end of the century, from friendship through guarded neutrality to bitter enmity. Fundamentally this was because a new generation of Germans, not

content with the dominance of Europe acquired by Bismarck, aspired to the further status of *Weltmacht*, World Power, and they saw in Britain the great obstacle to their achieving it. If Germany was to fulfil her destiny, they believed, she would have to fight and defeat Britain as she had fought and defeated France, and she built a great navy in order to do so. The British naturally responded, and by 1914 each saw the other as natural adversaries. Young Germans were brought up to expect *Der Tag*, the day of reckoning with England. The British responded with a flood of light fiction depicting the horrors of an imminent German invasion. So when war came in 1914 the British found themselves fighting, somewhat to their surprise, on the same side as the French.

Anglo-German antagonism did not at first long outlast the First World War. Very rapidly thereafter the British tried to restore their links with the Germans. This was due partly to a reaction against the war itself, but partly also because the British felt, out of a sense of fair play—the most suicidal of all feelings in politics—that the Germans had been badly treated by the Versailles Treaty, and that it was all the fault of the French. Up to a point they were right: the French did indeed treat the Germans badly. But they saw them as a menace that had been only scotched, not destroyed, and believed that their security depended on keeping Germany as weak as possible for the foreseeable future. The British on the other hand believed that the security of Europe lay in the appeasement of Germany's grievances and her readmission to the ranks of peace-loving powers. In principle they were no doubt right. In practice they were unfortunate in having to deal with Adolf Hitler. But as a result, the only alliance capable of restraining German ambitions was reconstituted far too late, and in 1940 Germany gained the victory denied to her in the First World War.

It is not surprising that French opinion then turned bitterly against the British, who had not only deserted their armies but sunk their fleet into the bargain. They therefore settled down to make such peace with the Germans as they could. Indeed if the Germans had had a half-way decent government, they might then have established the leadership in Europe that they had earned by their military victories, by their industrial dominance and by the size of their population, and made it acceptable to the French and to everyone else. As it was, the regime imposed by the Nazi ideologues soon became intolerable to all but the small minority that shared their views. The Russian campaign prevented the Germans from consolidating their conquests; and American entry into the war made their defeat virtually certain.

The US & USSR — Complicating Factors

But the United States was not yet seen, and did not see itself, as a permanent element in the European balance of power. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, very clearly was. The British therefore felt it necessary, in the

> *"Largely on the initiative of the British,
> the Americans were persuaded to return to
> Europe and become part of the new North
> Atlantic Treaty Organization."*

immediate aftermath of the war, to provide some counterpoise both to a possibly renascent Germany and to a potentially hostile Russia, and pressed for the revival of French power as quickly as possible. France was given the status of an equal co-victor, and in 1947 Britain concluded with her at Dunkirk an alliance that, if it had come ten years sooner, might well have prevented the Second World War. A year later this was extended by the Brussels Pact to include Italy and the Benelux powers. But by this time it was clear that the danger to European security came, not from a defeated and divided Germany, but from the Soviet Union, and that nothing could balance Soviet power but the assistance of the United States. So largely on the initiative of the British, the Americans were persuaded to return to Europe and become part of the new North Atlantic Treaty Organization. With their advent, the traditional structure of European politics was transformed. In the new alliance the United States took the lead and laid down the guide-lines. Washington became the capital of the West.

Post-war Settlements

The United States, however, exacted a heavy price for its participation: West Germany was to be immediately and rapidly rearmed. Understandable and necessary as this was from a military point of view, in terms of European politics it was traumatic. Barely five years had passed since the death-camps at Auschwitz had been working at full blast; now the Germans were to be welcomed back as friends and associates. The British, who had suffered least of all from the Nazi tyranny, found this just tolerable. The French did not. The French Foreign Minister, M. René Pleven, devised a plan for a European Army in which German forces were to serve in a very subordinate capacity, but even this was unacceptable to the National Assembly, and after three years of negotiation it was rejected. The alliance was only saved by the British committing themselves, in 1954, to stationing not less than four divisions on the Continent until the end of the century. Their object was not so much to contain the Russians as to reassure the French. As was

said at the time, the purpose of the alliance was to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down, and it was only under those circumstances that the French were prepared to go along with it.

Nevertheless, the feelings of the French were not assuaged. They resented their status as being only honorary members of the victorious alliance. They resented the dominance of the Anglo-Saxons, and the structure of an alliance in which English was the main language and Americans occupied the senior positions. They resented what they saw as the American betrayal of their efforts to retain their colonial possessions, first in Indo-China and then in North Africa.

Underlying all this was a contempt for the Americans themselves, and a resentment that so barbarous a people should be wielding so much power. This underlying hostility found expression with the return to power of General de Gaulle in 1958—a leader determined to restore *la grandeur de la France*, and re-establish his country in the position of world leadership that her culture, her character, and her history had earned.

This he achieved with astonishing success; partly through his own self-confidence, partly through restoring French pride in themselves. As part of this process the creation of an independent nuclear *force de frappe* was essential. Also necessary was the removal of French forces from military structures which, although based largely on French soil, were dominated by Anglo-Americans. So all NATO headquarters were evicted from French territory and France became, as it were, although still a partner in the enterprise, no longer a member of the central management.

But the most important of de Gaulle's achievements, for our purposes, was his rapprochement with the Germany of Konrad Adenauer. Only if France and Germany could overcome their traditional enmity could Europe come together as an entity independent of the United States; and such an entity would, in de Gaulle's view, come naturally under the leadership of the French. Simultaneously a European Economic Community was being created, also largely on French initiative. From the very beginning, at the Messina Conference of 1957, the Germans played a major part, but it was always the French who provided impetus and leadership, and laid down the main guide-lines. Many of the senior bureaucrats, indeed, appear to have seen in the new Europe a revised and benevolent reincarnation of the Napoleonic Empire.

Realigning Relationships

How did the British and Germans react to all this? So far as the British were concerned, not well. Looking back on our attitude I feel a certain sense of shame at the resentful and reluctant fashion in which we reacted to France's re-emergence as a major actor in her own right. The rapprochement with Germany, in particular, we viewed with deep suspicion. We saw in it simply an attempt ultimately to lever the Americans out of Europe, or at the

very least to provide an alternative focus for the Alliance. The British themselves saw the American presence as essential, not only to the military effectiveness of the Alliance—which was hard to deny—but to British status within it. It was, after all, as a co-equal ally with the Americans that the British had returned as liberators to Europe in 1944. All the other allies had either been liberated, the French no less than the Belgians, the Dutch, and the Danes, or defeated, like the Germans and the Italians. We were at the top table; as long as the Americans remained in Europe we could still bask in their reflected glory. After all, we had a "special relationship," sharing nuclear and intelligence secrets and speaking more or less the same language. We had an uneasy sense that if France and Germany displaced the United States as the focus of the Alliance, we would be participating, if at all, at a very much lower, if not marginal level.

As for the Germans, they were naturally delighted that there should be a rapprochement with France and the old hatchet buried. They wanted to turn their backs on the old destructive nationalism that had led them to disaster in two World Wars, and they saw in the new Europe an arena in which they could peacefully expand and prosper. The French might dominate its government, but they would certainly dominate its economy. They put their weight behind the European Community with enthusiasm. But they did not want to lose touch with the Americans. They knew quite well that the United States was the real guarantor of their freedom and independence. After all, Germany was still divided and the Soviet armies were just over the other side of the wall. The French and British were all very well, but it was the Americans who were keeping the Russians out, and there was no way in which the Germans were going to swap the American guarantee for French friendship. They needed both, and they did their very best to keep them together.

So the consequence was that, between 1949 when NATO was created, and 1989 when the end of the Cold War placed its rationale in doubt, the relationship between British, French, and Germans was determined by their attitude to the United States. It was within an American-dominated alliance that all three functioned. Then came the demolition of the Berlin

Wall, the reunification of Germany, and the end of the Soviet Threat; cataclysmic events with which we are still trying to come to terms.

Yankees Go Home?

What have been the implications of these events for the nations of Western Europe? The immediate effect is that there is no longer a direct threat to keep the Alliance together. Concurrently, there is no longer a need for the Americans to stay in Europe—or rather, there is no longer *that* need for the Americans to stay in Europe. There are many other reasons why they should remain, but keeping the Russians from pouring through the Fulda Gap is no longer one of them.

There is therefore a distinct possibility, if not a probability, that the Americans will now go home. The French reaction to that possibility is to press forward with the Europeanisation of the Alliance, on the assumption that the Americans are no longer needed and that anyhow they are not going to be around for very much longer—indeed, it would not be a good thing if they *were* to be around for very much longer. They are also deeply concerned about the huge potential increment of power brought to the Germans through the reunification of their country. They are therefore pressing for a restructuring of the Alliance within the framework of the Western European Union—an organisation created in the early '50s to enable the Germans to join the Alliance under strict control, and one whose membership conveniently parallels that of the European Union created by the Treaty of Maastricht.

The British, on the contrary, are doing their best to keep the Americans in and to dissuade them from going away. The WEU seems to them at best redundant, at worst a deliberate challenge to the United States to leave the Europeans to fend for themselves. As for the Germans, they are only anxious not to offend any of their allies. They accepted politely the French offer to form a joint Franco-German brigade, which has now been expanded into an Army Corps and is seen in some quarters as the nucleus of a new European Army. The Germans justify its existence as a mechanism for binding the French more closely into the alliance. The British and the Americans, on the contrary, see it as a French ploy to divide the Germans from the Anglo-Saxons. There is little desire in Washington to see the French displace them as the leaders of a European alliance, and that may indeed be a factor in persuading them to remain.

In any case, the United States is unlikely to formally withdraw from Europe before the end of the century, and so long as they retain any kind of a presence this will continue to determine the relationship between their major partners. But they are unlikely to remain forever; and we can only hope that by the time they do leave, the three major European powers will have settled into a relationship that will represent something more than an uneasy equilibrium. ❏

Renewing the US-European Relationship

PIERRE SHOSTAL

Despite the hopes that abounded as the 1990s opened, post-Cold War Europe is an unstable and dangerous place. A single massive threat of the proportions of Nazi Germany or Soviet Russia is not likely to occur again soon. But economic chaos, rampant nationalism, and ethnic hatreds are the type of kindling which could ignite major regional conflict. Economic interdependence and the effects of modern communications would make it difficult for the United States to shield itself from European upheaval. Thus, unless greater stability can be fostered, the United States might again find its security threatened by European developments.

What does stability mean in today's Europe? During most of modern history, it meant finding a balance in which no single power was so dominant as to threaten the existence or vital interests of its neighbors. Neither post-Soviet Russia nor any other European power appears likely to pose this kind of threat in the near future. Today's European security challenge looks more like a race to head off or contain regional conflicts before they become uncontrollable. Rather than confronting a single adversary, we will find ourselves dealing with many problems of bedeviling complexity. What should we build on in confronting them?

Our Postwar Lessons

The American-led response to the Soviet Cold War challenge was a new set of integrative political, military, and economic structures, notably NATO and the European Community. We and our West European partners realized, in establishing these institutions, that a traditional power arrangement based primarily on nation-states would no longer meet their security needs.

These new institutions succeeded beyond all expectations: Western Europe achieved unprecedented stability and prosperity; its adversary, the

Soviet Union, collapsed. While the dangers facing Europe following the disappearance of the Soviet Union are great, the West has emerged from the Cold War with tremendous advantages. One of the most important is the experience that by engaging Western Europe in a grand design of European integration and Atlantic partnership, the United States fostered a degree of interdependence that makes war among West European countries almost unthinkable.

In a new era in which Western Europe should, by virtue of its stability and prosperity, bear increasing responsibility for the rest of the continent's security, there are many reasons why American leadership will still be needed. What they boil down to is that the prosperous and democratic part of Europe is having tremendous difficulty in coming to terms with the continent's new problems. There is no single European country with the resources or acceptance from its partners to organize the effort. The hope that Germany, following reunification, would spearhead a European response to this challenge will not be fulfilled in the short or medium term.

German Unification and Its Aftermath

While Britain and France both had reservations about German unification following the fall of the Berlin Wall, they found they had no choice but to accept it. Subsequent hand-wringing, particularly by the French, over their relative loss of influence in Europe indicates a deep European reluctance to accept German leadership openly. While the Germans have demonstrated an assertive approach on some issues (e.g., recognition of Croatia and expanding European Union membership), historically-grounded inhibitions make them unable to exercise across-the-board leadership.

Issues on which Germany will continue to be reluctant to lead are primarily those of military security and peacekeeping.[1] This reluctance remains acceptable for the time being to Germany's European partners, fearful of too sudden an expansion of German power. It also reflects the views of many Germans, who are uncomfortable with the notion of their country playing a military role that goes beyond its NATO commitments. Despite the German constitutional court's recent decision that the Bundeswehr may participate in military activities outside the NATO area, the new government which takes office in Bonn late this year probably will make only slow progress toward a more robust international security role.

Pierre Shostal is a Department of State Foreign Service Officer currently teaching at the Defense Intelligence Agency's Joint Military Intelligence College in Washington. His most recent overseas assignment was as Consul General in Frankfurt, 1990-93. Before that he was director of the State Department's Office of Central European Affairs, 1987-90, where he was directly involved in US policymaking on German unification. He also has served in Hamburg, Brussels, Moscow, Zaire, and Rwanda.

While they lack Germany's economic power and influence, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, Britain and France will thus continue to be our main partners on European security activities that extend beyond the NATO area. This arrangement allows time for the development of new multinational European military structures, such as the Eurocorps, in which the Germans can play a significant role. In time, these arrangements can lead to greater European initiative in security matters and an accepted German role in this field. But a lot of bad things can happen in Europe before then.

What this suggests is the continued need for a strong American political and military commitment to NATO while the Europeans develop greater responsibility in the security field. The most tangible part of our commitment—our troop presence—should remain large and stable enough to be effective in case of emergencies. It also should be capable of reinforcement so as to respond to specific needs. Nevertheless, our presence should be tied to European readiness to contribute enough of their soldiers and resources to a common effort.

The Maastricht Treaty and Its Lessons

Paradoxically, German unification provided the main impetus to the current effort to "deepen" or intensify West European integration through the Maastricht Treaty. The treaty, which went into effect in November 1993, sets out the ambitious goal of achieving a common foreign and defense policy. Skepticism is in order about the near-term realism of this goal, particularly in light of the weak performance of the European Union (EU) in the Balkans crisis. Expansion of the EU to include such neutrals as Austria, Finland, and Sweden can only make a common foreign and security policy an even longer-term goal.

Achievement of another of the Maastricht Treaty's goals—a common European currency—has somewhat better prospects of being achieved in the next several years, though the path will be rocky. The governments that participate in this effort would give up a large measure of sovereignty, perhaps smoothing the way to common policies in other areas. Under Maastricht, those countries that meet strict criteria set out in the treaty would adopt a common currency by 1999. The number of countries that could meet these criteria now is small. If they include both Germany and France, there would be good chances of achieving a momentum that would carry other countries.

The Maastricht criteria for monetary union reflect the Bundesbank's policy principles, a sign that the monetary field is one in which German influence in Europe is already paramount. As has been true since the European Community's founding, economic cooperation probably will remain in the near future a more powerful motor for integration than political or security efforts.

In an excellent analysis, Douglas Stuart asserts that Maastricht mistakenly concentrates attention on expanding progress toward a fully integrated West European economic system.[2] He argues that the Europeans should

focus more on "widening" of the European Union to include newly independent states of East and Central Europe, and on building ties to Turkey and other Islamic states.

While it is true that the West Europeans need to address these issues, we should recognize that German unification drastically reshuffled the geopolitical cards. The resulting power shift in Germany's favor requires the EU to strengthen its core if it is to continue as a stabilizing framework for Western Europe. Serious weakening of that core would risk a return to largely national policies among member states. Thus, despite the difficulties, the goal of common foreign and security policies among its key Western members remains important.

The road to approval of the Maastricht Treaty, which included the 1992 Danish and French referenda, suggests other problems that need addressing. The large anti-Maastricht votes in both countries—as well as opinion polls which show low public support and understanding for the treaty in other countries[3]—also indicate substantial voter fears of loss of control over decisions that affect their countries. European leaders have concluded from this experience that they need to do a better job at dialogue with their publics about next steps in the integration process.[4]

Complicating Europe's efforts to formulate geopolitical priorities is mounting concern with instability in North and Black Africa. This preoccupation is especially strong in the European Union's southern tier—those countries most exposed to the social and political shock waves coming from across the Mediterranean.

For Americans, the aftermath to German unification and the collapse of the Soviet power system has a triple lesson. The first is that Western Europe will in the next few years remain focused on consolidating progress toward internal integration, while also bringing in new members and dealing with instability on its borders. The second lesson is that no European government will seize the reins of foreign and security policy leadership in the near term. Indeed, the Maastricht goal of a common foreign and security policy tends to discourage national attempts at leadership. Third, Europe will remain for a considerable time dependent on US leadership. In the Balkans, for example, it was only after the United States began to assert itself that there was even slight progress toward a political solution.

Which Lessons Should We Heed?

Preparations for the January 1994 NATO Summit brought to a head discussion of Western strategy toward the former members of the Warsaw Pact. In its broadest terms, the question has been about which lessons to draw from 20th-century European history.

One school, recalling Germany's humiliation and desire for revenge following the Versailles Treaty, argues that the West should give priority to

encouraging Russia, the successor states of the Soviet Union, and the other former members of the Warsaw Pact to become partners in a Europe without dividing lines. Under this view, the greatest danger to a stable Europe would be an isolated and resentful Russia.

The other school, recalling the turbulence in Central and Southeastern Europe which contributed to the outbreak of both World Wars, argues for promoting stability through giving priority to building NATO's ties with the formerly communist Central European countries in which democracy has already made a strong start.[5] This priority, according to the partisans of "Central Europe first," should be expressed through offering these states a clear prospect of early membership in NATO.

How Russia will eventually organize its society and deal with the outside world is not yet clear. Much will depend on whether it seeks to remain a multinational empire held together by force or becomes a Western-style democratic nation-state. The evidence thus far is mixed.

A few things are, however, already known about Russian foreign policy. One is that there exists a consensus among Russian elites that their country's external relations must be based on a defense of Russian "national interests."[6] This means that any Russian leader must be able to portray his country's relationship with the West as one in which Russia's importance is recognized. As Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev wrote, Russia cannot be excluded from efforts to resolve such a major European problem as Bosnia.[7]

Initially constructive Russian behavior in Bosnia suggests that the West should not succumb to negative self-fulfilling prophecies about Moscow's future diplomacy. At the same time, efforts to reconstitute a Russian empire in the "near abroad" through force and intimidation must be rejected. In such an eventuality, benefits for Russia of cooperation with the West must be withheld.

How can the security needs of the newly free Central European states be met while still encouraging constructive Russian conduct? Zbigniew Brzezinski has suggested offering Russia a special treaty of friendship and alliance even as NATO itself expands its membership eastward into Central Europe.[8] Such a treaty offer would be contingent on Russia demonstrating concretely that it is behaving toward its neighbors like a democratic nation-state rather than as an empire with possible designs on them.

As Brzezinski suggests, such a good-neighbor Russia could be associated with Europe-wide cooperative undertakings without being a member of NATO and the EU. If Russian performance in these activities supports a more formal relationship, the cooperation that develops could defuse lingering suspicions in Moscow about NATO.

We can expect the Visegrad countries—Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia—to expand their cooperative activities with NATO under the recently adopted Partnership for Peace as far and as fast as they can.

> *"We can expect the Visegrad countries — Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia — to expand their cooperative activities with NATO as far and as fast as they can."*

Early NATO membership for them is not, however, a desirable prospect. Dealing with Russian suspicions will take time. Moreover, the armed forces of these countries need thorough restructuring and will not be able in the short term to participate fully in Alliance military activities.

Beyond this, there is a fundamental NATO issue to be addressed with these Central European countries. Under the NATO Treaty's Article 5, "an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all." As Poland learned in 1939, an ineffective security guarantee is of little value in the face of an attack. In other words, NATO's armed forces would need to be structured to carry out a security guarantee for these countries if they became members. Some argue for revising NATO members' treaty obligations toward each other as a way out of this dilemma. It is difficult to see, however, how a dilution of security guarantees could be stabilizing.

Richard Nixon argued shortly before his death that progress by the Visegrad countries toward membership should be gradual and that Russia must not be given a veto over NATO's decision.[9] The Partnership for Peace is certainly flexible enough to offer Russia the opportunity to participate in Alliance activities to the extent that its policies are compatible with the Alliance's commitment to "the preservation of democratic societies, their freedom from coercion and intimidation, and the maintenance of the principles of international law."[10] Such participation would help smooth the way toward a more formal relationship between NATO and Russia.

Inviting Russia into the Partnership may seem to some like inviting the fox into the chicken coop, but there is much to be said for trying to train this particular fox in the advantages of responsible international behavior. Russia's vast size and historical lack of attachment to Western political values will make sorting out its relationship with the West enormously difficult. Moreover, security problems on its Asian borders would seem to preclude even eventual full membership in NATO. But these complexities should not prevent the development of a cooperative relationship in which Russia is

exposed to Western political and economic culture and encouraged to act responsibly. We cannot be certain that such an effort will succeed, and the West might need to make difficult decisions if Russian actions revert to undemocratic past patterns.

Russian behavior in three areas will be critical in forming Western policy. First, how will Moscow perform in the Balkan crisis—will it continue to cooperate in the search for a constructive political solution? Second, how will it conduct its relations with the former Soviet republics, and with Ukraine in particular? If these ties are based on voluntary cooperation and Russian respect for their sovereignty, European security would be much enhanced. If the contrary is true, Western rearmament would definitely be on the agenda. Third, what will Russian behavior be regarding the implementation of arms control agreements and cooperation on halting the spread of weapons of mass destruction? Russian performance in this area thus far has been encouraging but will require careful monitoring.

A Long-Term US Commitment

We learned through bitter experience in the 1930s and 1940s how our vital interests in Europe can be threatened if we are not actively involved there. Our successful commitment after World War II to building European and Atlantic structures fostered an era of unprecedented stability in the Western part of the continent. The opportunity exists to extend these structures eastward to encompass much of the remainder of Europe and to develop cooperative relations with Russia. There are also great dangers. As Vaclav Havel observed, one sees:

> ... hatred among nationalities, suspicion, racism, even signs of fascism; vicious demagogy, intrigue and deliberate lying; politicking, an unrestrained, unheeding struggle for particular interests, a hunger for power, unadulterated ambition, fanaticism of every imaginable kind. ... .[11]

It is not hard to imagine the potential for local and regional conflict growing out of such an atmosphere. Unfortunately, Western Europe's performance in foreign and security policy since 1990 does not portend an early assertion of its leadership in dealing with such problems. Perhaps more than at any time since the early 1970s, a consensus prevails in Europe that continued US leadership and a substantial American military presence are needed.

Recalling the US role in two world wars and in the Cold War, Senator Richard Lugar argues for a modest investment now to stabilize and secure the peace in Europe. To do this requires, in his view, a new bargain with Europe "not only to stabilize the continent but also to induce Europe to become the outward-looking and meaningful ally Washington needs to reduce its own global burden."[12] Lugar's proposal that the United States and Western Europe

> ## "A consensus prevails in Europe that continued US leadership and a substantial American military presence are needed."

together seek to project democracy and security both eastward and southward should become a central principle for a renewed transatlantic partnership.

Lugar includes the Balkans in his proposal. The crisis in that region may confront us with difficult decisions about deploying troops there. An American refusal to send troops to help enforce agreed political arrangements might become fatal to these efforts. It also would raise serious questions about the worth of our overall commitment in Europe.

If we do send troops to the Balkans and they are withdrawn because of casualties, the political effect on NATO would be even more disastrous. Before sending troops to the Balkans, the President would need to tell the American public that such a deployment might be costly and lengthy. The reason for such a step would be that keeping the Balkan conflict from spreading is fundamental to our interest in maintaining European stability.

Many predicted in the early 1990s that the US-European relationship would become a more contentious one, especially in the economic sphere. The recent GATT accord defused some of this concern, but the risk of economic quarrels undermining transatlantic cooperation still exists. Industry on both sides of the Atlantic is being restructured to meet sharpened international competition, and resultant unemployment creates domestic pressures to get tough with trading partners. Just as we did during the Cold War, we will need to keep frictions over individual economic problems within limits so as not to damage our basic ties. Putting the whole range of US-European relations within a broad revised political framework might help keep individual problems manageable when disputes erupt.

The Goal of Devolution

The profound changes of 1989-90 make it too soon for Europe to assume now the responsibilities of leadership that Americans have borne for half a century. This does not, however, mean that a gradual devolution of responsibility should not be a goal. It should, and this concept should be at the core of a new Atlantic Compact in which the United States explicitly declares that European stability remains central to our own national security.

In this context, the Bonn-Paris axis will continue to play a central role in European deliberations. While the Germans move incrementally toward assuming greater political responsibility in Europe, France will also gradually free itself from old policies. Coming to terms with a greater German role should impel France toward increased involvement in NATO and with the United States. While the French will remain difficult partners, this evolution in their position would facilitate maintaining our own European commitment.

Putting together a renewed transatlantic partnership along these lines will require patience, clarity of purpose, and skill from the United States and its European partners. We should build on what has been achieved in the postwar partnership and extend democratic government, market economies, and cooperative structures eastward and southward.

From the Europeans devolution will require taking adequate account of American interests while they pursue the goal of common policies. Americans will have to get used to not having our way as often as in the past. We probably will need in time to accept some restructuring of NATO that reflects both our gradually diminishing role and the new security missions the Alliance will assume. There should be no hurry to such efforts since premature steps in this direction could encourage those in our country who argue for a sharply reduced American commitment now.

A true revolution took place in Europe in 1989-90. It did not, however, end dangers to American security from that continent. We continue to need a commitment there, a commitment that must be adapted to a changing environment and a growing European role.

NOTES

1. In a 12 July 1994 decision, the Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe found in favor of the Kohl Government's position that the German Constitution or Basic Law permits Bundeswehr participation in UN peace missions outside the NATO area. That position had long been contested by the opposition Social Democrats, who argued that the Basic Law would have to be amended to allow operations "apart from defense." Notwithstanding the court's decision, public opinion remains profoundly divided on the issue.

2. Douglas T. Stuart, *Can Europe Survive Maastricht?* Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 4 February 1994.

3. Ibid., p. 11.

4. This conclusion is based on my 1990-93 conversations with German political business leaders while serving as US Consul General in Frankfurt.

5. Edward L. Rowny, "NATO and the Difference between Eastern and Central Europe," *The Washington Times*, 15 March 1994.

6. Alexei G. Arbatov, "Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives," *International Security*, 18 (Fall 1993), 5-43.

7. Andrei Kozyrev, "Don't Threaten Us," *The New York Times*, 18 March 1994, p. A29.

8. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Normandy Evasion," *The Washington Post*, 3 May 1994, p. A23.

9. Richard Nixon, "Moscow, March '94: Chaos and Hope," *The New York Times*, 25 March 1994.

10. Partnership for Peace: Framework Document, para. 2.

11. Vaclav Havel, as quoted by Vladimir Tismaneanu in *Reinventing Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1993), p. 301.

12. Richard G. Lugar, "American Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War Period," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 24 (Winter 1994), 25.

A Regional Perspective on European Defense

MASSIMO DAL PIAZ

NATO, the European Union (EU) (through the Western European Union), and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) had been the principal institutional players in European security until the United Nations recently made its presence felt in such matters. Italy in particular, based on a careful reading of Article 11 of its Constitution, delegated the safeguarding of its own interests to international organizations for nearly half a century.

Until ten years ago NATO had a monopoly on providing security in Europe. But the limits of the Washington Treaty became evident in the early 1980s when the first Gulf crisis—the war between Iran and Iraq—dramatically underscored for Europeans the potential reach of events beyond Europe's borders and beyond the Mediterranean. Although such events may occur outside the geographical scope of the NATO treaty, they can—and have—put the interests of NATO members at stake.

To offset NATO's reluctance to become involved in "out of area" matters, it was quite natural after the dissolution of the Soviet Union for the EU to look to the Western European Union (WEU) as the organization most capable of providing the security framework to safeguard the interests of its member countries. The catchphrase at the time was "to revitalize the WEU." Security considerations in the climate of East-West confrontation had for a long time required the diversion of resources to NATO. Without that confrontation, entrusting European defense to the WEU appeared to some to be more a matter of providing a new structure rather than adjusting the old one. The initiative for the Franco-German brigade, now grown to a corps-sized organization involving the forces of five nations (France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Spain), is one consequence of the search for an alternative to NATO.

Another contributor to European security has been the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The CSCE, established in 1972 as a proposal of the former Warsaw Pact countries, was to set the final seal on the map of Europe as drawn at Yalta. As the transformation of Europe was taking

place, the CSCE itself underwent a change in mission. The three principal decisions of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act set in train initiatives that eventually encouraged and accelerated the pace of change in Europe. The human rights initiative undoubtedly helped establish the new democracies in Europe. The economic initiative served to foster development and trade and contributed to recent events related to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The security initiative paved the way—through the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and the process for confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM)—for the remarkable changes that led to the Warsaw Pact's demise and the end of the Cold War. Thus, the genesis and outcomes of these processes were fundamentally different from the intentions of those who had established the CSCE.

With the 1990-91 Gulf War, the United Nations has sought to assume the role of guarantor of world security. Until that time, problems susceptible to being solved were dealt with through Moscow-Washington channels, which left to the UN the role of peacekeeping under Chapter VI of the Charter. With the emergence of the United States as the only surviving superpower, consensus and legitimacy for US initiatives has been sought in the only forum chartered to grant them: the UN.

Against this backdrop of intertwining initiatives and changes, the maelstrom of upheavals in the East, and the recurring and violent out-of-area crises which draw ever nearer to the heart of Europe, we need to examine the machinery actually at our disposal to meet all these challenges. National roles should be assessed in light of each international organization's ability to protect common interests.

NATO and Other International Organizations

NATO has at times appeared to be constrained by the boundaries set by the Washington Treaty, despite its declared willingness to support peacekeeping operations in the framework of the CSCE and the UN. Recent events have demonstrated that the UN resolutions against Serbia would not have been enforced were it not for NATO. The NATO Alliance is a uniquely credible institution which can rely on a functioning integrated command and control system to carry out peace-enforcing operations without fielding ground troops—at least for the time being.

Brigadier General Massimo Dal Piaz, Italian army, is the Commander of the Italian Army Aviation Center in Viterbo. He formerly was Chief of Military Policy, International Relations Branch, Italian Defense General Staff. Previous assignments have included staff positions on both the Army General Staff and the Defense General Staff and command of a Cavalry Group of Squadrons in 1985-86 and a Military Territorial District in 1990-92. He was the Italian Liaison Officer to the US Army Armor Center from 1983 to 1985, and he is a 1990 graduate of the US Army War College.

NATO was the only reliable alternative when it came to enforcing UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 836, which provided the basis for NATO's ultimatum to Serbia. Thanks to its sufficiently broad international membership, NATO alone conveys the perception that the operation in Bosnia is truly multinational, aimed only at making peace.

The WEU and the CSCE, by contrast, have no geographical constraints, but they lack effectiveness as well as the resources and structures to carry out any plan they or others might devise. The CSCE in particular has a weak structure compared to its broad membership base. For the present at least, the CSCE has less utility than the WEU for enforcing the will of its members. This is demonstrated by Europe's vacillation in crises such as the one in Yugoslavia, which was born, nurtured, and matured before the eyes of a disbelieving Europe.

The UN, unique among supranational organizations, can develop the broad consensus needed to deal with many regional issues. But despite the advantages of seeking UN initiatives to settle such issues, the absence of a functioning UN military structure has proven to be a crippling liability. The UN must therefore rely on the countries or organizations that are able and willing to support it. One result of this situation is a chronic distortion in its decisionmaking procedures. Without an effective military staff group, the Secretary General or his appointed representative on the scene issues instructions directly to the force commander, a procedure being followed in the former Yugoslavia. It was also the preferred means of doing business in Somalia and in Mozambique. This procedure can be effective in purely humanitarian operations (distribution of food, medicines, and other goods to a civilian population, for example), but it is ineffective if events dictate a transition to operations that could require the use of force. When the shift from Chapter VI to Chapter VII operations occurs, neither the Secretary General nor his personal representative on the scene is in a position to translate political guidelines into orders to the force commander; those orders must take into account the precise terms and conditions established when each nation agreed to provide forces for a UN operation.

Another development is that UN-flagged NATO operations in Europe immediately involve Russia, as in Bosnia. The same could happen in the so-called "gray belt," the former Warsaw Pact area. If taken lightly, this aspect of UN operations risks adding new destabilizing elements in a Europe which already has its fill of challenges to stability. One example will suffice: the UN/NATO ultimatum to Serbia entailed the acceptance of 400 Russian paratroopers on Bosnian soil under the UN banner. So Russia, a country which has traditional and cultural links to the Serbs, and which has frequently brought pressure to bear on the Balkans, now has a military presence there. But more than that, its presence in the region during a period of domestic instability could aggravate the underlying tensions that precipitated the intervention.

A Common Goal

Europe now needs to unite in employing existing international organizations.

To develop a strong sense of common purpose, and to plan and carry out joint and combined operations, the first idea that comes naturally to mind is the establishment of links among the UN, NATO, the CSCE, and the WEU. This would entail an attempt to pool their staff operations, resources, experiences, and goals in order to converge on a statement of purpose and a set of objectives that could be supported by all these organizations. Many Europeans are well aware of the great differences existing among the organizations—such as in the procedures to achieve consensus on political decisions, or in the often disparate contributions each organization requires of its members. Realistically, however,

The WEU and European Defense

The WEU was born in October 1954 out of the Paris Agreements. It brought together seven countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) for the purpose of promoting collective defense as well as economic, social, and cultural cooperation. Spain, Portugal, and Greece have also joined. In spite of initial enthusiasm, the WEU has long remained without an identity in defense matters. In economic, social, and cultural matters, the European Community has predominated. On security issues, the East-West confrontation made it imperative to divert all resources toward NATO. But when the idea of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) began to gain ground, WEU took steps toward revitalization.

France and Germany announced in June 1987 their wish to set up a Franco-German brigade. The Defense Minister of the Netherlands, who would soon become the WEU Secretary General, welcomed the initiative. Italy, France, and Spain started bilateral negotiations on air-maritime cooperation in the Mediterranean. Italy declined to hold technical discussions on a trilateral level because it believed that bilateral arrangements could have a European dimension without appearing anti-Atlantic. This expedient, however, did not undermine in the least France's lead in the initiative to establish a defense role for the WEU and left Mrs. Thatcher and the US distrustful.

The WEU Ministerial Council met in the Hague in October 1987 and adopted a "Platform on European Security Interests." While expressions such as "European Defense" and "coordination" became recurring themes, repeated attempts to place the European fleets in the Persian Gulf under a single European command failed. Subsequent talks have yet to resolve the four fundamental questions related to WEU aspirations in defense coordination: which political goals, whose leadership, which missions, which forces.

Many observers noted that even as bipolar confrontations were declining, conflicts were on the increase; "European Defense" came to be perceived as a new name for a new mandate: the defense of "out-of-area" national interests.

we cannot expect any of the four organizations to adopt the decisions, projects, or even the statement of principles of the others. The reasons are manifold; the most important in this case may be that over the past two years the map of Europe has been redrawn more than once, and the latest edition may not be the last.

NATO has certainly been the quickest to respond to these changes in the makeup of Europe. It has embarked on a fundamental review of its strategy and its command and force structures. One result has been the creation of the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps, which features a strong European participation and is commanded by the UK. With regard to the "Partnership for Peace," it is an undertaking of wide scope, whose intent is to accommodate the needs of many countries in Eastern and Central Europe. Yet NATO retains its sense of purpose and its commitment to common defense, in contrast to suggestions to the contrary in the aftermath of the collapse of the Berlin Wall.

The swift and necessary reshaping of NATO, however, did not take place in concert with the other European security organizations; NATO already enjoyed a solid structure at the end of 1990 when its review process began, while the WEU and the CSCE were still in search of their separate identities and common perspectives on defense.

The reshaping of NATO has not been easy. While the transformation of NATO was in process (and it has still to be completed in many respects), the NATO countries in northern and central Europe were reluctant to shift their attention, and the NATO focus as well, to the south. They were naturally inclined to adhere to previously held concepts that ascribed to some countries, such as Germany, far greater influence than other countries in the NATO decisionmaking structure, even in regard to the Southern Region. It is not that the importance of those northern and central states has diminished; rather, the relative significance of other countries in the defense debates has increased.

When the focus of crisis shifted from Eastern Europe to the Balkans, Italy, from its position astride the Mediterranean (which it divides and controls), became the base for NATO operations in and around Bosnia—air, naval, and even land if circumstances should dictate. But so long as the greatest risks to European security emanate from the east, the commitment of NATO's southern countries, Italy included, is required to prevent a period of vulnerability and uncertainty about regional security.

The WEU, feeling that new responsibilities were demanded of it and seeking to leave the sideline to which it had been relegated during the Cold War, has tried to develop a more prominent role in European security matters. Under WEU auspices, France and Germany have sought leverage through the Franco-German Corps ("Eurocorps," as Paris and Bonn like to call it). As originally conceived, this unit was to involve forces and missions which were not compatible with those of NATO. Subsequently Paris and Bonn clarified their position, at least in part, by agreeing that this formation would fall under the operational command of the SACEUR when engaged in NATO missions.

The establishment of the Eurocorps had the merit of highlighting, at a time when debate within the international organizations was at a standstill, that while multilateral diplomacy may be preferred when guided by strong and proven leadership (as in NATO), sound decisions could nonetheless be made through bilateral initiatives. One benefit of bilateral negotiations is that they often can work as a catalyst and an accelerator for decisions to be made within the major multinational organizations.

It would seem that prospects for any "multinational" initiative after the 1990 London NATO Summit Declaration have faded as officials try to piece together military formations suitable to the organizations vying for primacy in European security matters. NATO is on the right track to succeed in this enterprise, although considerable effort remains before NATO can declare success. There are reasonable doubts that other European organizations, in which regional interests are paramount, can ever succeed to the degree that NATO has. Such interests, particularly those related to out-of-area matters, which require less effort to develop consensus among neighboring nations, obviously prevail over more general interests. So it is that the French and the Germans have set themselves common goals in Central Europe, with normally skeptical British and Dutch support. To the south, an agreement is imminent among Italy, France, and Spain, whose common interests have strengthened with time.

Analysis of NATO-WEU coordination and the activities of the WEU military planning cell demonstrates the failure of multilateral diplomacy. There is still no institutionalized forum for NATO-WEU political coordination. The planning cell remains what it is, nothing more than a "cell," without an integrated military command or even an effective staff counterpart to NATO's International Staff. Notwithstanding the initial enthusiasm inspired by this initiative, there are now doubts about its effectiveness.

Awareness of the difficulties inherent in multilateral diplomacy may have altered the NATO objective of expansion to the former Warsaw Pact countries. If pressures to do so—mostly from the Germans—had prevailed, it would be extremely difficult today to achieve a consensus within NATO. This outcome highlights the obstacles that the CSCE, with its much broader representation, will face if it does not succeed in finding appropriate objectives and support for its initiatives.

After the "Paris Charter for a New Europe" was signed in 1990, the CSCE began a process of institutionalizing its programs. One step was to set up a Council of Ministers, along the lines of NATO, with permanent representatives and supporting staffs. Once that process concludes, the CSCE will have a capability for improved dialogue with the other European institutions, provided that its decisionmaking machinery is compatible with theirs. As a matter of principle, dialogue is possible only among institutions which make decisions on the same subjects in comparable periods with compatible organizational structures. European nations have had years of experience in align-

ing their individual national security processes to NATO's way of doing business. It is unlikely that they will try to accommodate the tempos of two more multinational groups as well.

What Should We Do?

If Europe is to assume responsibilities in the defense field, we must have a clear picture of the political goals we intend to set for ourselves.

First, Europe can operate as a "sub-level" of NATO because emerging crises, whether out-of-area or in regions contiguous to NATO nations, require timely, gradual, and credible responses. In Bosnia—and maybe also in Croatia and Slovenia—it would have been better to intervene in the early stages of the fighting under the NATO banner, but on a European scale based on political decisions shared with the United States. By doing so, the involvement of Russia probably could have been avoided. The questions for similar future challenges become: "by which means?" and "under whose leadership?" For example, if we postulate a European defense system, the issue of its leadership cannot continue to be linked to the provision of US resources as a *conditio sine qua non*. On the other hand, either the leadership issue is resolved because the European countries are willing to find a European identity or we will let crises worsen, as in the Bosnian case, by increasing the number of interacting agents (Russia enters the scene) without the assurance that the crisis can be resolved. Such ad hoc policymaking creates a high potential for unintended consequences far more significant for Europe than the outcome of the crisis itself.

Second, we are building a united Europe on the basis of equality. So, while shared responsibilities and the allocation of certain roles and functions has become easier since the Cold War, equality could prove to be a disadvantage in matters affecting security. The military organization required for an effective partnership requires a mission, forces to perform that mission, and strong leadership to guide those forces. Leadership in security matters in the new Europe is a particularly complex issue, especially for Europeans long accustomed to having the United States in that role, and especially since the configuration of a military decisionmaking structure immediately conveys the idea of each country's political weight. It is clear that if we want equality within the European security structure, leadership within that structure will have to be clearly defined and continuously exercised.

It would be unrealistic to think that if economic leadership exists within a coalition, it does not lead to political and eventually military leadership. And the line separating leadership in all areas and regional supremacy is almost too narrow to define. Hence the process of developing a European defense system introduces the possibility of leadership capable of bypassing the political agreements that underpin the defense system itself. Conversely, we cannot renounce the concept of a European defense policy. These circumstances create a fundamental dilemma for the WEU and CSCE in defense matters.

Third, a clear and established political division of defense roles is necessary. This division must remain linked to geographical areas and their associated risks. In this sense, the division of Europe into Northern Europe, Central Europe, and Southern Europe is still valid.

In the north, Great Britain has a natural function to control and protect the polar and North Atlantic routes, the straits and the coasts of mainland Europe. In the center, Germany, the pivot between northern and southern Europe, helps to contain instabilities originating in the east and has much to contribute to controlling the conditions that create instability there. In the south, Italy, with its northern frontiers in the heart of the European subcontinent and its foot in the middle of the Mediterranean, retains its undiminished importance as an outpost and a link with the most unstable areas of the continent. Each of these three countries plays a role which cannot and must not be avoided. Were one of them to fail, one of the other two would have to assume the responsibility for safeguarding a second area or, worse, the remaining two might become involved in a struggle over that responsibility.

Disruption of this natural evolution to sub-regional responsibilities could lead to an imbalance which could in turn rekindle rivalries among the north, center, and south of Europe, with unimaginable consequences. Therefore, if a single operational military command is necessary, it is also necessary to break it down into interdependent sub-regional headquarters. This division will in turn produce the appropriate command structure for forces based on the geographical location of an emerging crisis—north, south, or center.

Fourth, of perhaps equal importance, the recent trend toward interventions at the request of troubled states or on behalf of the populations of so-called "failed states" poses a real challenge to NATO and to the organizations that seek to complement NATO or replace it. The unique characteristics of out-of-area operations, a fringe issue during much of the Cold War, must now be dealt with effectively. Our inability to meet this challenge successfully as the former Yugoslavia was dissolving cannot dissuade us from applying the lessons of that situation in a creative and constructive fashion. Establishment of the Eurocorps is one form of response; unfettered by the constraints in the NATO Charter, this organization has the potential to go a long way to providing the military means of responding to out-of-area issues. Political will and leadership will determine its effectiveness in the next such crisis.

All these elements will have to be assimilated and harmonized in a broad forum, one in which differences can be ironed out fairly and expeditiously. This means coordination within and among NATO, WEU in the broader UN context, and the CSCE. Effective coordination will promote stability and will foster confidence that future interventions will serve common interests rather than the individual interests of participating countries.

These aspects of the emerging political-military structure of Europe can be developed only by collective political agreements. In this sense, technical

military agreements, either bilateral or multilateral, while perhaps necessary, are clearly not sufficient to shape a European response to future challenges. Indeed, they can produce the opposite effect if they are interpreted as a sign of the political absence of one or more parties essential to the agreement. Instead, it is political agreements that reflect and safeguard the role of each individual country. Therefore, the military chain of command must at all times be subordinate to a joint military body, with that body in turn subordinate to a joint political body—not only within NATO but also within the UN, WEU, and other institutions. This joint political body would be the forum for political and political-military decisions and for coordination, first at the political, then at military level, with other European organizations. Only this organizational concept will provide reasonable assurance that national identity and interests will be reflected in international commitments. Nothing less will enable Europe to face the issues of the next century, the shapes of which can already be seen in outline, if not in detail.

Conclusion

Future European defense policy should be based on the following broad principles:

- compatibility among all organizations committed to security, in order to reinforce strengths and compensate for weaknesses among participating nations
- best use of the resources already earmarked by coordinating the activities of existing structures, thereby avoiding further dilution of European responses to matters of mutual concern
- a commitment to parity among partners, particularly in regard to national positions on matters both known and unpredictable

It is evident that if one of the three principles is ignored or abandoned the other two alone will not produce a balanced European defense policy. The opposite result—in the form of a bitter debate—is more likely to follow the failure of one of the three. Such an outcome would create anxiety about the principle of mutual support in defense matters and would inevitably contaminate political, economic, and social discussions as well.

The UN, NATO, WEU, and CSCE decisionmaking bodies should have a capability for timely dialogue at appropriate decisionmaking levels, especially when they deal with peace management, crisis prevention, and crisis management. To be successful the dialogue must be conducted by nations on equal footing. These mechanisms cannot be a matter of improvisation: it is the habit of coordination, first at the political and then at the military level, that will create a sound and sure basis for responding to crises. Once these mechanisms have been created, it will be easier to put in place the machinery for the management of conflicts. Finally, only when this political framework has become clear will we have an accurate picture of the military structure that can ensure and strengthen, rather than threaten and weaken, stability in Europe. ❑

Partnership for Peace:
A Personal View from NATO

MICHAEL RÜHLE and NICHOLAS WILLIAMS

Manfred Wörner, the late Secretary General of NATO, often joked that had someone told him in 1988 that only four years later he would chair meetings with the Russian or Ukrainian foreign ministers present, he would have urged that individual to immediately have his head examined. Today, meetings of this sort have become a regular feature of NATO's activities—so regular in fact that we sometimes forget how significant these changes are.

Perhaps this latter fact explains why Partnership for Peace (PfP), a NATO initiative aimed at deepening security cooperation with non-NATO countries, has attracted so much public interest since it was launched at the NATO Summit in January 1994.[1] For some, it reflected a significant step forward in bringing the countries of Central and Eastern Europe closer to NATO. For others, it was nothing more than a security placebo, offering secondary benefits but withholding the primary one: full membership in the Alliance. In the United States in particular, PfP became an issue for the op-ed pages, where its merits were either hyped or ridiculed. Partnership for Peace thus suffered the same fate as does many a coffee table book: people talk about it, many have strong opinions about it, yet few know its content.

The misleading assertion that PfP is a weak compromise gained credibility because of the timing of the Partnership's initial discussion in October 1993 by then-Defense Secretary Les Aspin at an informal meeting of NATO defense ministers in Travemünde, Germany. Aspin introduced it as an idea for intensifying cooperation with the Partners. He acknowledged that it was still in its initial stage, but indicated that once further developed by the Allies it could form a major part of the January 1994 NATO Summit.

Support for NATO expansion had grown during 1993, publicly driven by political enthusiasm both in the US Congress and in the Visegrad countries— Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. The bandwagon for expansion had picked up momentum in the summer when Russian President Yeltsin had apparently agreed in Warsaw that Polish membership in NATO would not be against Russian interest. It was checked in the fall by the specter of chaos and

civil war in Russia, as Yeltsin struggled to protect democracy, paradoxically by sending in the tanks against the parliament. Even though there was never a real prospect for early NATO expansion, PfP appeared to many as an attempt to evade the membership question and buy time.

Initially the Visegrad countries felt betrayed: they thought the Allies were dancing to the Russian tune, first in apparently favoring expansion when Yeltsin seemed to have no objection, then in finding an apparently half-formed idea like PfP as a substitute for membership when the going got rough in Russia. In a letter to several NATO Allies in September 1993, Yeltsin had explicitly warned against the effect of NATO's expansion on Russian public opinion; these circumstances thus gave additional weight to the theory that PfP was a weak compromise.

There is a saying among British journalists: "Never check a good story; inconvenient facts might get in the way." The inconvenient fact for those who see PfP as a weak compromise is that it was born out of a genuine desire to expand and intensify the military cooperation already under way between NATO and its partners in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC).[2]

The origins of PfP thus lie in the realization that it was time to move beyond Cold War assumptions, policies, and structures. The military contacts program fostered by creation of the NACC was more dialogue than cooperation: it had met its aim of better understanding astonishingly quickly. Its general, undifferentiated approach was seen to have run its course, in NATO as well as by the PfP Partners. Something more closely tailored to the several Partners' detailed requirements was needed. Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) first appreciated the need for a decisive evolution of NATO contacts with Partners in early 1993 and developed ideas for individual Partner programs. Planners in the Pentagon picked the ideas up as they prepared for the Defense Ministers Meeting at Travemünde and beyond that for the January 1994 NATO Summit. The PfP idea itself was given greater form and political substance during intensive discussions by all 16 NATO members as they worked collectively toward that meeting of NATO heads of state.

Partnership for Peace is, of course, not the only means that has been devised to enhance security in Europe after the Cold War. Rather, it should

Michael Rühle is Senior Planning Officer in the Policy Planning and Speechwriting Section, Political Affairs Division, NATO Headquarters. Previously he was a Volkswagen Fellow at the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Sankt Augustin, and a Visiting Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington. He holds an M.A. in Political Science from Bonn University and has published widely on NATO and international security issues.

Nicholas Williams also works in the Policy Planning and Speechwriting Section, Political Affairs Division, NATO Headquarters. He has held a number of defense planning and policy positions both at NATO and in the UK Ministry of Defence, whence he has been seconded to NATO.

be seen as part of a broader outreach by Western institutions to their eastern neighbors. There are parallel efforts by the European Union and the Western European Union (WEU) to engage the countries of Central and Eastern Europe through "Europe agreements" and the granting of associate status. These are important incentives for stabilizing democratic change, as those countries concerned prepare for eventual membership in the European Union.[3] Finally, membership in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Council of Europe helps establish a set of commonly agreed norms of behavior and—over time—may help bring about a common security culture which has never existed in Europe.

NATO, through Partnership for Peace and other initiatives, reinforces these ongoing efforts by supplementing the transformation to market-oriented democracies with a parallel transformation in the military sphere. The rationale for closer military-to-military cooperation, however, is not only domestic. It also serves to orient the new democracies on a more cooperative approach in their foreign and security relations.

Partnership for Peace: The Goals

The goals of PfP are both political and military in nature. They are explained in the PfP Framework Document in a rather straightforward manner:[4]
- to facilitate transparency in national defense planning and budgeting processes
- to ensure democratic control of defense forces
- to maintain the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or responsibility of the CSCE
- to develop cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed
- to develop, over the longer term, forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance

PfP is addressed to a wider audience than that defined by NACC membership. It is open to all states participating in the NACC and to other CSCE countries able and willing to contribute to this program. Slovenia became the first non-NACC country to join the Partnership, in early April 1994, and Finland and Sweden did so at the beginning of May. The acceptance of the Partnership by such countries extends the Alliance's efforts into new areas. It underlines the point that Partnership for Peace is not about reducing divisions and misunderstandings between old adversaries. It has a new agenda, looking forward rather than back.

The increased opportunity for bilateral cooperation between NATO and individual Partners is one of the distinctive features of this initiative. It is essentially for Partners to decide individually the pace and scope they want to give to their programs with NATO, and thereby determine the development and scope of their Partnership with the Alliance.

The Partnership, in short, offers equal opportunity for all, allowing each Partner to develop progressively closer relations with the Alliance on the basis of its own interest and actual performance. This is not a kind of competition or race, however. It simply reflects the reality that countries develop in different ways and at varying rates. The range of cooperative possibilities and interests with a country as large as Russia will be greater than with smaller countries. Hence, the need to tailor cooperation programs to each Partner.

Partnership Opportunities

Activities and contacts among the Partners are set to increase significantly. Before PfP, Partner countries sent representation to NACC meetings and activities either from their capitals or from their embassies in Brussels. But as the intensity of the work increases, so will the need for frequent, even daily contact. The NATO Summit therefore invited PfP Partners to establish their own liaison offices at NATO Headquarters in Brussels to facilitate their participation in NACC/Partnership meetings and activities. Most of the countries that have joined the Partnership for Peace have indicated their desire to take up NATO's offer of permanent offices at NATO Headquarters.

Another feature of the Partnership for Peace is the establishment of a Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) at Mons, Belgium, where SHAPE is located. The PCC will carry out, under the authority of the NATO Council, the military coordination and planning necessary to implement Partnership for Peace programs. PfP Partners have been invited to send permanent liaison officers to the PCC.

One of the main focuses of Partnership for Peace is the development of greater cooperation in the field of peacekeeping. NATO and Partner countries find themselves side-by-side with increasing frequency in responding to and implementing UN and CSCE mandates. The need for systematic preparation for peacekeeping undertakings has grown more urgent as a result of the increased risks and greater demands for military forces for such operations as those in former Yugoslavia.

Field exercises to promote closer peacekeeping cooperation and interoperability will therefore be a major aspect of Partnership for Peace. In mid-September 1994, the first exercise, involving 13 nations, was held in Poland. A second was held in the Netherlands, and a maritime exercise was held in the Baltic Sea. These ventures are intended to exercise and simulate common peacekeeping tasks from planning through deployment to improve the ability to work together in actual missions.

The concept of interoperability in peacekeeping is aimed at ensuring compatibility in approaches and procedures, not at sharing common or standardized equipment. For example, exercises seek to improve communications and operational procedures among participants. Since peacekeeping is a field of activity where both Allies and Partners have experience to offer and share, cooperation in this field is breaking new ground. This is genuinely a two-way street.

In launching the Partnership, NATO's leaders also made a commitment to consult with any active participant if the Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security. The outcome of any consultation cannot be predetermined, nor can any supportive action be presumed to follow. The offer is therefore far from being a "security guarantee." However, in the face of a direct threat, consultations with the Alliance can give a powerful signal that a Partner is not facing the threat in isolation. Such consultations also could be the basis for coordinating policies and action for defusing the crisis. So the offer of consultation under PfP is of great significance. For it to retain its value it would have to be exploited only in real need. And its potential could be fully explored only in the face of a real crisis.

Joining the Partnership

Countries join the Partnership simply by signing the Framework Document. This is done by a representative of the Partner country at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council. The Framework Document is a public document, issued at the January 1994 Summit and common to all Partners. Signing it is only the beginning of a process: it is the first step. It is a public affirmation that the country accepts the objectives of the Partnership and the goals and values that underpin it: the preservation of democratic societies, their freedom from coercion and intimidation, and the maintenance of the principles of international law.

In the second step, the new Partner submits a Presentation Document which addresses the various political and military aspects of the Partnership. For example, the document lists the steps undertaken by the applying nation to promote transparency in national defense planning and budgeting processes, and to ensure the democratic control of defense forces. It also indicates the kind of cooperative activities of interest to the Partner and the military forces and other assets that it might make available for Partnership activities. The document not only addresses short-term possibilities for cooperation but also covers longer-term planning factors that could affect a Partner's future involvement, such as changes in the structure of the armed forces or the setting-up of special peacekeeping units.

The third step is the development of Individual Partnership Programs (IPP) setting out a range of cooperative activities specific to each Partner. These IPPs will be developed and agreed individually between NATO and each Partner. To assist in the development of the IPPs, NATO has elaborated

a directory of possible activities called the Partnership Work Program, which is in essence a menu of possible activities. It is another typical characteristic of PfP that this menu is not exhaustive but remains open to input from Allies and Partners alike.

By the fall of 1994, three IPPs had been agreed and 11 were at various stages of development. They indicate a range of different interests and emphases, confirming the relevance of PfP's innovative differentiated approach. Finland and Sweden, for example, are interested primarily in developing a common approach to peacekeeping with the Allies. The countries of Central Europe want to move their forces toward greater interoperability with NATO. The Baltic States are looking for practical help in establishing their joint peacekeeping force.

One of the prime challenges in implementing PfP is how to reconcile its strong bilateral element with the concurrent need to avoid suspicions and misunderstandings among Partners. In keeping with the basic principles of PfP, each Individual Partnership Program is developed solely between NATO and the specific country involved. Once programs are agreed, however, they are circulated to all other Partners. There is thus no reason for suspicion about hidden agendas among Partners nor for vetoes on the level of participation of anyone else. It may take time and accumulated practical experience to allay anxieties on this score, but the success of PfP depends on these fundamental facts being understood and accepted by all participants.

The arrangements for overseeing and managing the Partnership for Peace are flexible and varied. A Political-Military Steering Committee (PMSC) was established after the January 1994 Summit under the chairmanship of the Deputy Secretary General to work further on the details of Partnership for Peace and prepare for its implementation. It will continue to function in various configurations as the Partnership develops. It will meet at 16 + 1 to address issues related to Individual Partnership Programs.[5] It also will meet with several Partner countries relative to specific activities of interest to those Partners. This might happen, for example, when an exercise is being planned in which only a limited number of parties express an interest in participating. The Steering Committee also will meet with all NACC/PfP Partners to handle common issues of Partnership for Peace. In this format, the PMSC provides the main forum for the transparency of individual Partnership programs.

PfP and NATO Enlargement

Perhaps the main reason why Partnership for Peace remains controversial in some quarters is the allegation that its principal purpose was to somehow prevent the entry of new countries into NATO. Indeed, this verdict had been accepted by some even before PfP had been officially launched, and the vocabulary applied by some critics ranged from appeasement (Richard Perle) to "echoes of Yalta" (Zbigniew Brzezinski).

It is evident that PfP, which is aimed at intensifying military coopera-
tion, cannot fully satisfy those who still advocate a rapid expansion of NATO to
the east. But as explained earlier, it should be equally evident that the Partnership
is neither the result of a "Russian veto" over such an expansion, nor a surrogate
for membership. By fall of 1994, 23 states, including Sweden and Finland,
already had joined the Partnership, proving the validity of NATO's preference
for functional cooperation over institutional quick fixes.

But there is a link—clearly expressed—between PfP and NATO's
expansion. It was agreed at the 1994 Summit that active participation in
Partnership for Peace will play an important role in the evolutionary process
of the expansion of NATO. And NATO expansion is not some remote
possibility in the future. As the Partnership for Peace Invitation stated, Allies
"expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic
states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account
political and security developments in the whole of Europe."[6] Partnership for
Peace can and will lead to NATO membership for some countries, though, of
course, this need not be a goal for all Partners.

For PfP to play its part in preparing countries for membership, it
must be given time to work and time to develop its potential. The Partnership
for Peace restores the membership question to its proper place, namely at the
end rather than at the beginning of an evolutionary process.

PfP and Russia: A Partner More Equal than Others?

One does not have to suffer from "Moscow myopia" (Senator Mitch
McConnell's term) to come to the conclusion that Russia, the strongest military
power in Europe, will continue to require careful handling. This does not
translate into a Russian veto on NATO's policies, yet it emphasizes that Russian
perceptions have to be taken seriously. NATO, which made a tremendous effort
to contain the Soviet Union for four decades, cannot afford to suddenly pretend
that it does not care any more about what is going on in Russia. Moreover, as a
member of the UN Security Council, the Russian Federation has a special weight
in deciding on crisis management activities which involve NATO. For this
reason, Allies attached great importance to engaging Russia constructively and
to bringing it into the Partnership for Peace.

This proved to be anything but easy. Although it was clear that many
leading figures in Moscow were sympathetic to PfP, NATO officials dealing
with Russian interlocutors had to do a tough selling job, explaining the merits
of the program but also dispelling doubts among some members of Russian
political and military elites. These doubts included Russian fears that by
promoting "interoperability" with Partners, NATO would try to force these
countries to buy Western equipment, thus minimizing Russia's chances for
lucrative arms exports. They also included suspicions that by engaging the

countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, NATO was somehow trying to undermine the viability of that grouping.

Russia finally signed onto the Partnership in June 1994. In doing so, it accepted the same conditions as any other Partner country. There was, however, a clear understanding on both sides that the size and weight of Russia would require some sort of special recognition. Along with the signature of the PfP Framework Document, therefore, NATO and Russia also published a so-called "Summary of Conclusions," which foresees the initiation of a "broad, enhanced dialogue and cooperation" in areas where Russia has a unique contribution to make. While the elements of such a relationship will still have to be worked out, it seems clear that issues such as nuclear nonproliferation or nuclear safety, as well as close consultation and cooperation in UN-mandated peacekeeping missions, are natural topics of such a dialogue.

At the time of this writing, work on the Russian IPP had not yet started. Nevertheless, much work remains to break down the hostility and suspicions toward NATO that still seem to exist in large parts of the Russian military. It remains a fact that NATO's military contacts program made less progress with the Russian military from 1991 to 1994 than with the forces of many other states.

The Way Ahead

Perhaps the most innovative, yet at the same time the most problematic, aspect of PfP is its mission to evolve. It is innovative because for the first time in NATO's cooperation effort the initiative for managing the evolution of cooperation lies both with the Partners and with NATO. The Alliance has thus embarked on a course of action whose outcome is unforeseeable because it will be determined as much by Partners as by Allies.

It is problematic because NATO countries are not yet clear about how far they are willing to go in the process of moving Partners closer to NATO. Some countries have a broad idea of the eventual scope of cooperation, expecting that it will lead to military cooperation of the forms and intensity that evolved through 40 years of hard work among Allies in the integrated military structure. Others are more hesitant. These would see the main focus of PfP as remaining in the sphere of peacekeeping at the military end of the spectrum, and general discussion of defense organization at the defense end.

There are also differences of perception and expectation of PfP to be resolved between Allies and Partners. Partners' desires to see visible progress exceed their resources and the capability of the system to achieve it. If, for whatever reasons—lack of resources, differences between Partners' expectations and NATO's response—Partners start to believe that NATO is not living up to the rhetoric of PfP, they may well become disillusioned. They could then insist that NATO membership is the only real benefit that NATO has to offer. Already some Central European countries have pointed to the lack of political

content in PfP, contrasting their primarily military cooperation within PfP with Russia's broad political dialogue beyond PfP. There is an inevitable gap between Partners' expectations in the short term and PfP promise over the longer term. This cannot grow too wide if PfP is to achieve its aims.

These aims are wide-ranging and lack a degree of coherence. In a way, PfP resembles a Cuban life raft, constructed of diverse materials and lacking any consistency in its various parts. At first sight it is difficult to see how the intended ends can possibly be achieved by the means at hand. For instance, how exactly can stability and democracy be strengthened in the east through military cooperation in peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian missions? Moreover, NATO countries have very different approaches to civil-military relations and provide a broad range of models, all rooted in their particular histories and forms of democracy. Consequently, much of the practical advice given by NATO on the organization of, for example, defense departments or budgets is just as likely to confuse as to enlighten. More specifically, it is not clear to Partners how they are to get closer to NATO through peacekeeping—especially as the NATO they would like to join is the old one of collective defense, not the new model of cooperation and peacekeeping.

PfP's emphasis at the outset on multinational peacekeeping and humanitarian operations is understandable. Everyone can agree on the value of peacekeeping cooperation, and NATO is better placed than any other organization to motivate it. The difficulties may arise when the militaries seek to exercise or develop skills for more demanding defense or peace enforcement scenarios. Would this be within or beyond the scope of PfP?

This brings us specifically to the question of the ways in which PfP can evolve. One important element of PfP announced at the Summit is a planning review between Allies and Partners. The wording in the Framework Document indicates that the members of the North Atlantic Alliance will "develop with the other subscribing states a planning and review process to provide a basis for identifying and evaluating forces and capabilities that might be made available by them for multinational training, exercises, and operations in conjunction with Alliance forces."[7]

Of all the elements of PfP, this is potentially the most substantial and the one most likely to bring Partners closer to NATO—particularly if it went beyond peacekeeping and covered defense planning. Within NATO there is a long-standing defense planning and review process which involves both a detailed exchange of information on existing military capabilities and a system for setting improvement goals and evaluating implementation. This has played a significant role over time in ensuring the coherence of both the political goals and military means of collective defense. The habits of NATO's planning process also have been an important element in NATO's overall cohesion.

The discipline of defense planning within a multinational environment achieves more in understanding and transparency than is possible through any

other means. But for progress to be made there must be frank discussions of the threats to security and agreement on the ultimate purpose of that planning, defense against a potential threat. It is possible to plan in a threatless environment, but it is not possible to do so if there is no free exchange of views or evaluation of risks. On the positive side, peacekeeping is neutral ground for military cooperation: a common endeavor toward a common requirement. However, a planning process which confined itself to peacekeeping cooperation would not bring Partners' military forces noticeably closer to those of NATO.

Any move toward force planning under PfP creates a dilemma. A review process that covered wider defense questions could not function with all Partners because of the need for frank discussion of potential threats, and a process that dealt selectively or individually with the most "active" Partners could run counter to the principle of transparency and would raise questions on the objective of such planning. The more demanding the planning scenario, the more problematic the political questions posed. Against whom is the defense capability being developed?

The above points suggest that some of the conceptual problems of PfP will have to be resolved during implementation. These problems are not insurmountable. The security environment in Europe and its periphery is such that peacekeeping is a highly more probable contingency than defense, collective or individual. PfP may thus evolve in response to the need for military cooperation in that area. However, the questions to be resolved in developing PfP may be more difficult than those in launching it. Having started well, it needs sufficient resources and continuing high-level support if it is to continue well.

With its offer of enhanced military cooperation through Partnership for Peace, NATO has drawn the right conclusion from a security environment that is still in flux. Rather than pretending that PfP is a final answer, we should see PfP as a preliminary one: a framework for an evolving process. To view PfP for what it is, rather than for what it is not, will ultimately serve European security better than creating myths about weak compromises.

NOTES

1. Countries which have joined the Partnership in chronological order: Romania, Lithuania, Poland, Estonia, Hungary, Ukraine, Slovakia, Latvia, Bulgaria, Albania, Czech Republic, Moldova, Georgia, Slovenia, Azerbaijan, Sweden, Finland, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russian Federation, Uzbekistan, Armenia. Of the countries of the former Soviet Union only Belarus and Tajikistan have not joined the Partnership. Other CSCE countries can join, subject to the agreement of all NATO Allies.

2. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was founded at NATO's initiative in December 1991. It consists of NATO countries and countries of the former Warsaw Pact and former Soviet Union. It meets at least once a year at foreign minister level and sponsors an annual workplan of political consultations and military contacts. PfP is set within the framework of NACC.

3. The nine countries that have signed agreements with the European Union and become associated partners in the WEU are: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovenia.

4. Partnership for Peace: Framework Document, reprinted in *NATO Review*, February 1994, pp. 29-30.

5. "16+1" is a meeting of the 16 NATO Allies with one (as opposed to several or all) of the Partners.

6. Partnership for Peace: Invitation, reprinted in *NATO Review*, February 1994, p. 28.

7. Ibid., p. 30.

France and NATO:
The Image and the Reality

WILLIAM T. JOHNSEN and THOMAS-DURELL YOUNG

French policy toward NATO has long befuddled US policymakers. Bilateral security and defense cooperation between Washington and Paris has long been cordial, if not intimate. Moreover, relations between the respective armed services of these two countries have also been close and mutually supportive of common national objectives.[1] However, this degree of bilateral cooperation has not extended into the multilateral fora of NATO. Paris has long suspected US motives in the Alliance and harbored perceptions of inadequate political control over NATO's military structures.[2] This distrust has resulted in obstructionist, if not counterproductive, French policies toward the Alliance. It is little wonder that US officials have been confused by this seemingly irrational and schizophrenic approach toward an organization which has provided the very bases for French national security.

In its own way, French Cold War policy toward NATO *was* logical. It was logical because President Charles de Gaulle, the architect of French security policy for the 5th Republic, felt that NATO-defined missions could not ensure civilian control over the military to the degree that nationally defined missions could. De Gaulle's decision to withdraw from NATO's integrated military structure thus served as the basis for Gaullist defense policy, which continues to influence strongly French strategy:[3]

- firm civilian control over the military, both within France and NATO
- an independent strategic nuclear deterrent
- substrategic and conventional forces for deterrence and defense in Central Europe and the Mediterranean
- intervention forces for out-of-area operations
- a sophisticated and technically advanced industrial base to ensure a high degree of independence in nuclear and conventional force requirements

During the Cold War, the Gaullist legacy offered France the luxury of pursuing a defense policy that supported specific French national interests, while

Washington stationed forces in Germany and kept the Soviet Union out of Western Europe. Under these circumstances, France maintained an independent distance from NATO, garrisoned forces in Germany, developed national nuclear forces, and deployed military forces throughout the world in support of French and Western interests. Paris, in short, had all of the political advantages of an aspiring world power without having to pay the full political cost associated with NATO membership.[4]

Regrettably for France, this has all changed as recent events have destroyed the comfortable assumptions that underwrote Gaullist strategy. Pierre Lellouche writes, "The French too are awakening, reluctantly, to a messy Europe, where most of the basic foreign policy and defense guidelines laid out by General Charles de Gaulle 35 years ago are simply no longer relevant."[5] Moreover, recent circumstances have unleashed a series of events that have challenged cherished French political objectives in Europe. German unification ended the long held (indeed, polite) myth of French leadership in the close Franco-German relationship.[6] The French vision for a deeper European Union (EU)[7] has effectively been placed on hold while the EU is widened (expanded in membership) with the inclusion of Norway, Finland, Sweden, and Austria, and, perhaps by the end of the decade, Switzerland and some of the Visegrad states of Central Europe.[8] Finally, the continuing conflict in the former Yugoslavia, and Western Europe's seeming inability to halt hostilities there, let alone bring about a long-term peace, have made French officials realize that their approach to dealing with both the United States and NATO needs to be revised.[9]

While these circumstances may be widely known within the US policymaking community, the effects of these new conditions on French policy toward NATO may be less well understood. The key question about French policy remains whether its reassessment of NATO reflects changes in policy, attitude, or both. This article argues that altered regional security conditions have forced French President François Mitterrand to change aspects of French *policy*

Lieutenant Colonel William T. Johnsen has been a Strategic Research Analyst at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, since 1991 and was appointed to the Elihu Root Chair of Military Studies in 1994. He has served in command and staff assignments in the 25th Infantry Division and 7th Infantry Division (Light), taught history at the US Military Academy, and was an arms control analyst at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe. He is a graduate of the US Military Academy and the US Army War College and holds M.S. and Ph.D. degrees from Duke University.

Thomas-Durell Young has held the Henry L. Stimson Chair of Military Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute since 1992. From 1988 to 1992 he was a national security affairs analyst at the Institute. Previously he was a country risk analyst for BERI, S.A., a Swiss-based consulting firm. Dr. Young received his Ph.D. from the Graduate Institute of International Studies, University of Geneva, Switzerland, and is a 1990 graduate of the US Army War College. He has published extensively on US alliance issues, with particular emphasis on Western Europe and the Southwest Pacific.

toward NATO. However, lingering atavistic *attitudes* within certain elements of the French bureaucracy may complicate the implementation and longevity of these new policies. Indeed, one needs to recognize that notwithstanding France's newly found interest in participating in NATO consultative fora, structures, programs, and activities, some French attitudes will not necessarily be all that different, or less difficult for Alliance and US officials to confront.

Consequently, it is quite likely that American perceptions of French "perfidy" toward NATO will continue in some measure to impede closer ties with France. Yet, as recent events have demonstrated, French policy toward NATO is capable of dramatic change (notwithstanding French statements to the contrary) when French national interests so dictate. An appreciation of the subtle differences in policy and attitude will elucidate actual changes in the content of French policy, and will indicate how policy will, or will not, be implemented.

Who's Who in Paris

Before examining the details of how and why French policy toward NATO has changed, one needs to review the elements of the security policy-making community in Paris and consider their complex interactions. For example, even those relatively familiar with Paris may not fully comprehend how strong an influence domestic politics exert over French policy toward NATO. And because of the past content and rhetoric of French security policy, many may not be aware that the United States and NATO enjoy strong support within portions of the French bureaucracy. Few of these individuals and bureaucracies, however, are at the pinnacle of the French decisionmaking structure.

 • Presidential Palace (*Palais de l'Elysée*). Under the Constitution of the 5th Republic, the President of the Republic need not take counsel of anyone in matters of defense and security policy. Such matters are his exclusively, his *domaine réservé*. However, David Yost, a leading expert on French security, has argued that President Mitterrand has taken a selective interest in defense issues (European, nuclear) and largely has left the administration of the French armed forces to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense.[10] The key result of this condition is that unless the President makes a specific personal effort to change security policy, inertia prevails. Concerning NATO, Mitterrand's Gaullist political foes have long painted him as an opponent of the widely popular principles of de Gaulle's defense and security policy. Thus, Mitterrand may oppose rapprochement with NATO—rejoining the integrated military command structure,[11] for example—not because of principled opposition to the idea but because he does not want his legacy to include betrayal of Gaullist security policy.[12]

 • Foreign Office (*Quai d'Orsay*). As befits any foreign ministry, the *Quai* attempts to dominate foreign and security policy. Thus, whenever the

President and his advisors are not actively engaged in initiating or overseeing a change in policy, the *Quai* reigns supreme in the implementation of foreign *and* security policy. Moreover, the *Quai* is extremely powerful: it is staffed by graduates of the *Grandes Ecoles*, whose stature is unequalled by graduates of any other French or European university. Perhaps more important for dominating the security and defense bureaucracy, the *Quai* is the agency charged with receiving and distributing (or not distributing as the case may be) official communications received from outside of France.

Special internal political considerations also contribute to the *Quai's* bureaucratic preeminence in security policy. De Gaulle perceived that NATO's integrated command structure lacked sufficient political oversight. Intent on maintaining tight civilian control over the military, de Gaulle and his successors have relied on the *Quai* to ensure close scrutiny over security policy. Consequently, the *Quai* traditionally has fought vociferously against French participation in the Alliance's military structures.[13] To put it diplomatically, the *Quai* is suspicious of NATO, and makes its concern known at every opportunity.

- Ministry of Defense (*Hôtel de Brienne*). As a consequence of the Gaullist objective of ensuring civil control over the military, the Ministry of Defense has long had scant influence in the formulation of national strategy and security policy. As a result, it historically has operated at a disadvantage in the interagency policy formulation process, a situation compounded by the presence of a cadre of politico-military and security affairs experts in the Foreign Ministry. Thus, despite the fact that many military and civilian officials have long wished for closer ties to NATO, change has been precluded by the relative weakness of the *Hotel de Brienne*.

The situation has recently changed. In 1992 the Minister of Defense, Pierre Joxe, reorganized and strengthened the *Délégation aux Etudes Générales* with top-flight civilian and military security analysts and renamed it the *Délégation aux Affairs Stratégique* (DAS). This reorganization better prepared him when he and his ministry sallied forth into the interagency policy-formulation process.[14] Moreover, the elevation of Admiral Jacques Lanxade to Chief of Staff of the armed forces, the French experience in the Gulf War, and the deployment of sizable numbers of French forces to the former Yugoslavia have increased dramatically the Ministry's influence in the interagency formulation of national strategy and security policy. In short, many in the French government, and particularly within the security policy apparatus, recognize that the new European security environment requires input from the *Hôtel de Brienne* in the policymaking process.

- Office of the Prime Minister (*Hôtel Matignon*). Given the President of the Republic's *domaine réservé* in defense and security policy, the Prime Minister traditionally has wielded little power in these areas. However, with the return to power of the conservatives (*Rassemblement pour la Répu-*

bique—RPR, headed by Jacques Chirac, and the *Union pour la Démocratie Française*—UDF, led by former president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing), France confronted a second instance of government divided between a president of a party different from the majority party in parliament. The first period of such *cohabitation* occurred when Jacques Chirac—President Mitterrand's arch political enemy—was Prime Minister from 1986 to 1988.[15] Because of that tumultuous experience, Mitterrand has gone out of his way to ensure a solid working relationship with the current Prime Minister, Edouard Balladur,[16] a key member of Chirac's RPR.

Evidence of the lengths to which Mitterrand will go to ensure the success of this working relationship with Balladur can be found in the recent release of a Defense White Paper, the first such document published since 1972.[17] French initiatives seeking to end the Yugoslav civil war and the presence of large numbers of French troops there have also necessitated Balladur's support and input into the policymaking process.[18] This cooperative atmosphere (which, not insignificantly, undermines Chirac's chances in the April 1995 presidential elections) has produced a unique situation in which the Prime Minister has regularly been brought into the policymaking circle by the opposition. Despite his early claim that he would not challenge Mitterrand, Balladur has used the opportunity to encroach on the President's security prerogatives and "to gather the strategic community around the prime minister" in preparation for his own run for the presidency in 1995.[19] As result of the Prime Minister's new influence, the *domaine réservé* is now sometimes referred to as a *domaine partagé* (shared domain).[20]

• General Secretariat of National Defense (*Secretariat General de la Défense Nationale*—SGDN). Organizationally under the Prime Minister, the SGDN is not a decisionmaking body, but rather a coordinating agency whose principal activities include managing national intelligence efforts and developing net assessments. SGDN is also the principal coordinating agency for crisis management. Since the 1992 establishment of the *Délégation aux Affairs Stratégique*, the SGDN has lost some influence, particularly in developing net assessments.

• The National Assembly and the Senate (*Assemblée nationale* and *Sénat*). Apart from providing budgetary input as the important long-term defense program is being developed, these legislative bodies exert little influence on national strategy and security policy. The French Parliament lacks the resources and the extensive organizational support (such as the Congressional Research Service and Congressional Budget Office) that allow the US Congress to influence significantly the formulation of defense and security policy. Notwithstanding the activities of their respective legislative committees, and given the power of the *Elysée* in defense and security policy, the legislature is relatively unimportant in formulating national defense and security policy.

When attempting to decipher French policy and attitudes toward NATO, one should never forget that their basis is largely founded on domestic, as opposed to external, political rationales.[21] And although there is a large security policymaking community in the French government, key decisions on policy issues are made by the President, in close collaboration with the Foreign Office. Given the high esteem in which the French public continues to hold General de Gaulle, successive Presidents have been loath to veer far from the tenets of Gaullist defense and security policy.[22] Public discord between Mitterrand and Balladur over Gaullist security and defense principles would remove one of the few remaining bipartisan agreements in French domestic politics. Bipartisan announcements notwithstanding, basic policy differences occasionally produce conflicting signals from the French government.

Strains also exist within the policymaking bureaucracies. For example, under the 5th Republic there have always been differences between the *Elysée* and the *Matignon* over the respective roles of the President and the Prime Minister in the formulation and conduct of security policy. While this has been true even when both offices have been occupied by members of the same political party, it has been exacerbated during the two periods of *cohabitation*.[23]

Other domestic political issues continue to shape French policy toward NATO. Most obvious are the differences between the Socialists and their opponents on the right, the RPR and the UDF. Equally important is the jockeying for position for the upcoming presidential election within the right—Giscard (UDF) and Chirac (RPR)—as well as within the RPR (Chirac vs. Balladur). The result of all these competing and conflicting interactions is that they confuse French policymaking and thus confound outside observers of French security policy.

Changes in French NATO Policy

The year 1991 was a difficult one for French officials. According to David Yost, the Gulf War had a chilling effect upon many of the military and political assumptions undergirding French strategy and security policy.[24] The French experience during the Gulf crisis largely explains the emergence of a dual, not always consistent, French approach to NATO. Clinging to the old axiom that the maintenance of bilateral security ties with the United States should be dealt with separately from NATO issues, some French officials—particularly then-Foreign Minister Roland Dumas—argued that the United States, the sole remaining superpower, needed to be balanced by an independent and more deeply integrated European Community.[25] Hence, France opposed efforts to transform NATO from a purely collective defense organization to a body that could participate in collective security missions (e.g., peacekeeping operations) under Article IV of the NATO Treaty.[26] The French

government offered an alternative that favored a stronger and revitalized European Union (vice the Atlantic Community) which eventually would undertake collective security responsibilities.[27] These French initiatives, sponsored by the Foreign Minister, failed.

During this same period President Mitterrand and Minister of Defense Pierre Joxe also began quietly reassessing and changing French policy toward NATO. Nine months after NATO started examining its strategy, Joxe surprised many analysts by announcing that France would participate in the Alliance's ongoing strategy review.[28] Given that the divisive debates that led up to the Alliance's adoption of the strategy of Flexible Response in 1966 contributed significantly to de Gaulle's decision to leave NATO, this move by the President and his Defense Minister had both substantive and symbolic meaning. France's subsequent endorsement of the Alliance's New Strategic Concept at the November 1991 Rome Summit further underscored the shift in French policy. At the same time, Paris continued to oppose French participation in the Defense Planning Committee (DPC), much to Joxe's disappointment,[29] and remains suspicious of the lack of sufficient political control over the SACEUR.

Notwithstanding the importance of these developments, the most significant step in France's policy evolution was the French decision at the Oslo NATO foreign ministers meeting, in June 1992, to underwrite NATO participation in Article IV peacekeeping missions under the political auspices of the United Nations and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.[30] Equally important, the French are participating under NATO aegis in missions such as Operation Deny Flight and Sharp Guard.[31]

These decisions have had three key effects. First, by agreeing to these new missions for the Alliance, France retreated from its long-held view that NATO should not be employed for missions other than the collective defense of its members.[32] Second, since April 1993, the Chief of the French Military Mission to the NATO Military Committee has participated in Military Committee discussions dealing with "peacekeeping,"[33] however broadly defined.[34] Third, the recent White Paper leaves the door open for the Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff of the armed forces to participate in the North Atlantic Council and the Military Committee, on a case-by-case basis, as decided by the President and Prime Minister.[35]

There are several reasons for these changes in French policy. The French have recognized that the dramatic changes in the European security environment have made NATO more important, not less so as they originally perceived.[36] Their experience with the Western European Union and the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, for example, have reinforced for the French the importance of NATO.

This may be the case particularly in peace operations, which appears to be the most likely venue in which French forces might be employed.

Consequently, the French have insisted on increasing the power and importance of the Military Committee in Article IV missions, at the expense of the Major NATO Commands. This has resulted in the Chief of the French Military Mission to the Military Committee attending its meetings as a participant, rather than as an observer, for the first time since France left the integrated command structure in 1966.

Participation in the Military Committee is certainly more politically palatable within France than allowing the Minister of Defense to attend DPC meetings, because such a symbolic and substantive move would enhance the power and prestige of the defense ministry at the expense of the foreign office. Moreover, if the Minister of Defense attended such meetings, other DPC members might demand that France participate fully in the defense planning process, a policy change the French are unlikely to make any time soon.[37]

Just as the French military has returned to high-level defense discussions in NATO, so, too, the French military now participates in a standing multinational structure in peacetime. Granted, the French have continued as nonintegrated participants in specific NATO functions, such as the integrated air defense systems and certain logistics and infrastructure activities. And agreements to allow cooperation in a crisis between French forces and NATO military commands (e.g., agreements with SACEUR and CINCENT) have existed since 1967.[38] New initiatives, however, indicate the extent of change in French policy.

The first example concerns command and control of the Eurocorps. The Eurocorps, a joint initiative of President Mitterrand and German Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl, emerged from the fall 1991 Franco-German Summit at La Rochelle.[39] The Eurocorps, as proposed, was to be based on an existing Franco-German brigade and provide the foundation for a European Security and Defense Identity. Although the Bush Administration and others in the Alliance strenuously opposed the initiative as another French assault on NATO,[40] the Germans touted the Eurocorps as a means of easing French participation into Alliance military structures.[41] The German view appeared vindicated when, according to press reports, on 21 January 1993 an agreement signed by the Chief of Staff of the Bundeswehr, General Klaus Naumann; then-SACEUR, General John Shalikashvili; and Admiral Lanxade placed the Eurocorps under the operational command (*vice* control) of the SACEUR for the conduct of NATO missions.[42] Thus, not only are French forces assigned to the Eurocorps anchored within a multinational structure, but French forces could be placed under the command of the SACEUR for wartime operations should signatory nations so decide, with all the peacetime implications this entails.[43]

The issues of NATO command and control and French forces in Article IV collective security missions continued their evolution when, at the January 1994 NATO Summit, France agreed to US initiatives for the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Combined/Joint Task Force (C/JTF).[44] While Paris agreed

in principle to both concepts, implementation of the initiatives has not been without expressions of French reluctance. For example, Paris insisted that the Planning Coordination Cell (the nerve center of PfP), while located at SHAPE in Mons, could not be under the control of SACEUR, but would be answerable to the North Atlantic Council in Brussels. Additionally, Paris manifested its long-held suspicions of the SACEUR during discussions concerning the development of the terms of reference for C/JTF.[45] While the French position was perhaps not precisely what the United States and other Alliance countries would have preferred, the mere fact that Paris did not veto these concepts marks a significant change in French policy.[46]

A final notable change in French policy toward NATO relates to weapons of mass destruction. In recognition of the importance of this issue and the absolute need to coordinate related Western efforts, the French have agreed to participate in the Alliance's political and defense committees dealing with nonproliferation.[47] Within the defense committee, France not only participates in the Senior Defence Group on Proliferation, but cochairs the group with the United States.[48] Paris's participation in this group is one of the few times France has joined in a defense committee project since 1966. Clearly, the potential magnitude of the proliferation problem and the overriding need to coordinate efforts with its allies have prompted this important change in French policy.

Implementing French NATO Policy

If it is important to know how French policy toward NATO has changed, it is equally important to understand the manner in which this change in policy has been carried out. Understanding the process of change will identify sources of new problems; it may also provide key indicators of the probability of further change, as well as the durability of recent French initiatives in NATO.

There are two impediments to recognizing change in French policy toward NATO. First, it seems that whenever senior French officials from the Prime Minister's office or the Ministry of Defense announce an apparent policy change, these declarations are almost inevitably followed by denials from the President's office or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[49] Second, in view of past French policy and attitudes toward the Alliance, some observers and officials find it difficult to accept that Paris has changed its NATO policy. This has been the case not only in a historical sense (during the Cold War) but was reinforced by French rhetoric and actions during 1989-92 as the Alliance developed its new strategy and significantly reduced its force structures.

The choice of Admiral Jacques Lanxade as the primary agent of change has been one of the more remarkable aspects of France's policy toward NATO. Mitterrand chose a military official for this task, as opposed to the Foreign Minister or a professional diplomat, for two reasons. First, as the

*"While French policy toward NATO appears
to have changed, the depth of that change
remains open to question."*

President's Chief of Military Staff in the *Elysée* during the Gulf War, Lanxade was well placed to coordinate France's involvement in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, especially in sensitive political discussions with French allies, and particularly with the United States. Following the end of hostilities in April 1991, Admiral Lanxade became Chief of Staff of the armed forces. Because he enjoys Mitterrand's confidence, he has been able to restructure the French armed forces, paying particular attention to joint and combined operations. This reorganization and emphasis on joint issues, in turn, supports Mitterrand's new policy of enhanced selectivity with NATO.

Second, as noted earlier, internal French politics helped drive Lanxade's selection for this task. Since the start of the second period of *cohabitation*, the issue of NATO has taken on an interesting partisan flavor, beyond its normal levels. Many currently assume that the race in the forthcoming French presidential elections is between Jacques Chirac (the leader of the RPR and mayor of Paris) and RPR Prime Minister Balladur (a previous Chirac supporter). Within this unusual intraparty struggle, Foreign Minister Alain Juppé supports Chirac, while Minister of Defense François Léotard supports Balladur.

As a result of this partisan political morass, Lanxade is the one individual capable of operating above partisan politics while still maintaining close relations with *all* the major political actors, particularly President Mitterrand. Indeed, French officials readily—albeit privately—acknowledge that Lanxade is probably the most influential and powerful official in the area of defense policymaking and implementation that France has seen in many years.[50]

Conclusion

While the preceding analysis indicates that French policy toward NATO appears to have changed, the depth of that change remains open to question: Do the issues described above constitute a fundamental change in policy, or has policy remained relatively fixed while the French pursue new means to their long-established ends? Even if French policy has changed, have attitudes in key elements of the French policy bureaucracy altered sufficiently to carry out the change, or will bureaucratic foot-dragging forestall full-scale implementation?

On balance, it should be clear that long-standing French policies toward the Alliance have changed. Before asserting that France has "returned" to the Alliance, however, one must understand that Mitterrand's reconsideration of France's relationship with NATO will not result in a return to status quo ante 1966.[51] Indeed, French policymakers—even those who most strongly support NATO—continue to pronounce that France will not return to the Alliance's integrated military structure.[52] Nor do the developments constitute a rapprochement, as suggested by one French journal.[53] Simply put, apparently irreconcilable differences remain between France and NATO. The determined independence of the French nuclear deterrent and strategy, and the French phobia about political oversight of NATO military authorities appear unlikely to be changed regardless of who wins the 1995 presidential election. A reconciliation does not a marriage remake.

While France is drawing closer to NATO, the Alliance should expect France to continue to pursue a policy of NATO *à la carte*. Certainly, the menu of French choices appears to be expanding, but the Alliance should expect the French to opt only for the perquisites that support French national interests, and to defer selections that would add new—and costly—responsibilities: contributions to infrastructure funding; adherence to NATO planning requirements; meeting NATO training and readiness standards; and supporting NATO standardization, rationalization, and interoperability requirements.

If one accepts the proposition that French policy toward NATO has changed, it is advisable to examine the nature and extent of these changes. The fact that the *Quai*, traditionally the center of French diplomacy and security policy formulation, effectively has been marginalized in the process—and by the Chief of Staff of the armed forces no less—does not bode well for long-term continuity of policy developed and supported by Admiral Lanxade. Simply put, once Mitterrand and Lanxade pass from the scene (as Mitterrand soon will, with Lanxade likely to follow quickly thereafter), will their successors continue these policies or will the *Quai* reassert its traditional opposition to French participation in the military structure of the Alliance?

Encouragingly, Balladur, a strong candidate for the presidency, favors this fresh approach to NATO, as evinced in the White Paper. However, whether Balladur, Chirac, or Giscard d'Estaing wins the election, the new President may find it difficult to stray far from the course charted by Mitterrand. Given the political and security situation in Europe, there simply is little other choice.[54]

Thus, even with a surface change in *policy*, an understanding of the deeper currents of French *attitudes* toward these changes, particularly within the policy bureaucracy, takes on added importance. Given the past attitude toward NATO by the *Quai* (as well as by some officials in the *Elysée)*, the absence of strong pressure from the President may allow recidivist officials in the *Quai* and *Elysée* to retard, if not sabotage, improvements in relations

with NATO. That the Minister of Defense continues to be proscribed from attending NATO DPC meetings (much to the displeasure of Minister of Defense Léotard) underscores the continued institutional power the Foreign Office enjoys over the Defense Minister.[55] And disaffected officials need not openly assault policy to kill it; they can simply let it wither and die from neglect. So while Paris can be expected to support some new NATO initiatives and draw closer to the Alliance, one should also expect standard, time-worn rationales to be trotted out in opposition to others. Despite this qualified reconciliation, therefore, France will continue to befuddle NATO and remain a source of frustration within the Alliance.

So, while French policy toward NATO has changed, attitudes in critical parts of the French government remain unrepentant, largely for bureaucratic and domestic political reasons. Limited change, French demands that even these circumscribed revisions occur on French terms, and residual attitudes in key segments of the French policy bureaucracy emphasize the fact that in effect, if not in principle, France continues to follow a policy of enhanced selectivity when dealing with NATO, which could create as many problems as it solves.

Such an approach should not come as a surprise. Nations are expected to act in their own national interests and pursue policies that further those interests. To assume otherwise is imprudent. But recent French initiatives should be viewed positively. These initial, hesitant steps may eventually lead to fuller French participation in the Alliance; the United States and other NATO partners should encourage France to return to the fold.

NOTES

1. On the surface, the image of French policy is of French independence in defense and security affairs, while maintaining, in public, a distant relationship with NATO. The image and reality are not the same. Following France's ostensible divorce from NATO, Allied commanders and their French counterparts maintained close, if not intimate, working relationships. As Frédéric Bozo documented in his comprehensive study on this "secret" relationship, French independence from NATO has, indeed, been qualified to say the least. See, Frédéric Bozo, *La France et l'OTAN; De la guerre froide au nouvel order européen* (Paris: Masson, 1991). When considered with France's very close relationship with the United States, to include nuclear research and development cooperation, the French claim of having maintained defense independence has to be assessed with skepticism. Apropos nuclear cooperation see *The Washington Post*, 29 May 1989 and 2 June 1989.

2. See Michael M. Harrison, *The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1981), p. 118.

3. It should be mentioned that one of the reasons for the widespread support in France of tenets of Gaullist defense policy over time is because it encapsulates long-standing French defense traditions. See Diego Ruiz Palmer, "French Strategic Options in the 1990s," *Adelphi Papers, No. 260* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Summer 1991), p. 3. For excellent historical background on the development of Gaullist security policy see Harrison, *The Reluctant Ally*, pp. 116-34.

4. For an excellent assessment of French strategy and force structure see David S. Yost, "France," in *The Defense Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1994), pp. 233-77.

5. Pierre Lellouche, "France in Search of Security," *Foreign Affairs*, 72 (Spring 1993), 122. Lellouche is the foreign affairs counsellor to Jacques Chirac, leader of the RPR political party.

6. See *Frankfurter Allgemeine,* 19 July 1990. For an excellent historical perspective on this important bilateral relationship see Julius W. Friend, *The Linchpin: French-German Relations, 1950-1990,* The Washington Papers No. 154, The Center for Strategic and International Studies (New York: Praeger, 1991).

7. See Anne-Marie Le Gloannec, "The Implications of German Unification for Western Europe" in *The New Germany and the New Europe,* ed. Paul B. Stares (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1992), p. 266. "Deeper" integration implies developing a common currency and common political, social, and other programs throughout the EU.

8. The Visegrad states include Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary.

9. See Lellouche, p. 128.

10. David Yost, "Mitterrand and Defense and Security Policy," *French Politics and Society,* 9 (Summer-Fall 1991), 146-47.

11. See *Agence France-Presse* (Paris), 5 May 1994 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS-WEU-94-088, 6 May 1994, p. 26.

12. It is interesting to note that François Mitterrand was for many years de Gaulle's most determined critic, leading the Socialist Party in rejecting de Gaulle's defense policy. Yet, upon taking power in 1981, Mitterrand and the Socialists continued to support the tenets of that policy. For an excellent treatment of this issue, see Philip H. Gordon, *A Certain Idea of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1993), pp. 106-18.

13. See Harrison, *The Reluctant Ally,* pp. 118-19.

14. In effect, DAS has become the policy cloister in the ministry, which has brought it into conflict, at times, with the *Etat-Major des Armées* (Joint Staff).

15. For background on this period see Gordon, *A Certain Idea of France,* pp. 144-57.

16. Indeed, some in his own party have complained that Mitterrand has done this at the expense of destroying politically his successor as leader of the party, Michel Rocard, and in effect, the Socialist Party itself. See *The Washington Post,* 23 June 1994.

17. See *Livre Blanc sur la Défense,* Paris, Ministère de la Défense, 1994. Note that another key reason for producing this document was to demonstrate, no matter how illusory, the continuation of bipartisan cooperation in the area of defense.

18. For an excellent assessment of French policy toward the Yugoslav conflict, see Pia Christina Wood, "France and the Post Cold War Order: The Case of Yugoslavia," *European Security,* 3 (Spring 1994), 129-52.

19. David Buchan, "Paris makes European security ambitions clear," *London Financial Times,* 24 February 1994, p. 2.

20. See *Le Quotidien de Paris,* 12-13 February 1994.

21. See, for example, David Buchan's commentary on recent policy formulations in his article, "Paris makes European security ambitions clear," p. 2.

22. Daniel Vernet, "The Dilemmas of French Foreign Policy," *International Affairs,* 68 (No. 4, 1992), 661.

23. See Buchan, "Paris makes European security ambitions clear," for an example of the current period of *cohabitation.*

24. See David Yost, "France and the Gulf War of 1990-1991: Political-Military Lessons Learned," *The Journal of Strategic Studies,* 16 (September 1993), 339-74. The evaluation of Jacques Baumel (former foreign minister and current RPR deputy) of the French security environment bolsters Yost's assessment. See *Le Monde* (Paris), 1 April 1993, p. 2.

25. Yost, "France and the Gulf War," p. 354.

26. The NATO treaty establishes the Alliance as a collective defense organization—i.e., nations bound together to defend themselves from outside aggression. Since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, some have attempted to use the consultative provisions contained in Article IV of the treaty as a justification for increased emphasis on NATO as an agent of reliance on collective security (i.e., maintaining peace and stability among the members of the organization) missions such as peacekeeping or peace enforcement. See Articles IV and V of the Washington Treaty, which can be found in NATO, *Facts and Figures* (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1989), Appendix 1, Document 2.

27. This particular policy was seen in Paris's opposition to the German-US initiative to create the North Atlantic Cooperation Council within NATO, and France's spurring the European Community to mediate the growing conflict in Yugoslavia. François Heisbourg, former Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and current vice president of Matra Corporation, argues that the French intended to use these initiatives to destroy NATO. See François Heisbourg, "A French View: Developing a European Identity," *The Officer,* January 1993, p. 31.

28. See *Le Monde* (Paris), 19 March 1991.

29. Joxe was particularly upset because he could not attend meetings of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, to which only France in the Alliance did not send a representative. See *Le Monde* (Paris), 30 September 1992.

30. NATO Press Communique M-NAC-1(92)51, Brussels, NATO Press Service, 4 June 1992, p. 4.

31. For details of Deny Flight see Allied Forces Southern Europe, "Fact Sheet—OPERATION DENY FLIGHT," Naples, 24 March 1994. For details of Operation Sharp Guard see Allied Forces Southern Europe, "Fact Sheet—NATO/WEU OPERATIONAL SHARP GUARD," Naples, 7 July 1994. Interestingly, to account for French sensitivities, Operation Sharp Guard is carried out under the authority of the Councils of NATO and WEU.

32. A sympathetic view would hold that French officials value too highly the Alliance's collective defense provisions to allow NATO to be damaged by participating in politically sensitive collective security operations. A less charitable interpretation holds that following the all-but-debacle by the European Community in the former Yugoslavia, France realized that the only way the United States would actively deal with these crises was through NATO, and therefore Paris had no other choice.

33. See *Le Monde* (Paris), 14 May 1993.

34. See *Le Monde* (Paris), 21 December 1993.

35. See *Livre Blanc sur la Défense*, p. 37.

36. "Les évolutions intervenues depuis 1991 dans l'organisation et les activités de l'Alliance doivent être prolongées et amplifiées," *Livre Blanc sur la Défense*, p. 35.

37. For a persuasive argument for France to take a more pragmatic view toward participating in the DPC see Bozo, *La France et l'OTAN*, pp. 206-07.

38. See ibid., pp. 101-04; and, Diego Ruiz Palmer, "France," in *European Security Policy After the Revolutions of 1989*, ed. Jeffrey Simon (Washington: National Defense Univ. Press, 1991), p. 232.

39. For an excellent description and analysis of the Eurocorps, see Rafael Estrella, "After the NATO Summit: New Structures and Modalities for Military Co-operation," Draft General Report AL 76 DSC(94) 2, Brussels, North Atlantic Assembly, May 1994, pp. 7-12.

40. See for example, Jeane Kirkpatrick's essay, "Is France Trying to Torpedo NATO?" *CQ Researcher*, 21 August 1992, p. 729.

41. See *ADN* (Berlin), 28 November 1992, in *FBIS*-WEU-92-230, 30 November 1992, p. 1; and *Le Monde*, 12 March 1993, in *FBIS*-WEU-93-057, 26 March 1993, p. 2.

42. See Daniel Vernet's excellent article in *Le Monde* (Paris), 12 March 1993; *Le Monde* (Paris), 7 May 1993; Karl Feldmeyer's essay in, *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 5 December 1992; and *The New York Times*, 1 December 1992.

43. For example, French forces should be subject to NATO training and readiness requirements. They also must be capable of operating with NATO forces, thus obligating the French to ensure adequate interoperability, standardization, and rationalization between their forces and NATO logistics and support activities.

44. See Press Communique M-1(94)3, Brussels, NATO Press Service, 11 January 1994. For details of the Partnership for Peace program see, Press Communique M-1(94)2, Partnership for Peace: Invitation, Brussels, NATO Press Service, 10 January 1994. A solid description and analysis of Combined Joint Task Forces can be found in Stanley R. Sloan, "Combined Joint task Forces (CJTF) and New Missions for NATO," CRS Report for Congress, 94-249S, 17 March 1994.

45. For an excellent and insightful assessment of this debate, see Bruce George, "After the NATO Summit," Draft General Report, AL 88 PC(94) 2, Brussels, North Atlantic Assembly, May 1994, pp. 4-5.

46. The late NATO Secretary-General Manfred Wörner stated that CJTF should enhance French participation in NATO military activities without its complete reintegration. See *Le Monde* (Paris), 16 December 1993.

47. For details see Press Release M-NAC-1(94)45, "Alliance Policy Framework on Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," Brussels, NATO Press Service, 9 June 1994.

48. See George, "After the NATO Summit," p. 6.

49. See *The Economist* (London), 3 October 1992, p. 34. The numerous experiences of former Minister of Defense Pierre Joxe (*Le Monde* [Paris], 10-11 November 1991; *Le Monde* [Paris], 30 September 1992; and *Le Monde*, 4 December 1992), as well as the late Prime Minister Pierre Bérégovoy (*Le Monde* [Paris], 6-7 September 1992), commenting on new policy initiatives toward NATO and subsequent governmental denials, are good cases in point.

50. This is not intended to disparage the efforts of former Minister of Defense Pierre Joxe to realign France's NATO policy. Before *cohabitation* he contributed significantly.

51. See *The Baltimore Sun*, 16 January 1994.

52. Of the many examples, see particularly, *Le Quotidien de Paris*, 20 December 1993, in *FBIS*-WEU-93-242, 20 December 1993, p. 35; *Liberation* (Paris), 24 February 1994, in *FBIS*-WEU-94-037, p. 35; and *Agence France-Presse* (Paris) 5 May 1994, in *FBIS*-WEU-94-088, 6 May 1994, p. 26.

53. See *Liberation* (Paris), 24 February 1994, in *FBIS*-WEU-94-037, 24 February 1994, pp. 28-30.

54. Interestingly, according to French defense expert Olivier Debouzy, it was during the presidency of Giscard d'Estaing, a Gaullist and not during Mitterrand's "watch," that the most far-reaching conceptual and doctrinal changes in Gaullist defense policy took place. Cf., Debouzy's book review of Gordon, *A Certain Idea of France* in, *Survival*, 36 (Spring 1994), 186.

55. See *Le Monde* (Paris), 21 December 1993.

The Chemical Weapons Treaty: Protective Measures are Essential

GRAHAM S. PEARSON

The signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention in Paris on 13-15 January 1993 by 130 nations represented a significant and welcome step forward for international security.[1] The Convention, which bans the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons, is the first multilateral arms control treaty *with verification* to ban an entire class of weapons. Article X addresses assistance and protection against chemical weapons and declares that "nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as impeding the right of any State Party to conduct research into, develop, produce, acquire, transfer or use means of protection against chemical weapons, for purposes not prohibited under this Convention."[2]

This article addresses the continuing need for chemical protection as an essential partner to the ban on chemical weapons. There is a direct linkage between the effectiveness of protective measures against chemical weapons and the range of chemicals that, if misused as weapons, present a risk to the Chemical Weapons Convention. The more effective the protective measures, the fewer the chemicals that have military utility to a potential aggressor. Likewise, the fewer the number of chemicals that are useful as weapons, the fewer the number that present a risk to the Convention and the easier it will be to control these chemicals with arms and export controls. The value of chemical weapons to a potential aggressor is made more uncertain both by the reduced utility arising from more effective protection and by the increased difficulty and risk associated with acquiring chemical weapons under taut arms and export controls. Our desire to strengthen national and

international security demands that we pursue this symbiotic relationship of effective protective measures and intrusive arms control; pressures to reduce protection and to dilute the hard-won provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention must be resisted.

The Chemical Weapons Convention

Scope. The Chemical Weapons Convention that opened for signature in Paris in January 1993 covers all chemicals employed as chemical weapons and has provisions for chemicals that may be developed or present a risk in the future. It is thus a truly comprehensive agreement. Article II defines chemical weapons as the following, together or separately:

> a. Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes.
>
> b. Munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals specified in subparagraph a, which would be released as a result of the employment of such munitions and devices.
>
> c. Any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions and devices specified in subparagraph b.[3]

It goes on to define toxic chemicals as

> Any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals. This includes all such chemicals, regardless of their origin or of their method of production, and regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere.[4]

Verification. The verification regime, in an annex of more than 100 pages to the Convention, focuses on those materials that present the greatest risk to the Convention.[5] In addition, the provisions for routine inspection are complemented by provisions for challenge inspection of any site. The onus

Dr. Graham S. Pearson is Director General of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment at Porton Down, Salisbury, Wiltshire, England. He took his B.Sc. in chemistry and his Ph.D. at the University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, Scotland. He then did two years of postdoctoral research at the University of Rochester, Rochester, New York, before returning to the UK to join the Rocket Propulsion Establishment in 1962. He was Director General Research and Development in the Royal Ordnance Factories before coming to Porton Down in 1984. In recent years he has participated in negotiations relating to both chemical and biological weapons arms control. He has contributed to *Biological Weapons: Weapons of the Future?* (1993), *US Security in an Uncertain Era* (1993), and *Non Conventional Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East* (1993).

in these challenge inspections is clearly on the inspected state to satisfy the concerns of the challenging state and of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.[6] Although the verification regime is not as intrusive as the United Kingdom—and others—would have liked,[7] it is important to elaborate these detailed procedures in such a way that the regime is as effective as possible. The more intrusive the challenge regime, the more difficult it is for a State Party seeking to evade the provisions of the Convention to conceal its prohibited activities.

The verification regime needs to minimize the potential for concealment of prohibited activities. This elaboration will be carried out by the Preparatory Commission which began its work in The Hague in February 1993. The aim of the Preparatory Commission is to have the Convention worked out fully by the time it enters into force, which occurs 180 days after 65 states have ratified the Convention, but not less than two years from the date at which the Convention opened for signature.[8] The earliest possible date for entry into force was thus the early spring of 1995; it is now clear that entry into force will be later in 1995 or possibly 1996. The Convention then allows ten years in which to destroy existing stocks of chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities. In the event of difficulties in destruction of chemical weapons, there is a provision for possible extension of this deadline to 15 years at most after the Convention's entry into force.[9]

Proliferation. Although 144 nations endorsed the text of the Chemical Weapons Convention at the General Assembly of the United Nations in November 1992, only 130 states signed in Paris. About 60 additional states were invited to sign but did not do so, including some that are assessed as having or seeking to acquire chemical weapons. The United Kingdom Defence White Paper of July 1992 notes that some 20 states are considered either to have or to be seeking to acquire a chemical weapons capability.[10] In February 1993, James Woolsey, the US Director of Central Intelligence, said that "more than two dozen countries have programs to research and develop chemical weapons, and a number have stockpiled such weapons."[11] There is therefore a continuing threat to security from the chemical weapons capabilities of several nations.[12]

The signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention is an element of the web of deterrence[13] comprising:

- intrusive chemical arms control
- effective chemical protective measures
- broad chemical export monitoring and controls
- a range of determined national and international responses to non-compliance

The purpose of this web of deterrence is to encourage nations considering the acquisition of chemical weapons to judge that such acquisition or the use of chemical weapons will be politically unacceptable.

Assistance and Protection. Article X of the Convention is concerned with assistance and protection against chemical weapons. It not only makes it clear that the Convention in no way impedes the right of States Parties to develop protective measures, it provides for assistance on chemical protective measures to be offered to other States Parties. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate, and shall have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material, and scientific and technological information concerning protective measures against chemical weapons. Moreover, there is a requirement in Article X for the annual provision of information on national programs related to protective measures to increase the transparency of such programs;[14] this requirement will necessitate a declaration comparable to the confidence-building measure on biological defence programs.[15]

Protective Measures Against Chemical Weapons

Historical Considerations. Chemical weapons have historically been used against unprotected personnel. In World War I, the initial use of chemical weapons against Allied forces led to the rapid development of protective measures. Since World War I, chemical weapons have been used against unprotected personnel in Abyssinia in the 1930s, in Southeast Asia, and at least twice during the 1980s: in the Iraq/Iran conflict and by Iraq against the Kurds in the north of the country.[16]

Chemical weapons were not used in World War II, nor were they used by Iraq against the Coalition forces in the Gulf War of 1990-91. The reasons chemical weapons were not used in these two instances are complex, but the ability of states to provide their armed forces with effective protective measures undoubtedly contributed to an awareness that the use of chemical weapons might have limited military utility. In the case of the Gulf War, the Coalition placed great emphasis on deterring Saddam Hussein from using his weapons of mass destruction; the facilities associated with those weapons were among the earliest targets in the bombing campaign.[17]

Protective Measures. Personnel without protection are vulnerable to any toxic material. As soon as some effective protection is provided, the range of materials that can be used by a potential aggressor is reduced. If the target population has a wide range of effective protective measures, an aggressor will be uncertain as to whether his chemical weapons capability will have military utility and, indeed, may conclude that using his chemical weapons will not give him a significant, worthwhile military advantage.

Effective protective measures are necessary for the armed forces of any state that may be exposed to the use of chemical weapons against them. In addition to the 20 states that are assessed to have or to be seeking to acquire chemical weapons, it should also be recognized that in regional conflicts such as that in the former Republic of Yugoslavia, there is a risk that the parties involved may seek to use any toxic chemicals—such as industrially available

chemicals—to gain a perceived advantage against both military and civilian personnel. There is a wide potential spectrum of chemical and biological agents, and the thrust of work on protective measures is to produce broadband defensive measures that are effective against as much of the spectrum as possible.[18]

The Range of Protective Measures. Protective measures embrace a range of activities and are not limited to the use of respiratory protection, important though that is. Work to address new, potential hazards that the use of chemicals may present is of particular importance. Such hazard assessment leads not only to advice on operations and tactics to minimize the hazard but also to determining the performance criteria needed for effective detection and protection. In addition, such studies are vital to develop concepts for using and deploying detection and protection equipment.

The first element of the essential range of protective measures is a means of detecting the approach of a hazardous concentration before the target personnel have inhaled a harmful amount. Once warning has been given, physical protection needs to be donned or collective protection facilities entered. The principal element of physical protection is the respirator, since most chemical agents affect through the respiratory tract; some chemical agents, such as mustard and the nerve agents, are effective through the skin, and protective suits need to be donned if there is a potential threat from these agents. The hazard then needs to be monitored so that physical protection can be relaxed as soon as it is safe to do so. Contamination control is needed should persistent agents have been used in the attack. Last, but by no means least, medical countermeasures need to be available either as pretreatment or prophylaxis to improve the protection of the body prior to an attack or to administer therapy after exposure to an attack.

The aim of protective measures is to provide effective protection against the most probable challenge; a balance needs to be struck between the degree of protection and the assessed severity of the attack. The aim is to optimize the level of protection without incurring an unacceptable physiological burden. Finally, protective measures must not be made available to potential aggressors, as the availability of the protective measures will enable the aggressor to evaluate those measures, determine their performance characteristics and vulnerabilities, and hence know how to modify his chemical weapons so as to defeat the protection. After all, a state having a chemical weapons capability will seek to improve that capability through the use of new agents with increased toxicity, improved delivery means, or the identification of materials that defeat protective measures. The vulnerabilities and performance characteristics of protective measures therefore need to be safeguarded.

This is not incompatible with the requirement in the Chemical Weapons Convention that States Parties undertake to facilitate, and shall have

the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange concerning protective measures against chemical weapons. Individual states currently consider on a case-by-case basis what information and material to release to other states. "Fullest possible exchange" reflects decisions made by the individual states concerned in the exchange, having taken into account their individual national security concerns.

The argument that work on protective measures can be readily misused for offensive purposes is false on several counts. First, states that have abandoned offensive chemical weapons will have instituted policies that cease all such work and, following the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention, states intending to ratify that Convention will enact national legislation to make work on chemical weapons a criminal offence.[19] Consequently, the national norm will rapidly reach a situation in which chemical weapons play no part. Additionally, states that have genuinely abandoned chemical weapons will have nothing to hide; they should be ready and willing to demonstrate the abandonment of their offensive chemical weapons program.

Second, although technically work on protective measures to provide defence against chemical weapons requires an understanding of how such weapons might be used and what their effects might be, this is very different from developing the capabilities required to produce, disseminate, and use chemical weapons in a militarily effective way. Undertaking the latter would risk international opprobrium and possible responses should such prohibited work be detected. The understanding that is needed to devise effective protective measures also will contribute to maintaining the effectiveness of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Such an understanding will ensure that lists of chemical agents are up to date and so avoid the danger that over time the Convention might become focused on the prohibition of obsolete chemical weapons rather than ensuring the continuing prohibition of whatever chemicals present a risk to the Convention.

Chemical Arms Control and Protection: The Vital Partners

The Chemical Weapons Convention alone cannot guarantee that no state will seek to acquire chemical weapons. Some states may not sign the Convention; others that do sign the Convention may convince themselves that there are loopholes in it which can be exploited, or they may covertly break out from the Convention. The Convention alone is unlikely to deter a determined cheater.

This points again to the fact that there is a direct linkage between the Chemical Weapons Convention, the availability of effective protective measures, and improved national and international security. As the effectiveness of protective measures increases, the utility of traditional chemical warfare agents is reduced, and potential aggressors will be forced to develop

> *"The Chemical Weapons Treaty alone
> cannot guarantee that no state will seek
> to acquire chemical weapons."*

and acquire advanced agents whose utility as chemical weapons will be much less certain.

The better the protective measures available, so the range of chemicals that may be used effectively is significantly reduced. Protective measures that reduce the range of chemicals which could be used effectively directly reduce the range of chemicals that need to be addressed by arms and export controls. In addition, as the effectiveness of protective measures increases, a potential aggressor who seeks to acquire an effective chemical weapons capability will be forced to obtain larger quantities of agent, which will be harder to conceal under the more intrusive verification regime of the Chemical Weapons Convention. There is clearly a complimentary partnership between the maintenance of effective protective measures and the effectiveness of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

These direct relationships between the effectiveness of protective measures and the effectiveness of the Chemical Weapons Convention establish the need to maintain the effectiveness of protective measures after the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention.[20] Any tendencies to relax chemical protection must be resisted. Such relaxations would serve to insidiously start to undermine and reduce the effectiveness of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The range of materials that might be used by an aggressor would increase, as would the ease of cheating under the Convention.

The effectiveness of verification measures in the Chemical Weapons Convention and the effectiveness of protective measures together produce a greatly enhanced deterrent effect. As the Chemical Weapons Convention becomes more intrusive, the probability of detection of noncompliance increases and the deterrent effect upon states contemplating acquisition of chemical weapons will be significantly greater. In a closely similar way, the more effective the protective measures are, the greater is the uncertainty of the utility of chemical weapons to a potential aggressor. Additionally, of course, the Convention can be effective only in detecting and deterring States Parties to the Convention; it will have no effect on those who do not sign, who fail to ratify the Convention, or who cheat.

The Way Ahead

Any relaxation in providing effective protective measures against chemical warfare agents would be destabilizing and would reduce security. Relaxation would increase the potential utility of chemical weapons to an aggressor and might lead such a state to judge that chemical weapons would provide sufficient tactical advantage over a potential enemy to justify the risk of the associated opprobrium. There is, therefore, no justification for any relaxation in pursuing protective measures against chemical weapons for the foreseeable future.

It is important now to work with the Preparatory Commission to ensure that the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention are made as effective and strong as possible. The Convention needs to enter into force at the earliest possible date in 1995, and states have been encouraged to ratify the Convention as soon as possible. Following the Convention's entry into force, confidence needs to be gained that declarations are full and correct, that the verification regime is indeed effective, and that chemical weapons and chemical weapon production facilities have been declared and are being destroyed by all States Parties assessed to possess chemical weapons.

There is at present no indication that the proliferation of chemical weapons has declined or ceased. Although to date over 150 states have now signed the Convention, not all nations assessed as having or seeking to acquire chemical weapons have signed it. At this writing only 14 nations have lodged their instruments of ratification to the Convention. There is a long way to go before all nations have become States Parties, and even then those possessing chemical weapons have ten to 15 years to destroy any declared chemical weapons or chemical weapon facilities. The verification regimes of the Convention need yet to be established and confidence gained in the effectiveness of those regimes and of the Convention. There remains therefore a continuing and compelling requirement for effective protective measures for the foreseeable future.

The Chemical Weapons Convention and the maintenance of effective protective measures are vital partners. Together they will enhance both national and international security by helping to rid the world of the threat of chemical weapons. Together these measures should cause potential aggressors to conclude that the acquisition and use of chemical weapons will be not only politically unacceptable but militarily ineffective.

NOTES

1. United Nations, *Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction* (United Nations, 1993, 93-05070). Hereinafter referred to as *CW Convention 1993.*
2. Ibid., p. 36. Article X, "Assistance and Protection against Chemical Weapons." A State Party is a state that has ratified or acceded to a treaty.

3. Ibid., p. 4. Article II, "Definitions and Criteria."

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., pp. 54-166, "Annex on Implementation and Verification" (Verification Annex). The annex has 11 parts which address Definitions, General Rules of Verification, and General Provisions for Verification Measures relating to initial inspections and facility agreements. Other parts of the annex address the main areas of the Convention—destruction of chemical weapons, chemical weapon production facilities, regimes for activities not prohibited under the Convention, challenge inspection, and investigations of alleged use of chemical weapons. Also see schedules in pp. 47 to 53, "Annex on Chemicals." Schedule 1 lists chemicals that have been used as chemical weapons or present a high risk to the Convention *and* have little or no use for purposes not prohibited under the Convention. Schedule 2 chemicals present a risk to the Convention or may be used as a precursor to Schedule 1 chemicals *and* are not produced in large commercial quantities for purposes not prohibited under the Convention. Schedule 3 chemicals present a risk to the Convention *and* may be produced in large commercial quantities for purposes not prohibited under the Convention.

6. Ibid., p. 33, Article IX, "Consultations, Cooperation and Fact-Finding." Paragraph 11 states that following a request for a challenge inspection, the inspected state party shall have "the right and the obligation to make every reasonable effort to demonstrate its compliance with this Convention."

7. See, for example, John Walker, "Challenge Inspections and Intrusiveness," in *Chemical Disarmament and US Security*, ed. Brad Roberts (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992), p. 91.

8. *CW Convention 1993*, p. 45, Article XXI, "Entry into Force" para. 1.

9. *CW Convention 1993*, p. 11, Article IV, "Chemical Weapons" para. 6. The possible extension to 15 years is in the Verification Annex, p. 89, para. 26.

10. *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1992*, Cm. 1981 (London: HMSO, July 1992), p.7, para 104.

11. R James Woolsey, Director of Central Intelligence, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, "Proliferation Threats of the 1990s," 24 February 1993.

12. A useful appreciation of chemical weapon possessor states is given in US House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, "Countering the Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat in the Post-Soviet World," Report of the Special Inquiry into the Chemical and Biological Threat, 102d Cong., 2d sess., 23 February 1993, Committee Print No. 15, pp. 9-14. This study indicates that six states in the "known, probable, or possible" categories and five states in the "doubtful" category had not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention as of 15 January 1993.

13. Graham S. Pearson, "Prospects for Chemical and Biological Arms Control: The Web of Deterrence," *The Washington Quarterly*, 16 (Spring 1993), 145.

14. *CW Convention 1993*, p. 36. Article X, "Assistance and Protection Against Chemical Weapons," para. 3, provides for the fullest possible exchange of equipment and information, while para. 4 requires annual information on national programs related to protective purposes.

15. United Nations, *The Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction*, Geneva, 9-27 September 1991, Final Document, BWC/CONF.III/23 (Geneva: United Nations, GE.91-62715—Jan 1992-500).

16. Historical appreciations of chemical weapons are numerous. See for example Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, *A Higher Form of Killing* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1982); Brad Roberts, "Chemical Disarmament and International Security," *Adelphi Paper 267* (London: IISS, Spring 1992), p. 6; and G. B. Carter, *Porton Down: 75 Years of Chemical and Biological Research* (London: HMSO, 1992).

17. *Statement on the Defence Estimates, Britain's Defence for the '90s*, Vol. I, Cm. 1559-I (London: HMSO, July 1991), p. 17, para. 205, and H. Norman Schwarzkopf, *It Doesn't Take a Hero* (New York: Bantam Press, 1992), p. 389.

18. Graham S. Pearson, "The Technical Challenge to Counter the CBW Spectrum," Third International Symposium on Protection against Chemical Warfare Agents, Umea, Sweden, 11-16 June 1989, pp. 375-83.

19. An analogy is the Biological Weapons Act (1974) that was passed by the UK Parliament to implement nationally the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972 prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling, and acquisition of biological weapons. The act makes it a criminal offence for anyone in the United Kingdom to work on biological weapons.

20. See for example, G. H. Cooper, "The Importance of Protection and Detection following a Chemical Weapons Convention," in *Proceedings of the 3d International Symposium on Protection against Chemical Warfare Agents*, Umea, Sweden, 11-16 June 1989, pp. 385-90. Also see the following, all from the *Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Protection against Chemical Warfare Agents*, Stockholm, Sweden, 8-12 June 1992: Peter Dunn, "Chemical Defence and Chemical Disarmament—The Need for Both Activities," pp. 9-27; Graham S. Pearson, "The Continuing Need for Chemical and Biological Defence Following a Chemical Weapons Convention," pp. 353-58; and Georges Fulachier, "The Future of Chemical Defence: The Next Decade Time Frame," pp. 359-63.

Aging Successfully:
The Example of Robert E. Lee

M. W. PARKER, W. A. ACHENBAUM,
G. F. FULLER, and W. P. FAY

With malice toward none; with charity for all; with firmness in the right, as
God gives us to see the right, let us strive on . . . to bind up the nation's
wounds; to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow,
and his orphan—to do all which may achieve and cherish a just, and a
lasting peace.[1]

> — Abraham Lincoln

President Lincoln made this moving commitment to veterans and their
families in his second inaugural address in 1865. While the public and
government commitment to veterans remains strong, much has changed since
Lincoln's day. Contemporary developments in American demography, re-
search on aging, and changes in the military provide both promise and
challenge for the men and women who "have borne the battle" in our time.[2]

The American population is experiencing a demographic revolution
that has important implications for the military. Gains in life expectancy, declin-
ing fertility rates, increased female labor-force participation, and more diverse,
multigenerational family structures affect veterans and other segments of Amer-
ica's aging population.[3] Today's veterans on average will live considerably
longer than their Civil War counterparts. At a mean retirement age of 42.8 for
military careerists, most can expect to live over three decades with few signifi-
cant health limitations,[4] and with many opportunities for productive activities.
For others, the extra years will seem a bane, not a blessing. The challenge of
successful aging is especially great for the oldest, those 85 and above, who are
likely to encounter severe physical limitations as they struggle with multiple
roles as parent, grandparent, and great-grandparent. The number of US veterans
85 years and over is expected to increase nearly 600 percent from 1993 to 2010.[5]

As the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) grapples with its "geriatric imperative," precipitated by the aging of its constituency, many veterans may not be prepared to make their extended years a period of great accomplishment and productivity.[6]

Significant progress has been made in the field of aging that is of direct relevance to individual veterans and military policy makers who are concerned about aging veterans. A seminal review article on human aging argued that the negative effects of the aging process itself have been exaggerated; it suggests that changes in lifestyle, diet, exercise, personal habits, and psychosocial factors can modify the vicissitudes of age.[7] Yet, like other older Americans, many aging veterans seem to lack clear-cut age norms and role models for late life behavior. Status uncertainty at the individual level and a shortage of institutions and ceremonies that help prepare people for role changes with advancing age have contributed to an uninformed state among veterans regarding "successful" aging, despite productive aging initiatives by the VA and other leading professional and governmental organizations.[8]

The need to provide veterans with better models for successful aging has increased with dramatic reductions in the number of military personnel on active duty. Since 1987, the American military has reduced its overall force by one fourth. If current plans hold, it will have declined one third by 1999.[9] Though much has been accomplished to ease the transition of officers and enlisted personnel to civilian life, veterans say that they are discouraged because their release from military service into an uncertain economy came sooner than expected. Many face financial and vocational uncertainty; some worry about their ability to fulfill multiple, ongoing responsibilities with aging children, parents, and grandparents. Cohort differences among veterans (World War II, Korean War, Vietnam, Desert Storm) have complicated the development of policies and programs.[10] Years of service have brought honor to some retirees but left others physically and emotionally wounded. An era of austerity, a

Lieutenant Colonel Michael W. Parker, DSW, recently completed a National Institute on Aging Post Doctoral Fellowship at the University of Michigan, and has dedicated his research to honoring aging veterans and their families. He is currently assigned to Noble Army Hospital, Ft. McClellan, Ala., where he is developing a number of pilot programs for the Department of Defense.

W. Andrew Achenbaum, Ph.D., is a professor of history at the University of Michigan and Deputy Director of its Institute of Gerontology.

Lieutenant Colonel George Fuller, M.D., is on the Teaching Staff and is Director of Geriatric Medicine in the Family Practice Residency at Madigan Army Medical Center, Fort Lewis, Wash.

William P. Fay, M.D., is Assistant Professor of Internal Medicine and staff cardiologist at the University of Michigan and VA Hospitals in Ann Arbor.

military establishment wrestling with other competing priorities, and limited coordination between the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs combine to make individual preparation the most important step in aging successfully.

Biological, sociological, and generational factors often are used to explain changes in behavior related to advancing age. Recently some military researchers have argued that more attention should be given to the effects of historical events (war, downsizing of the military) on lives. Increasing evidence suggests that while such events often cause profound trauma and social dislocation, they also offer opportunities for personal growth.[11]

Research in the field of aging also suggests that the effects of life events depend most on how the event is interpreted and given meaning by the individual, rather than the severity or stressfulness of the event.[12] How military personnel interpret the events of their career—the effects of a military career on family, type of retirement, transition to civilian life—may determine perceptions of success or failure of their individual journeys. Though the military establishment may encourage this process through a variety of transition programs, success ultimately requires a commitment by the individual.

Some personality theorists (Allport, Erikson, Jung) have maintained that wisdom is the application of a lifelong understanding of one's self. Retired individuals have a tremendous opportunity for this form of wisdom because they have a great deal of information about their individual selves to process:

> The elder has a reservoir of strength in the wellsprings of history and storytelling. As collectors of time and preservers of memory, those healthy elders who have survived into a reasonably fit old age have time on their side—time that is to be dispensed wisely and creatively, usually in the form of stories, to those younger ones who will one day follow in their footsteps. Telling these stories, and telling them well, marks a certain capacity for one generation to entrust itself to the next, by passing on a certain shared and collective identity to the survivors of the next generation: the future.[13]

A successful life review can be both the source and the consequence of such sharing of information.

General Robert E. Lee's late life serves as a possible frame of reference for contemporary veterans and their future selves. As one historian put it, "The reasons for his success remain valid for any soldier who must bear a like burden of responsibility."[14] Obviously none of us is comparable to Robert E. Lee in stature or experience. Reflection on Lee's vocational, social-familial, emotional, physical, and religious themes may, however, assist contemporary veterans in negotiating their own responses to the events of their lives and in planning successful futures.

Though each individual's life history is unique, biographical accounts have a potential power to move us deeply in exploring legitimate questions about ourselves, particularly at a time of transition.[15] As one aging

veteran put it, "I wish I had known I was going to live as long as I have. I would have lived smarter." Lee's story can help today's aging veterans to make their last years a time of reflection, promise, and opportunity. This article therefore examines Lee's last five years, from 1865 to 1870, to identify and describe his successful, paradigmatic adaptations to aging.

Lee's Retirement and Late Life Success

In the spring of 1865, General Robert E. Lee passed through the Confederate and Union lines en route to the McClean house at Appomattox, Virginia, to surrender what remained of his starving Confederate Army to General Ulysses S. Grant. "Thirty-nine years of devotion to military duty had come to this . . . and this, too, was duty."[16]

Lee, like most returning Southern soldiers—and our more recent Vietnam veterans—made the journey home without the solace of victory, virtually alone, without fanfare, to confront a depressed community and a divided country. He was a homeless, paroled prisoner of war who faced a potential trial and hanging. He was unemployed; without government retirement, pension, or medical benefits; and with inadequate finances. He was exhausted from the years of war, trauma, and stress, and he suffered from a number of degenerative conditions evidently including significant coronary disease (atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease). He was confronted with multiple family responsibilities, including a frail wife, five unemployed adult children, and another son missing in action. And he bore other losses too deep for us to fathom. A Baptist minister described Lee's entry into Richmond "amidst a gloomy spring downpour":

> His steed was bespattered with mud, and his head hung down as if worn by long travelling. The horseman himself sat his horse like a master; his face was ridged with self-respecting grief. . . . Even in the fleeting moment of his passing by my gate, I was awed by his incomparable dignity.[17]

Lee was a thoroughbred even in utter defeat. While many of his contemporaries left the country or would remain incapacitated because of their reduced circumstances, Lee's transition to civilian life was characterized distinctively by multifaceted, successful aging themes.[18] Over a century later, the General's last years would be portrayed by Charles Flood as Lee's "great, forgotten chapter."[19]

As the senior retired military officer of the defeated South, Lee would, according to one historian, do "more than any other American to heal the wounds of war."[20] Vocationally, Lee invigorated a college that stressed classical subjects and practical education. Domestically, he became a prototype of intergenerational caregiving, familial responsibility, and social support. Emotionally, he survived both the traumas of war and his cumulative losses, all the while maintaining a personal sense of control and autonomy.

Financially, he set his own house back in order, serving as an example of frugality to the defeated South. Physically, he maintained an exercise regime that helped to maximize his independence and functionality. Spiritually, Lee allowed the unobtrusive, small voice of conscience, rooted in unceasing faith, to have an uncommon influence in all spheres of his life and decisionmaking.

Vocational Themes

After a few months of unemployment, Lee accepted the presidency of Washington College (now Washington and Lee University), then a small, essentially bankrupt institution. Starting with only four professors on staff when he assumed his duties, Lee would be recognized by the end of the decade as one of America's top educators, "without reference to his military past."[21]

Under Lee's guidance, Washington College offered one of the first elective college systems in the country, encouraging its students to learn how to "design bridges, develop chemical compounds for fertilizers, restore railroads and canals, and work on blueprints for factories."[22] In 1859, all but one of its 95 students had been from Virginia. By 1867, two years after Lee accepted the presidency, Washington College had 410 students from 26 states.[23] Under his leadership, the college became financially solvent. During his tenure ten departments were added, stressing science and modern languages. Schools of commerce, agriculture, journalism (the first in America), and law were planned or opened. Before such institutions as Harvard or Johns Hopkins emphasized research in higher education, Lee's faculty initiated summer studies, resident masterships (forerunner of fellowships), and research for the public welfare at Washington College.[24]

Lee's success as an academician can be attributed in part to his capacity to change roles late in life. Having taken a new vocational identity, he refused to wear a uniform for what would be his last portrait, stating "I am a soldier no more."[25] Another reason for his vocational success can be found in Lee's advocacy of lifelong learning. "The education of a man or woman," he declared, "is never completed till they die."[26] Having seen many young men fall in battle under his standard, and sensing God's providence in the offer of the presidency of Washington College, Lee was committed to training young men to rebuild the South and reunite the country.[27] This spiritual affirmation of his call to a different profession may have enabled Lee to resist a variety of tempting offers (including a candidacy for governor of Virginia, the vice chancellorship of the University of the South, and titular head of an insurance company) and focus all his energies on his new vocation.[28]

Thus Lee appeared to embrace a new vocational calling without undue dependence upon his military identity. He was generally able to discriminate successfully in electing to apply some military-based skills while discarding others. Open to new learning himself, Lee was able to take considerable risk in making late life vocational changes.[29]

Lee as president of Washington College: "I am a soldier no more."

Lee's late life encourages us to ask questions about our attitude toward lifelong learning and our willingness to assume new roles, to take risks, and to know ourselves well enough to be able to maximize our talents and experiences.

Social-Familial Health

Retirement from the military enabled Lee to be closer to his family; reciprocity of generational support became the order of the day. Remembering his earlier days of separation from the hearth, the presence of his family at Washington College added greatly to the quality of his life. He must have felt valued as he received a steady flow of affection, information, advice, and assistance. His family's presence reduced the effect of stress and helped protect him from the consequences of illness.[30]

Lee also was a source of support for his family and friends in late life. For instance, he was deeply sensitive to his wife's progressive frailness from arthritis and other maladies.[31] After the war he removed her from the stressful circumstances of postwar Richmond and planned numerous vacations to locations of potential therapeutic benefit to her.[32] When a new president's home was designed at Washington College, he masterminded the

building of an extensive veranda fully accessible by his wife in her wheel-chair, "silent evidence, after sixty years, of his thought for Mrs. Lee's comfort in her invalidism."[33]

Lee's caregiving was not limited to his wife; sickness was a recurrent theme in the life of the Lees. Douglas Southall Freeman describes Lee in the caregiving role during one of these episodes that occurred on vacation:

> Mildred (Lee's youngest daughter) contracted a low debilitating fever which the doctor diagnosed as typhoid. Her mother could not nurse her, and the burden fell primarily on the General. In her sickness, Mildred developed whimsies, and insisted that she could not sleep unless her father sat by her and held her hand. He did not try to argue her out of this or to substitute someone else for the vigils. Night after night he stayed there, in the little upstairs chamber of the cottage. . . . What was he thinking about through those long hours, he who had commanded tens of thousands of men in the bloodiest battles of the continent, and yet had spent so many of his days as nurse to mother, to invalid wife, and to children?[34]

Wrote a frequent visitor to the Lee home, "His tenderness to his children, especially his daughters, was mingled with a delicate courtesy which belonged to an older day than ours."[35]

Lee did not allow himself to become socially isolated following his military career. In fact, he experienced considerable growth in his social network. Despite his caregiving responsibilities, the presence of close family members and friends increased the quality of Lee's late life.[36] Though Lee's family life was not without problems, his manner of interacting with family members set an example of kindness and mutual respect that fostered a growing level of familial intimacy.[37] During his last days, his family and friends would mount a round-the-clock vigil of support for the man who had been their caregiver and supporter in time past.[38]

Lee's late life with his family suggests the wonderful possibility of more stable family relations for the military careerist, and of a death with dignity, at home among familiar surroundings, with family present. Lee's family was part of his own self-description. His experience encourages us to examine the events of our careers and how those events have affected us and our families so that we might act with understanding in bringing about improved family relations and enhanced stability. Lee's story also suggests that we need to acknowledge our own mortality and to develop specific, proactive plans based on its reality: a will, living wills or durable power of attorney with a health care proxy.

Emotional-Mental Health Themes

One of the greatest challenges of successful aging is the capacity to refrain from visiting the problems and trauma of one generation onto the next. Lee demonstrated an ability not only to survive the dual traumas of war and

the lingering effects of a difficult childhood, but, in late life, to compensate for and in part recover from these experiences.

There is evidence that Lee's early years were characterized by neglect, by a father whose life was besmirched by extravagance and marital infidelity, and by his mother's frailty and melancholy.[39] As a result, Lee's capacity to experience a full expression of his childhood during his early years may have been severely limited.[40] During his early military career, he would struggle with issues of separation from his family and self-doubt as a parent.[41] Despite these early and mid-life experiences, Lee's last years were characterized consistently by intimate father-son, father-daughter experiences, and he seemed to rediscover aspects of his lost childhood in his childlike, sought-after relations with children of all types and ages.[42]

Lee's war experiences were extremely traumatic. During the last days of the Civil War, suicidal thoughts would tempt him to "ride along the line and all will be over!" but he was rescued by his religious commitment and sense of duty.[43] He saw countless injuries and deaths. Not only was his life repeatedly threatened during the war, but so were the lives of all of his sons who were actively engaged in the conflict, as well as the security of his wife and daughters.[44] After the war he would seek to avoid feelings, activities, and interest in war-related matters, a characteristic found in many suffering from post traumatic stress disorder. "I do not wish," he would write, "to awaken memories of the past."[45]

The psychotherapeutic value of reminiscence for older people was not recognized in Lee's lifetime.[46] Nevertheless, Lee experienced some therapeutic benefits from confronting his past. Lee's son Rooney, whose first wife died while he was a prisoner of war, became engaged to marry following the war. The wedding was to be held in Petersburg; Lee was reluctant to attend, dreading "to visit again the scenes of his travail of soul during the last winter of the war."[47] Rooney ultimately convinced his father to attend the wedding, and Lee described the positive effect it had on his life emotionally:

> My visit to Petersburg was extremely pleasant. . . . I was gratified in seeing many friends. In addition, when our armies were in front of Petersburg, I suffered so much in body and mind on account of the good townspeople, especially on that gloomy night when I was forced to abandon them, that I have always referred to them in sadness and sorrow. My old feelings returned to me, as I passed well-remembered spots and recalled the ravages of the hostile shells. But when I saw the cheerfulness with which the people were working to restore their condition, and witnessed the comforts with which they were surrounded, loads of sorrow which had been pressing upon me for years were lifted from my heart. [48]

By exposing himself to new information and by facing his pain with others, Lee was able to reevaluate aspects of his past, to let go of some of the discomforting feelings associated with it, and to recognize that he was not

alone in his struggle. Perhaps there is no greater mark of success than Lee's commitment during his last years to avoid a revisitation of his trauma as a child and as a soldier on the next generation.

Physical Health Themes

Lee's lifestyle suggests that he recognized the importance of self-care and good health behavior. During his last five years, he continued an exercise pattern that had its roots in military service. "When I was with the army," he told his nephew:

> I had to take daily rides in order to obtain the exercise that was necessary for me. When I got on my horse, no matter what battle or movement was impending, and no matter what my cares or troubles were, I put all such things out of my mind and thought only of my ride, of the scenery around me, or of other pleasant things, and so returned to my work refreshed and relieved and in better and stronger condition. If it had not been for the power to do this, I do not see how I could have stood what I had to go through. [49]

Despite his zeal for activity, General Lee suffered during the final years of his life from several chronic illnesses, which eventually caused his death in 1870.

Based upon the descriptions of his biographers, it seems highly likely that Lee had coronary artery disease. Despite limitations in diagnostic procedures and therapies, he sought regular medical assistance and was compliant with his physicians' recommendations. Perhaps most important, Lee made every effort to maintain regular physical activity, even when it was likely that the discomfort he was experiencing would have made a sedentary lifestyle tempting. He continued his regular horseback rides but reduced their length and intensity. His actions are consistent with current recommendations that even patients with severe cardiovascular disease attempt to maintain regular physical activity. [50]

Despite his efforts, Lee's health became progressively compromised during his last months by work-related stressors, his inability to continue regular exercise, and the emotional effects of the war. "Old age and sorrow," he said, "are wearing me away." [51] Still, he remained active in his position as President of Washington College until his death at the age of 63, hardly a ripe old age, but one greater than that reached by most men of his birth cohort. [52]

Lee was able to continue after his military retirement his practices of regular exercise and physical exams. Deciding what practices acquired during military service should be continued represents a vital area of inquiry yet today. As a veteran of World War II recently put it, "When that first bullet came over my head, and they provided me with free cigareetes, I lit up. After the war, I stopped smoking." Developing increased levels of physical activity and making dietary changes are among the many successful aging practices available to today's veterans.

Financial Health

Though Lee knew from experience that economic security was a basic underpinning for emotional health, the pursuit of money was never an overriding pursuit. For him, simplicity was more than a necessity; it was a virtue. Mindful of his father's indebtedness, eviction from their Stratford Hall home when he was three, and the effects of penurious economies on his mother, Lee stressed after the war:

> Work is what we now require. . . . We must spend less. . . . We require very little, and we must use that little sparingly. . . . By this course the good old times . . . will return again. We may not see them, but our children will, and we will live over again in them.[53]

"I have seen him," an assistant at Washington College once wrote, "in garments which many men of smaller income and far less reputation would have been unwilling to wear."[54]

Lee worked earnestly to put his house in order financially so as not to repeat the sins of his father. His initial salary at Washington College was $1500 a year; business offers of six times that amount awakened no pecuniary yearnings.[55] When he received an increase in his salary from the college, he did not change his style of living. His thrift was successful, and he invested wisely in good securities. All of his children would receive inheritances.[56]

When the college offered Mrs. Lee the use of the president's house for life and an annual annuity, Lee declined: "I am unwilling that my family should become a tax to the college." "Nothing is more impressive in the intimate annals of the family," Freeman wrote, "than the absence of complaints about hard living or lack of money."[57]

Though Lee recognized the necessity of economic security and worked hard and lived frugally, his financial motivations were in no sense greedy; his treasures were found in other pursuits. His late life suggests that we examine our financial motivations, and that we act to the best of our ability with our convictions.

Themes of Religious Involvement

In an effort to uncover the real Lee, the paradoxes of his nature and the validity of his historical image recently have come under study and criticism. No scholar, however, challenges the genuineness of his religious involvement and the centrality of its influence on all aspects of his life.[58] Lee's religious practices included attitudinal, organizational, and nonorganizational forms of expression: daily morning prayers with his family; daily private devotionals, prayer, and Bible study; regular chapel attendance during the week and on Sunday; leadership in the local church; and financial support of worthy missions.[59] His religious involvement greatly influenced his interpretation of life events. "We must be resigned to necessity, and commit

> *"Lee's story can help today's aging veterans to make their last years a time of reflection, promise, and opportunity."*

ourselves in adversity," he would write after the war, "to the will of a merciful God as cheerfully as in prosperity. All is done for our good and our faith must continue unshaken."[60]

Whereas many of his contemporaries and their family members were bitter over the harsh realities of Reconstruction, Lee argued for reconciliation by personal example, by countless personal counsels, and through bountiful correspondence.[61] His faith allowed him to leave the outcome and results of the war with God.[62] In a private discussion with a visiting clergyman, who had exclaimed vehemently in an earlier social gathering over the impropriety of the General's indictment for treason, Lee responded:

> Doctor, there is a good old book which I read and you preach from, which says, "Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you and persecute you." Do you think your remarks this evening were quite in the spirit of that teaching? I have never cherished toward them bitter or vindictive feelings, and have never seen the day when I did not pray for them.[63]

The nonorganizational, private expressions of Lee's faith were the most important to him.[64] The inner workings of his faith met deep needs in the aging life of a man who felt as if he had failed to meet impossible standards of moral, vocational, and domestic perfection. He found relief in the foundational Christian concepts of grace and forgiveness, which in turn fostered his genuine humility in success and his capacity to make "youth and age akin."[65]

"Lee reacted to his inner problems," Thomas Connelly wrote, "with a steady immersion in religion . . . . Lee held a simple faith in God which guided his conduct. His deeper humanity was reflected in such traits as his kindness to Federal prisoners, a willingness to share privation with his soldiers, and a concern for the army's religious welfare."[66] Lee's faith, according to Freeman, "was stronger after Appomattox."[67] His "instinctive" kindness, consistent humility, "unquestioning response to duty," self-denial, devotion to family, willingness to accept the consequences of his actions, and clean-mindedness were all a reflection of Lee's spiritual nature.[68]

Like many of our veterans, Lee was affected profoundly by events beyond his personal control. After doing his duty, his style was to subject

things seemingly beyond his control to his understanding of God's provi-
dence. So equipped to cope with circumstances beyond his influence, he
moved with confidence into an environment that he believed would be
responsive to his initiatives, one in which he believed he could achieve
desired outcomes. These antecedent processes of faith and the confident
pursuit of achievable goals enabled Lee to maintain a sense of control
throughout most of his late life. This aspect of his personality provided him
with a source of stability during times of difficulty. Lee's final chapter of life
demonstrates that individual choices can provide opportunities that can help
one transcend difficult circumstances, when guided by a core set of unwav-
ering beliefs.

Conclusions

Following the Civil War, there was little societal support in place to
assist Confederate veterans. Yet Robert E. Lee aged successfully after the war.
He maintained a robust health, sense of control, and functional capacity for
most of his final years; he used effective psychosocial practices that enhanced
his family life; he avoided premature functional incapacity within the limits
of his physical condition and given the quality of the medical care available;
and he reduced the risk of adverse health outcomes. To a large degree, General
Lee was successful because he constructively framed and interpreted the
events and circumstances of his life.

This article is not intended to provide aging veterans with overly
simplistic prescriptions for "finishing well," nor to impose unrealistic goals,
nor to suggest that one must live exactly as Lee did. He lived in a different
time. His late life story represents an intergenerational transfer of a different
form, and it has been told here to help aging veterans ask important questions.

"It is history," Lee said, "that teaches us to hope." Perhaps contem-
porary veterans who are experiencing a radical shift in mid-career and are
facing the prospect of added years can find hope in Lee's historical example.
His vitality across the adult life span culminated during his last years when
he contributed so much to his family, community, and country.[69]

Many of Lee's contemporaries, poisoned by the effects of war,
lacked a sense of control and purpose in their lives. While their choices were
certainly limited, Lee found purpose for living his life responsibly from his
religious involvement. Though his lack of adequate financial assets was a
factor in Lee's pursuit of another career, his confident belief in his ability to
achieve desired outcomes influenced not only his decision to assume an
academic career late in life, but also affected his willingness to exercise for
most of his last years. His adherence to a regular exercise regimen in the face
of degenerative illness sustained a level of functionality that allowed him to
continue to contribute to his society.

Another encompassing theme in Lee's late life was his capacity to cope with life events associated with loss. In Lee's theology, each loss paved the way for further personal development. His losses were multiple and diverse: they included losses through death, separations and departures from loved ones, relocations, lost dreams, unrealized expectations, and, ultimately, the loss of his idealized younger self. Lee and his family emerged from one crisis only to encounter another, with but occasional periods of tranquility. Despite the trauma of war and other losses, however, Lee showed a clear ability to play, work, and love, and to make the decisions needed to shape his late life.

Lee might teach us that a hoped-for period of tranquility associated with retirement may never arrive. We must learn to seek a balance of stability on one hand and change and transformation on the other. Retirement should be anticipated as an active growth phase within one's life span.

Those who have served their country honorably in military service are an incredibly diverse group. The needs of World War II veterans may be substantially different from those of the contemporary veteran, who may be retiring from a 20-year military career without any direct experience with war. Despite these profound cohort differences, all veterans share the experience of serving their country, and ultimately each veteran must interpret his own military experience. Many veterans share common traits of discipline, self-sacrifice, and willingness to take on tough missions often associated with military experience. This may help many to age productively and to contribute to our country's successful transition into the 21st century. However, many of our veterans have been so committed to the accomplishment of their military missions that they have not taken the time to properly examine their own lives in preparation for the future.

After retirement, Lee engaged in an ongoing life review which led to many successful aging practices. Throughout the numerous tragedies of his personal and professional life, some brought on by historical events beyond his control, he showed a willingness and capacity to address constructively many of the difficult questions of life. Just as Lee was compelled to examine and interpret the historical and familial events of his life, so each area of our lives holds significance that requires individual interpretation. Like Lee, today's veterans can be pioneers in the development of new roles as they travel uncharted territory. Many of the familiar social structures associated with work, retirement, and education may be transformed in the coming decades as age loses some of its power to determine when people should enter or leave these structures.

Just as the people of Lee's and Lincoln's generation, we have the opportunity and obligation to treat with dignity the nearly 27 million men and women who currently represent the heterogeneous cohorts of Americans who have served in the military forces during this century.[70] It is important that we

honor all veterans: those who gave their lives and those who continue to live with the experience of war, including the many disabled veterans who served their country so honorably. At the same time, surviving veterans need to help themselves by asking the difficult questions of life. Sound policies, programs, and research must be met by individual preparation and responsibility. In the final analysis, the quality of each veteran's life will be affected by the investment he or she makes in examining and assessing the life themes that were so successfully addressed by Robert E. Lee.

NOTES:

1. Abraham Lincoln, 4 March 1865, in Carl Sandburg, *Abraham Lincoln, The War Years* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948), IV, 93.

2. Department of Veterans Affairs, *Annual Report of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs* (Washington: Department of Veterans Affairs, 008B3-93-1, 1992), p. 1.

3. M. Neal et al., *Balancing Work and Caregiving for Children, Adults, and Elders* (London: Sage Publications, 1993); V. Bengtson, C. Rosenthal, and L. Burton, "Families and Aging: Diversity and Heterogeneity," in *Aging and the Social Sciences*, ed. R. H. Binstock and L. K. George (New York: Academic Press, 1990), pp. 263-64.

4. Average excludes Reserve and disability retirees. Office of the Actuary, Department of Defense, *1992 DOD Statistical Report on the Military Retirement System* (Arlington, Va.: Department of Defense, Office of the Actuary, 1993), p. 97.

5. The number of US veterans 85 years and over in 1993 (more than 200,000) is expected to increase nearly 600 percent by 2010 to about 1.3 million. The percent of the 85-and-over veterans who are World War II veterans increases to 98.2 percent in 2008 (1.1 million). National Center for Veteran Analysis and Statistics, Demographics Division, *Veteran Population Projections 1990 to 2010* (Washington: Department of Veterans Affairs, 1993).

6. W. A. Achenbaum, "The Politics of Aging: The Geriatric Imperative of the Department of Veterans Affairs," *Journal of Aging & Social Policy*, 3 (No. 3, 1991), 33-50.

7. J. W. Rowe and R. L. Kahn, "Human Aging: Usual and Successful," *Science*, 10 July 1987, pp. 143-49.

8. See for example, T. T. Ysohikawa, "United States Department of Veterans Affairs Health Care for Aging Veterans," *Facts and Research in Gerontology* (1992), pp. 431-37; US Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, *Healthy People 2000* (Washington: GPO, 1991, DHHS Publication No. PHS 91-50212); American Psychological Association, *Vitality for Life: Psychological Research for Productive Aging, Research Initiatives* (Washington: APA, July 1993).

9. "Changes in Force Bring on Career Jitters," *Army Times*, 3 January 1994, p. 26.

10. Ibid.

11. Glen Elder and E. Clipp, "Introduction to the Special Section on Military Experience in Adult Development and Aging," *Psychology and Aging*, 9 (No. 1, 1994), 3-4.

12. H. Markus and A. R. Herzog, "The Role of the Self-Concept in Aging," in *Annual Review of Gerontology and Geriatrics*, ed. K. Schaie and M. Lawton, Vol. 11 (New York: Springer Pub. Co., 1991), pp. 111-43.

13. E. Erikson, J. Erikson, and H. Kivnick, *Vital Involvement in Old Age* (New York: Norton, 1986), p. 331.

14. Douglas Southall Freeman, *R. E. Lee* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948), IV, 187.

15. Data for this paper was taken from a stage-state content analysis of each biographical work. For method, see: W. Mckinley Runyan, *Life Histories and Psychobiography: Explorations in Theory and Method* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1984), pp. 100-17. Douglas Southall Freeman, *R. E. Lee* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948), vol. IV; Charles B. Flood, *Lee, The Last Years* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981); and Thomas L. Connelly, *The Marble Man: Robert E. Lee and His Image in American Society* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1977).

16. Ibid., p. 134.

17. William E. Hatcher, *Along the Trail of the Friendly Years*, pp. 118-19, in Freeman, p. 161.

18. Flood, p. 34.

19. Ibid., p. 22.

20. Ibid.; see also Charles Francis Adams in Connelly, p. 209.

21. Flood, p. 112.

22. Ibid, pp. 111, 156.

23. Marshall W. Fishwick, "Robert E. Lee," in *Gentlemen of Virginia* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1961), p. 187.

24. Flood, pp. 112, 204-05.

25. Frank Buchsers, *amerikanische Sendung, 1866-1871: die Chronik seiner Reisen* (Basel: Holbein-Verlag, 1941), in Flood, p. 219.

26. L. Jones, *Life and Letters of Robert Edward Lee, Soldier and Man*, p. 117, in Freeman, p. 421.

27. Freeman, pp. 217, 420.

28. Ibid., pp. 244, 310-11, 368-71.

29. For example, see Flood, pp. 133, 155; Freeman, p. 278.

30. See for example, Freeman, pp. 188-214; Connelly, pp. 216-17; Flood, pp. 114, 130, 200.

31. Connelly, p. 167; Flood, p. 41.

32. Freeman, pp. 198, 271.

33. Ibid., p. 409.

34. Ibid., p. 372; Flood, p. 192.

35. Margaret J. Preston, *Century Magazine*, vol. 38, p. 286, in Freeman, p. 411.

36. For example, see Freeman, pp. 380-81.

37. Flood, pp. 130-31.

38. Freeman, pp. 482-92.

39. Connelly, pp. 169-72.

40. Ibid., pp. 176-77.

41. Ibid., pp. 8-9, 166-86.

42. See, for example, R. E. Lee, Jr., Recollections and Letters of General Robert E. Lee, in *R. E. Lee, Jr.*, p. 333, in Freeman, pp. 381, 411. Also see Freeman, pp. 446-52; Flood, pp. 131, 191-93, 268, 404, 410, 449, 455.

43. Freeman, pp. 120-21.

44. For example, see Flood, p. 42.

45. Ibid., p. 412.

46. Robert N. Butler and Myrna I. Lewis, *Aging and Mental Health*, (London: C. V. Mosby, 1982), pp. xiii, 193-94.

47. Freeman, p. 334.

48. R. E. Lee to W. F. Lee, 21 December 1867, in R. E. Lee, Jr., *R. E. Lee, Jr.*, p. 293, in Freeman, p. 338.

49. George Taylor Lee, "Reminiscences of General Robert E. Lee, 1865-68," in *South Atlantic Quarterly*, vol. 26, p. 244, in Freeman, p. 328.

50. Freeman, pp. 482-92, 521-24; Lewellys F. Barker, "General Lee's Malady and the Probable Causes of His Death," in Freeman, pp. 524-25; Flood, pp. 257-61.

51. R. E. Lee to Mrs. Lee, in Jones, p. 211, in Connelly, p. 193.

52. Flood, pp. 248-61.

53. R. E. Lee to Hill Carter, 25 April 1868, in Freeman, pp. 363-64.

54. E. C. Gordon, in F. L. Riley, *General Robert E. Lee after Appomattox*, pp. 95-96, in Freeman, pp. 390-91.

55. Freeman, pp. 244, 388-94.

56. Ibid.

57. R. E. Lee to J. Brockenbrough, 28 May 1870, in Freeman, p. 469.

58. See, for example, Carol Reardon, "Chipping Away at 'The Marble Man': Robert E. Lee in Civil War History," *Reviews in American History*, 21 (1993), 415-23; A. T. Nolan, *Lee Considered, General Robert E. Lee in Civil War History* (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1991).

59. See, for example, T. Dowley, "The World's Great Soldier," in *More Than Conquerors* (London: Moody Press, 1978), pp. 26-31; Connelly, pp. 189-93; Freeman, pp. 493-505; Flood, pp. 82, 213-14.

60. R. E. Lee to W. H. F. Lee, 19 July 1865, in Flood, p. 56.

61. See, for example, Freeman, pp. 314, 482-83.

62. Connelly, pp. 189-93; Freeman, p. 329.

63. J. William Jones, "Personal Reminiscences, Anecdotes, and Letters of General Robert E. Lee," in Freeman, p. 206.

64. Connelly, p. 190.

65. Ibid., p. 208.

66. Ibid., pp. 189-90.

67. Freeman, p. 297.

68. Ibid., pp. 493-505.

69. R. E. Lee to Charles Marshall, in *Confederate Veteran*, p. 364, in Freeman, p. 484.

70. Department of Veterans Affairs, *Annual Report of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs*, p. 1.

Commentary & Reply

THIS IS CNN (WARS)

To the Editor:

Lieutenant Colonel Frank J. Stech's article "Winning CNN Wars" (*Parameters*, Autumn 1994) was thoroughly researched, soundly argued, and refreshingly positive. It stands in marked contrast to the uninformed, emotional, and negative attitude toward the press and television so often found among military officers. Commanders and staff officers from the Chief of Staff to company grade should take Colonel Stech's prescriptions to heart and act on them.

Colonel Stech hit the nail square on the head when he wrote that if military officers "tell no stories from the heart on the how and why of our military actions, then others will do it for them, and the results may not be to their liking." The Colonel's advice should be integrated particularly into the multifaceted operations so aptly analyzed by the Chief of Staff, General Gordon R. Sullivan, and Lieutenant Colonel Andrew B. Twomey in their article in the same issue on "The Challenges of Peace."

One minor flaw: Colonel Stech, like most people, tends to confuse the written press with television under the encompassing rubric "the media." He says, for instance, "the media emphasize event coverage, exclusiveness, and distribution of images rather than the quality, nuance, substance, and interpretation of news content." That is true for television but is not so for *The New York Times*, *The Los Angeles Times*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *The Washington Post*, and other first-class newspapers. At their best, they do strive for quality, nuance, substance, and explanation (interpretation having gotten a bad name because it allowed spillovers into editorializing).

Some years ago in an article in these pages, I urged American military leaders to quit bellyaching about the press and television. Colonel Stech has gone far beyond complaining to render cogent and perceptive advice. If commanders will follow his guidance, they will not only cope with CNN but will surely win the CNN wars.

Richard Halloran
Honolulu, Hawaii

To the Editor:

Lieutenant Colonel Frank Stech's "Winning CNN Wars" is a compelling scholarly aid to those who wish to understand the effect of the media on contemporary military operations. It is particularly useful when viewed in light of other perhaps less sanguine articles, such as Pete Williams' "The Press and the Persian Gulf War" (*Parameters*, Autumn 1991). Coming from a country which, on the one hand, produced Marshall McLuhan, but whose Army has lately been involved (too often?) in highly media-influenced peacekeeping operations, I would humbly offer three cautionary notes.

Our society is indeed a "vicarious" one (as Stech suggests) but can hardly be otherwise; the secondary or story-telling nature of television inevitably makes it so. This is because, as a famous American television producer once said, news stories are dramatic fictions that convey a symbolic truth ("and that's the way it is," said Cronkite). Far from Walter Lippmann's seeming "utter reality," news stories are concerned with meaning, not facts. Indeed, anyone who thinks that CNN video footage is a portrayal of reality need only be reminded that 90 percent of the video taken ends up on the editors' floor. The "multi-step flow of communications"—one person telling something to another, then that person telling someone else, and so on—is probably a better visualization of the forces at work in modern media. This model of communications is not exclusively related to either personal experience or media shaping, but it affects and is affected by both. This secondary nature of popular information passage has indeed defined us as a "secondary oral culture" (to credit both McLuhan and Walter Ong), and it distinguishes ours from one which relies on firsthand experience, or even the printed reflections of a first-hand observer. It draws us back to an oral culture in which gesture and intonation were more important than the grammatical structures of a literate society.

Second, it is important to remember that television news is a product, not unlike any other program or commercial. The average sound-bite, some 15 seconds in length only 20 years ago, is now seven to nine seconds. That news must be entertaining, therefore, would seem intuitively obvious. As Professor Barry Cooper, one of Canada's brightest political philosophers has opined, there are many things which are routinely employed by TV news producers to make sure that news is entertaining. Television news opens and closes like a theater with musical cues and smart computer-generated graphics. The anchor is the solid center of control in the chaotic seas of external catastrophe, which are enumerated in brief shots from far-flung corners of the globe. The anchor, and the network selling the news product, rely absolutely upon his or her credibility. This requires, amongst other things, that once a story line is established, subsequent contradictory information not be allowed to affect the anchor's believability. The reason why credibility is so central is obvious enough: it is hard to fake an expression but quite easy to ignore incon-venient facts. A related notion is that in order for something to be reported, it must be out-of-the-ordinary. Deviance, therefore, is the defining attribute of what TV producers regard as newsworthy.

In this rather unforgiving milieu, the American military-press relations dur-ing the Gulf War were remarkable indeed. The calm, reasoned, and straightforward demeanor of the military briefers contrasted markedly with the oft-times arrogant, adversarial, combative, and sometimes militarily ignorant reporters. General Kelly's rejoinder to a reporter about minefields was a memorable case in point. The military, nevertheless, cooperated in detail with journalists, even when they pro-tested that the press was violating the ground rules. The final decision to publish or broadcast was always left, as Pete Williams points out, in the hands of journalists, not the military.

Finally, public opinion polls consistently indicate that senior military leaders are viscerally trusted by the public much more than the media and many other groups. But besides being galling to the press, this provides a temptation to compete for credibility in an environment which might bring the military perilously

close to realizing what de Tocqueville perceived to be the most serious threat to democracy, namely enslavement to public opinion. Nevertheless, Stech's appeal for proactive military-media planning as an integral part of operations is compelling.

Media convergence will see the already tremendous speeds associated with news reporting become even faster. But this need not concern the operational level commander (especially as articulated by Brian Holden Reid in *The British Army and the Operational Level of War*) any more than the myriad other factors which affect planning at that level. Lieutenant Colonel Stech has done a great job explaining the synergistic closed-loop CNN effect. For the planner, however, the implication is that the likely outcome of press involvement and the implied tasks generated thereby must be modeled and anticipated in the decision analysis phase of the deliberate planning process, just like any other factor. The tools are available to account for the press as a malevolent or ambivalent force in war—indeed, even as an ally (President Bush's wonderful ruse on the eve of bombing comes to mind). It is the senior leader prepared to function in the ambiguous "war and anti-war environment" who will ensure that the media become no more than another factor to be dealt with at that most difficult, operational level.

Lieutenant Colonel John P. Sweetnam
Canadian Army Liaison Officer to HQ TRADOC
Ft. Monroe, Virginia

The Author Replies:

Richard Halloran's endorsement is praise indeed; his by-line graced many a story on military and political affairs in the first-class newspapers he mentions. As Halloran notes (and practiced in his news articles) the print media (newspapers and magazines) differ dramatically from television in reflecting quality, nuance, and substance. Yet even "the prints" often drift into the "story framework" I outlined, force-fitting events into dramatic confrontations of good guys and bad guys. To wit, the befuddled (and befuddling) Whitewater-gate press; or the muddled print from Bosnia, until the story line evolved into the classic script: Serbs typecast as villains, Moslems cast as victimized underdogs. Print journalists, less vulnerable to convenient (and misleading) schema than their electronic colleagues, are not immune.

Lieutenant Colonel Sweetnam's cautionary notes cogently reinforce several points I tried to make. Cultures make and remake histories; our "electronic oral culture" makes and remakes the news. Walter Lippmann warned us not to be drawn into emotion-laden images and intonations (he was concerned with the newsreels and demagogues, but his point applies equally to TV news and electronic personalities). Lippmann and Sweetnam post flags at the same trap—utterly real images aren't reality.

The US military in the Gulf War offered the very characteristics Sweetnam defined for entertaining news: a "solid center of control" amid chaos, orchestrating events from "far-flung corners," theatrical presentations, fabulous graphics and videos, etc. The CENTCOM and Pentagon news briefers upstaged the TV anchors at almost every turn. Knowing this successful interaction of the military with the media *can* be done, future commanders and staffs are obliged to anticipate such interactions, and deliberately plan that they *will* be done. The "electronic oral

culture" defines a new dimension for combat, just as the airplane defined air power. Winning CNN wars requires that we plan operations in this new dimension (as Sweetnam challenges) "just like any other factor."

Frank J. Stech

TAKING ISSUE WITH "THE THIRD BALKAN WAR"

To the Editor:

In an article in the Autumn 1994 issue of *Parameters*, "The Third Balkan War and How It Will End," Dr. Michael Roskin depicts an allied effort to force the Serbs to agree on a compromise settlement in which they would retain some territory while settling for rights and guarantees for Serbs outside Serbia. There is a brutal irony to this scenario. When ex-Yugoslavia was breaking up, it was the lack of constitutional guarantees to the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia that helped ignite the war. Dr. Roskin rightly asserts that the Serbs suffered enormously at the hands of the Croats in Bosnia in World War II.

However, involving the Albanians in a Croat-Muslim-Albanian ring around Serbia, as Dr. Roskin suggests, is a sure formula for a wider and more destructive conflict, one that would destabilize the southern Balkan region. And once this conflict starts, it will become as uncontrollable as the conflict in Bosnia.

Dr. Roskin's analogy comparing the present containment of Serbian expansion with the elimination of Ottoman and Bulgarian hegemony of the Balkans in the first and second Balkan wars is partially valid. Perhaps the emerging issue of this war, as is the case throughout the Balkans today, is minority guarantees along with the rise of nationalism and self-determination in the post-Cold War era.

Those problems extend to the 280,000-member ethnic Greek minority in Southern Albania (historically known as Northern Epirus). For the last 50 years, the Greek minority was subjected to the same repression as the Albanians in Kosovo. The Epirus region in Southern Albania is another Kosovo, with the same potential for ethnic violence. As a result, the Epirus Greeks now want union with Greece, but contrary to Dr. Roskin's assertion, Greece is not looking to secure claims in Southern Albania except to obtain minority guarantees or, at most, promote autonomy for its minority there.

Involving the Albanians in an anti-Serbian coalition in the present Balkan conflict will spread the war south, igniting a chain-reaction of minority uprisings in Kosovo, the Western Macedonian region, followed by a Greek uprising in Northern Epirus. It would be an all-out Balkan war of great destructive violence, all to no purpose.

The Third Balkan War, as Dr. Roskin calls it, is part of a larger complex picture involving minority rights, a new nationalism coupled with the issue of self-determination, old territorial disputes, and ethnic animosities suppressed during the Cold War. In this uncertain environment, such matters are far more contentious than they were during the Cold War.

Lieutenant Colonel Chris C. Parkas, USAR Ret.
New York City

The Author Replies:

I fully share the concerns of Lieutenant Colonel Parkas: in the post-Cold War world the ethnic conflicts of the Balkans "are far more contentious." (He might take a look at my earlier article, "Macedonia and Albania: The Missing Alliance," in *Parameters*, Winter 1993-94.) He is also right in naming Northern Epirus as another flashpoint, in this case between Greece and Albania.

I hope the article makes it clear that any US policy in the region—including keeping out—could be conducive to a major expansion of the conflict. Using Kosovo as an example, one could sketch out two equally plausible scenarios: (1) Albania, emboldened by US support, encourages the *Kosovari* to revolt against Serbian repression, and soon the fighting spills over into Albania and Macedonia; (2) Serbia, emboldened by lack of US support for Albania, decides to settle the problem of the troublesome ethnic Albanians of Kosovo. To do so, Serbian forces cross into Albania to take out guerrilla camps, and the fighting soon spills over into. . . .

We could be equally damned for doing and for not doing. One key question, I submit, is this: Does a US military presence have a stabilizing or destabilizing effect in a given situation? Once we can answer this question—and we might get clues from the US presence in Macedonia and Haiti—we will have taken an important step toward defining US foreign and defense policy in the complex post-Cold War world.

Michael Roskin

Review Essays

Strategic Reading on the New Europe

VICTOR GRAY

The unexpected revolution of 1989-1991 was a turning point in European history and international security that transformed Europe, for nearly half a century a bastion of enforced stability, into a cockpit of instability. In many ways, the "new" Europe resembles an older, more dangerous Europe marked by: a strong Germany in the center; revolution in Russia; a vacuum in East Central Europe; and turmoil in the Balkans. Unfortunately for the strategists who have to deal with this new situation, the old order collapsed before a new order was ready. Thus, we find ourselves in a period of perhaps prolonged transition, groping through a veritable alphabet soup of overlapping, not yet concentric organizations—NATO, WEU, EU, CSCE, PfP—asking how, indeed whether, they can be rearranged into a new security edifice relevant to the new realties. As we do so, we must focus on how the realities have changed. What are the new perspectives, relationships, threats? The organizational patterns—which, after all, are nothing more than the means to the end of ensuring security in the new environment—will flow naturally from such an analysis. It is an analysis that is at the heart of the best current literature on European security.

Proceeding from the proposition that we must know where we have been in order to know where we are going, part of that literature seeks to examine the reasons for the breakdown of the old Cold War order in Europe and the lessons that collapse might hold for the creation of a new order. One attempt is Allen Lynch's *The Cold War Is Over—Again* (1992). In this provocative work, Lynch, a Professor of Government at the University of Virginia, argues that the United States and Soviet Union were more partners than opponents during a Cold War that had already wound down by the 1970s with the "resolution" of the major issues in Europe—the division of Germany and the status of Eastern Europe. What ended in 1989 was, therefore, not the Cold War but rather the "post-Cold War order." It was a collapse that, according to Lynch, not only "surprised" but "alarmed" the West, because it reopened previously "settled" issues and made Europe an infinitely more unstable place. Chief among Europe's reopened issues is the interminable German Question, the centerpiece of Timothy Garton Ash's truly masterful *In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent* (1993), which focuses on the Russo-German relationship. Examining the success of Bonn's Cold War *Ostpolitik* and the prospects for Berlin's new *Ostpolitik*, Ash, a Fellow of St. Anthony's College, Oxford, concludes that Germany, emerging again as the hegemon in East Central Europe, faces the task, "in Europe's name," of assisting the countries of that area to democracy and stability. He is optimistic that Germany will make the most of this "second chance." Using an even longer perspective in his equally monumental *Diplomacy* (1994), Henry Kissinger focuses on the centrality of Russo-American rela-

tions, which, he says, "desperately need a serious dialogue on foreign policy issues." Integrating Russia into Europe and overcoming instability in East Central Europe, he argues, will require spinning the Partnership for Peace (PfP) off from NATO and merging it into the CSCE. The "wild card," he concludes, will be the will of the United States to play the old offshore balancing role Britain once did.

Other writing on current European security focuses on the state of strategic thinking in the key countries and the evolving relationships among those countries. Among the books in this category are *Security and Strategy in the New Europe* (1992) edited by Colin McInnes of the University College of Wales and *European Security Without the Soviet Union* (1992) edited by Birmingham's Stuart Croft and Pittsburgh's Phil Williams. The latter, which contains strong pieces on Germany and France, concludes that the WEU will prove central to melding the European efforts. The former contains an insightful essay by Frederic Bozo of the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) who foresees a dual-track French approach—NATO and European—in which France will gradually warm to NATO now that "constraints to French-NATO rapprochement have been removed."

To gain the flavor of the national strategic perspectives, however, one must still rely heavily on journal articles and official documents. Current German thinking, for example, is well described in "German Security Policy" (*Adelphi Paper No. 277*, 1993) by Pittsburgh's Professor Wolfgang F. Schloer, and in "National Interest and International Responsibility: Germany's Future Role in World Politics" (*Deutschland*, 9-10/93), by the German academic Gregor Schoellgen. Schloer argues that their traditional preference for multilateralism will lead the Germans to seek all-European solutions based on a merged CSCE/NACC (now PfP). Schoellgen's argument for a more assertive pursuit of German interests is echoed in Burkhard Koch's "American and German Approaches to East Central Europe: A Comparison" in *World Affairs* (Fall 1993). Koch, an east German academic resident at Washington's American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (AICGS), contends that the new situation confronting Germany in East Central Europe demands a power politics approach, in which German decisions form the basis of Western collective policy.

Again, it is from the journals that one gains the clearest picture of French strategic thinking, with the best of the lot being Pierre Lellouche's "France in Search of Security" (*Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1993); Michel Gurfinkel's "France, Germany and the World: The Strategic Paradox" (*Global Affairs*, Summer 1993); and Steven Philip Kramer's "The French Question" (*The Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 1991) and "France and the New Germany" (AICGS *German Issues Paper No. 11*, 1993). Kramer, a professor at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF), contends that German unification profoundly disoriented French strategists, forcing them to question old Gaullist assumptions in their search for new anchors with which to "moor" Germany in the Western collective. Will they choose an overhauled NATO, in which they would be subordinated to German-American leadership, or a more loosely defined WEU/EU arrangement that would risk alienating the United States? While one might have concluded a year or two ago that they preferred the second course (a preference one cannot entirely dismiss, given the development of the Eurocorps and the elevation of the WEU to the status of the EU's security arm), very recent developments indicate greater French receptivity to NATO. In any event, there should be greater French involvement in Western collective defense efforts.

Perhaps indicative of a dangerous blind spot in American thinking about European security is the absence of a satisfactory book on the post-Cold War Russian strategic perspective. It is dangerous, because there is not only a German Question and a French Question about which we must be aware but also a Russian Question: What is the possibility of a return of Russian imperial ambition and a reconstitution of a Russian strategic threat? If one were to take at face value the words of the current Russian leadership, one would not lightly dismiss that question. The Russian strategic perspective, which reasserts special interests in the "near abroad" and the right to police the former republics spun-off in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), can be found most clearly and most authoritatively in two documents readily available to American scholars thanks to the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). The documents are: "Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation" of 25 January 1993, and "Russian National Security Concept for 1994" of 14 December 1993. These are not the abbreviated pablum of similarly titled US government documents but, rather, revealing expositions of current Russian strategic thinking. As such, they are must reading.

Three recent journal articles provide useful frames of reference with which to approach these Russian documents. The first is S. Neil MacFarlane's "Russia, the West and European Security" (*Survival*, Autumn 1993), in which MacFarlane, Director of Post-Soviet Studies at England's Queen's University, warns that "the historic tendency in Russia has been periods of disintegration and contraction to be followed by reconsolidation and reassertion." The second is "Russia in Search of a Foreign Policy" (*Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 12, 1993), in which ICAF's Professor Milton Kovner highlights the historic continuity in Russian foreign policy and the resentment of many in the Russian leadership over the country's losses since 1989. Most compelling, however, is Alexei G. Arbatov's "Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives" (*International Security*, Fall 1993). Arbatov, Director of Moscow's Center for Geopolitical and Military Forecasts, writes that after resolution of the current crisis at home, Russian foreign policy most probably will shift from the pro-Western paradigm of 1992-93 to a more assertive moderate-conservative position.

There are other perspectives that should not be ignored. East Central European views are well treated in Theo van den Doel's *Central Europe: The New Allies?* (1994); Andrew A. Michta's *East Central Europe After The Warsaw Pact: Security Dilemmas in the 1990s* (1992); and *Report on the State of National Security* (1993), a series of essays published by the Polish Institute of International Affairs that provides the first honest look at the internal determinants of Polish security policy. More broadly, van den Doel, a military strategy researcher at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, concludes that Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia will have met all criteria for NATO and WEU membership by the end of the decade. And, he insists, membership must then be granted; otherwise "chances may shrink away and then it may again become closing time for democracy" in East Central Europe. For his part, Michta sees a "grey zone period" for the area. Until the crisis in the CIS is resolved and until the West Europeans decide whether they prefer NATO, the WEU or the CSCE, the East Central Europeans would best depend on bilateral ties.

And what of the British, those erstwhile offshore balancers? Relying too long and too complacently on a "special" Anglo-American relationship that had already lost its luster before 1989, Britain marginalized itself in the European security

debate, leaving the field to the French and Germans. It is only now scrambling to become a player again, with a new, more forthcoming attitude toward Europeanized defense coming across clearly in Trevor Taylor's "West European Security and Defence Cooperation: Maastricht and Beyond" (*International Affairs,* January 1994) and in Sherard Cowper-Coles' "From Defence to Security: British Policy in Transition" (*Survival,* Spring 1994). It is ironic, given the previously stand-offish British policy toward Europe, that British think tanks and universities have, as evidenced in this survey, consistently produced some of the best writing on European security issues. Turning to the relationships among the key players, one finds a number of good books. Perhaps because of its centrality, Germany features prominently in them. *The Germans and Their Neighbors* (1993), edited by Dirk Verheyen and Christian Soe, surveys the views of 17 of its neighbors concerning the implications for European security of Germany's new power. Not surprisingly the consensus is one of apprehension—apprehension fed by perceptions of growing German assertiveness within EU/NATO Europe. Perhaps the most interesting of the essays is that of France's Anne-Marie LeGloannec who concedes that the leadership of Europe has shifted to a newly central and newly sovereign Germany that it is no longer so dependent on the United States for its security. While she worries whether Germany will be a good team player willing to carry its fair share for the EU, she is generally optimistic that the Franco-German axis will continue strong albeit on increasingly German terms. Given the importance of that axis, it is a shame that there is no English translation of *Frankreich und Europa: Ein Deutsch-Franzoesicher Rundblick* (1993) edited by Ingo Kolboom and Ernst Weisenfeld of the Research Institute of the German Society for Foreign Policy. This Franco-German *tour d'horizon* contains some familiar but still controversial views; for example, that Russia *and* France were the two losers of the Cold War and that the Maastricht Agreement on a common foreign and defense policy was designed to tie Germany to the West so thoroughly that it could not (the Germans would say "need not") exercise a free hand in East Central Europe.

Then there is the Russo-German relationship with its own long and problematic history. Given that history and the current security vacuum in East Central Europe, it could be the most important in terms of European security. One of the more interesting examinations of that relationship is a collection of 13 essays by Germans and Russians entitled *In from the Cold: Germany, Russia, and the Future of Europe* (1992). Edited by Vladimir Baranovsky and Hans-Joachim Spanger, it is forward-looking and generally optimistic about the prospects for Russo-German cooperation and pan-European security integration. It also reveals, mostly subconsciously, mutual respect and need.

While American strategists must keep these intra-European relationships in mind, they must keep most firmly in mind that it is the web of US-European relationships that is most important to us. In this regard, Elizabeth Pond's updated *Beyond the Wall: Germany's Road to Unification* (1993) and W. R. Smyser's *Germany and America: New Identities, Fateful Rift?* (1993), deal with our relationship with a country as central to us as it is to the Europeans. They come to radically different conclusions. Pond, a distinguished American journalist resident in Bonn, is generally optimistic about US-German relations. That optimism rests, in part, on a judgment that both countries value continued American engagement in Europe as the sine qua non for the stability needed to see both through a period of transition in the Alliance

and of turmoil in Eastern Europe. It rests, too, on the weight she places on German gratitude for the strong support of the United States for German unification. Perhaps, however, she has overestimated the interest of Americans in Europe and underestimated the "debt" that many Germans feel they owe Russia. Unification may, as Pond notes, have shown Germans "who [their] real friends are," but it would not have been possible without the acquiescence of their erstwhile enemies. For his part, Dick Smyser, former Political Counselor in the American Embassy in Bonn, is profoundly pessimistic about US-German relations, predicting that the two countries—despite their desires and best efforts—will drift apart with "massive" consequences. This, he concludes, will result in the demise of the Western alliance and the emergence of Germany as an "alternative center of power . . . [that] will sometimes counteract and cancel out the effects of US policies." One does not have to buy into Smyser's apocalyptic vision in order to take seriously his warning that "if America chooses to withdraw completely from Europe . . . , [it] will be repeating the mistake of its isolation after World War I." Smyser's book, therefore, represents a sort of *Realpolitik* version of Scrooge's nightmare in "A Christmas Carol." We can put it down, awake on Christmas morning, and realize we have time to change the ending.

Ironically, Smyser's is the first of several essays on Europe in *U.S. Security in an Uncertain Era* (1993). Edited by the *Washington Quarterly's* Brad Roberts, it is but one of several books that seek to provide a blueprint for ensuring that the ending of the European security dream is more to our liking. In it, Francois Heisbourg, the former director of the prestigious International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), argues that, if European integration proceeds apace and the United States "plays along," NATO will be transformed into a Euro-American bilateral organization; the National War College's Hugh De Santis emphasizes the WEU as an integrator of West European defense; Ambassador James Goodby, now a professor at Carnegie Mellon, points to the peacekeeping function of the CSCE; and Adrian Basora, the US Ambassador to Prague, looks to NATO as the main vehicle for proffering security to East Central Europe. Together, they take the view that all of these organizations will merge to a degree into a new Euro-Atlantic partnership.

This relaxed view about a gradual merging of existing organizations also comes across in *The Future of European Security and Defense Policy* (1993) by the University of Denver's Werner Feld and in *The Cold War Legacy in Europe* edited by Otto Pick, Emeritus Professor of International Relations at the University of Surrey. In the latter, NATO Deputy Secretary General Simon Lunn generally agrees with WEU Secretary General Willem van Eckelen's prediction that NATO—necessary to ensure an American presence in Europe—and the CSCE will merge around a thickened WEU/EU core. Feld, too, sees some coming together of these organizations but feels that they will coexist side-by-side for some time, thus offering us and the Europeans a smorgasbord of security tools with which to face future challenges. He is, by the way, one of the few authors to address head-on the nuclear issue that hovers over the European security debate: What happens if the Europeans, especially the Germans, lose faith in American extended deterrence? It is a question which figures prominently in *From Euphoria to Hysteria: Western European Security After the Cold War* (1993) edited by David G. Haglund, Director of the Queen's University Center for International Relations. Lieutenant Colonel David A. Anhalt, USAF, for example, examines the prospects for the nuclearization of the WEU and urges the United States to ensure

a "stable devolution" of the American deterrent. Laure Paquette, another member of Haglund's team of international fellows, speculates on the creation of a Euro-deterrent through the "extensibility" of France's nuclear forces.

Concerning the broader question of the shape of the emerging European security structure, the Haglund team shares the consensus view that there will be a merging of existing organizations, perhaps through trial and error, into a CSCE with teeth. So, too, does Michael C. Pugh, defense lecturer at the University of Southampton and editor of *European Security Towards 2000* (1993). He argues that Cold War instruments such as NATO must adapt to be useful and that those such as the CSCE and Council of Europe that were underutilized during the Cold War need to be given greater powers. He sees the latter playing the dominant role with regard to confidence building, economic integration, and crisis management, with NATO taking on a "minimum deterrence defensive orientation."

Consideration of the current European security scene would not be complete without some attention to the flanks, which always received such short shrift during the Cold War. They have taken on new importance in the new situation. Three important changes have been: the new weight of Turkey, which is now a major player in the Middle East, the Caucusus, the Balkans, and, perhaps most importantly, Central Asia; the emergence of a new "threat from the South" represented by fundamentalism in Algeria and radicalism in Libya, which threatens France and Italy with mass migration and terrorism; and the emergence of the Baltic as sub-region in which the Baltic states and the newly assertive Nordics might forge their own zone of peace. These issues are explored in John Fitzmaurice's *The Baltic: A Regional Future* (1992); *Nordic Security in the 1990s* (1992) edited by Jan Oberg; *Southern European Security in the 1990s* (1992) edited by Roberto Albioni; and *Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China* (1993) by Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser.

The reader daunted by the plethora of new literature on European security futures—and this survey scratches only the surface—should begin his or her own investigation with Adrian G.V. Hyde-Price's timeless *European Security beyond the Cold War: Four Scenarios for the Year 2010* (1991). It is a model of clarity and wisdom. Like Feld, Hyde-Price, an international security fellow at Chatham House, discusses the pros and cons of existing organizations and the four scenarios that derive from them: NATO Atlanticist, West European, CSCE Pan-European Collective Security, and *L'Europe des Etats*. He balks at the architectural metaphors (from "bridges" to "pillars") that have dominated the discussion of European security, pointing out that they imply the existence of an architect with a grand plan. He prefers instead organic metaphors that better befit the evolutionary process he sees toward a pan-European security system of interlocking and overlapping organizations that will offer strategists the sort of smorgasbord of tools envisaged, among others, by Feld and, in a *SAIS Review* special issue on "Europe's Challenges" (Winter-Spring 1994), by Professor Stefan Froelich of the University of Bonn. To this end, Hyde-Price stresses, it will be necessary to deepen *and* broaden the European integration process and to concentrate on improving existing organizations rather than devising desirable but abstract models. He advises us to follow the "process utopian" models of Joseph Nye and Ken Booth rather than the "end-point utopian" approach of would-be architects who would try to squeeze the emerging European realities into a pre-fab design. As Booth has said, "If we look after the processes in international politics, the structures

will look after themselves." This is particularly sage advice for the would-be strategist approaching the new Europe.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Roberto Albioni, *Southern European Security in the 1990s* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).

Alexei G. Arbatov, "Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives," *International Security*, 18 (Fall 1993), 5-43.

Timothy Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent* (New York: Random House, 1993).

Vladimir Baranovsky and Hans-Joachim Spanger, eds., *In from the Cold: Germany, Russia, and the Future of Europe* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992).

Sherard Cowper-Coles, "From Defence to Security: British Policy in Transition," *Survival*, 36 (Spring 1994), 51-59.

Stuart Croft and Phil Williams, eds., *European Security without the Soviet Union* (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1992).

Werner Feld, *The Future of European Security and Defense Policy* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1993).

John Fitzmaurice, *The Baltic: A Regional Future* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).

Foreign Broadcast Information Service, trans., "Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation," FBIS-USR-93-037, 25 March 1993.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service, trans., "Russian National Security Concept for 1994," FBIS-SOV-94-038-S, 25 February 1994.

Stefan Froelich, "Needed: A Framework for European Security," *SAIS Review*, 14 (Winter-Spring 1994), 35-52.

Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lessr, with Paul B. Henze and J. F. Brown, *Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993).

Michel Gurfinkel, "France, Germany and the World: The Strategic Paradox," *Global Affairs* (Summer 1993), 27-48.

David G. Haglund, ed., *From Euphoria to Hysteria: Western European Security after the Cold War* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993).

Adrian G. V. Hyde-Price, *European Security beyond the Cold War: Four Scenarios for the Year 2010* (London: Sage Publications, 1991).

Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994).

Burkhard Koch, "American and German Approaches to East Central Europe: A Comparison, *World Affairs*, 156 (Fall 1993), 86-96.

Ingo Kolboom and Ernst Weisenfeld, eds., *Ein Deutsch-Franzoesischer Rundblick* (Bonn: Europa-Union Verlag, 1993).

Milton Kovner, "Russia In Search of a Foreign Policy," *Comparative Strategy*, 12 (July-September 1993), 307-20.

Steven Philip Kramer, "France and the New Germany," *German Issues Paper No. 11*, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, Washington, 1993.

Steven Philip Kramer, "The French Question," *The Washington Quarterly*, 14 (Autumn 1991), 83-96.

Pierre Lellouche, "France in Search of Security," *Foreign Affairs*, 72 (Spring 1993), 122-31.

Allen Lynch, *The Cold War Is Over - Again* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992)

S. Neil MacFarlane, "Russia, the West and European Security," *Survival*, 35 (Autumn 1993), 3-25.

Colin McInnes, *Security and Strategy in the New Europe* (New York: Routledge, 1992).

Andrew A. Michta, *East Central Europe after the Warsaw Pact: Security Dilemmas in the 1990s* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1992).

Jan Oberg, ed., *Nordic Security in the 1990s* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).

Otto Pick, ed., *The Cold War Legacy in Europe* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).

Polish Institute of International Affairs, *Report on the State of National Security* (Warsaw: Polish Institute of International Affairs, 1993).

Elizabeth Pond, *Beyond the Wall: Germany's Road to Unification* (Washington: Brookings, 1993).

Michael C. Pugh, ed., *European Security Towards 2000* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).

Brad Roberts, ed., *U.S. Security in an Uncertain Era* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993).

Wolfgang F. Schloer, "German Security Policy," *Adelphi Paper No. 277*, Institute for International Security Studies, London, 1993.

Gregor Schoellgen, "National Interest and International Responsibility: Germany's Future Role in World Politics," *Deutschland*, No. 1 (9-10/93), 33-38.

W. R. Smyser, *Germany and America: New Identities, Fateful Rift?* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993).

Trevor Taylor, "West European Security and Defence Cooperation: Maastricht and Beyond," *International Affairs*, 70 (January 1994), 93-110.

Theo van den Doel, *Central Europe: The New Allies?* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994).

Dirk Verheyen and Christian Soe, *The Germans and Their Neighbors* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993).

The Reviewer: Victor Gray is a recently retired Senior Foreign Service Officer with 26 years of service and extensive European experience. He has served in Berlin, Warsaw, and Munich, and as Consul in Krakow, Poland, which post he opened in 1973. In the Department of State, where he served as Director of Northern European Affairs from 1988 to 1990, he also held such positions as Officer-in-Charge of German Democratic Republic Affairs and, during the 1980-81 Solidarity crisis, Polish Affairs. Outside the department, Mr. Gray was Director of the Carnegie Endowment's "Face-to-Face" program from 1981 to 1982 and, from 1985 to 1986, a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council of the United States. A 1962 graduate of the Naval Academy, Mr. Gray holds an M.A. in international relations from Boston University, and during the past three years he has served as the Department of State Chair at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

Review Essay

A Wake for Clausewitz: Toward a Philosophy of 21st-Century Warfare

STEVEN METZ

L ike adoration for some family elder, the veneration heaped on Clausewitz seems to grow even as his power to explain the world declines. He remains an icon at all the US war colleges (figuratively and literally) while his writings are bent, twisted, and stretched to explain everything from guerrilla insurgency (Summers) through nuclear strategy (Cimbala) to counternarcotrafficking (Sharpe). *On War* is treated like holy script from which quotations are plucked to legitimize all sorts of policies and programs. But enough! It is time to hold a wake so that strategists can pay their respects to Clausewitz and then move on, leaving him to rest among the historians.

Who to invite to the final vigil? Who can possibly provide future-looking considerations of armed conflict that even approach the power and depth of *On War*? Though the literature on warfare and military matters is vast, few writers have grappled with the sort of fundamental issues so astutely dissected by the great

Prussian. From the small group searching for a new philosophy of war, the most important recent works have been Alvin and Heidi Toffler's *War and Anti-War*, John Keegan's *A History of Warfare*, and Martin van Creveld's *The Transformation of War*.

At first glance, this is a polyglot group. The Tofflers are Americans, probably the world's best-known futurists, and wildly successful mass-market authors. The other two are military historians and trained scholars; Keegan is British and van Creveld Israeli. In this case, heritage plays a major role in the tone and tenor of analysis. The three books also differ in methodology, with distinct notions of why and how future wars will be fought. The Tofflers are economic determinists—Marxist in analytical style though not in prescription. "The way we make war," they argue, "reflects the way we make wealth." Keegan, while sensitive enough to the complexities of war to eschew monocausal explanations, uses *A History of Warfare* to argue that the importance of culture on how and why people fight is often underestimated. Van Creveld turns the causal relationship around and contends that how and why people fight help determine their political, economic, and even social organization. War for him is as much an independent variable as a dependent one.

Despite such differences, these three books do belong together. They share, for instance, a degree of influence. All were written by justifiably renowned authors and have helped shape contemporary thinking on the future of armed conflict. At an even deeper level, all three agree that the world is in the midst of a historical transformation. They expect the future of organized violence to be fundamentally different from its past. And this leads all three to reject what they see as the conceptual limitations of Clausewitz as they peer into the future. From this common starting point, they move in dramatically different directions.

First to the Tofflers. Written for a general audience, *War and Anti-War* is certainly the easiest to read of the three books. It also represents the Tofflers' first extended foray into military matters. Since they are little concerned with staking a claim in the literature of strategic studies, their rejection of Clausewitz is indirect. For Keegan and van Creveld, Clausewitz's notoriety demands that he be executed in public; the Tofflers are willing to let him die quietly in a closed room. And, as newcomers to the field, the Tofflers build *War and Anti-War* from their past writing on economic trends rather than an existing body of work on military matters. The core argument of the book is that a third historic economic transformation is under way (the first was the invention of agriculture, the second the industrial revolution). The emergence of "Third Wave" economics "based on knowledge rather than conventional raw materials and physical labor" will affect all aspects of human life, including warfare. But "First Wave" states or regions (pre-modern, agrarian) and "Second Wave" ones (industrial) will persist even as "Third Wave" states or regions explore new techniques of economic production and social organization. This heterogeneity will have an immense effect on global security. According to the Tofflers, "The historic change from a bisected to a trisected world could well trigger the deepest power struggles on the planet as each country tries to position itself in the emerging three-tiered power structure" (p. 25). The Tofflers thus accept the long-standing notion that deep and fundamental change—whether in the global system or within a developing country—sparks instability and often violent conflict.

The changing nature of production and the emergence of Third Wave states and regions are already shaping military forces. "Knowledge," the Tofflers write, "is

now the central resource of destructivity just as it is the central resource of productivity," an idea that has captured the attention of US Army leadership (Sullivan and Dubik, 1994). In *War and Anti-War* the Tofflers briefly survey the military implications of "demassification," which point to highly specialized "niche wars"; the military use of space; robotic combat; nano-technology; non-lethal weapons; and cyberwar. Throughout, their fascination with existing or potential technology is evident. Quintessentially American, the Tofflers concentrate on technology feasibility with little concern for the strategic, political, social, psychological, or ethical implications of changing military technology. They describe *how* men might fight in the future, but not *why*.

Even while speculating on the future of war, the Tofflers seek ways that "anti-war"—"strategic applications of military, economic, and informational power to reduce the violence so often associated with change on the world stage"—can match evolving military technology. Their analysis of this topic is halfhearted compared to their description of the changing nature of organized conflict. Even here they follow the long American tradition of searching for technological panaceas. As in all of their writing, the Tofflers see technology driving and shaping history rather than reflecting human values and systems of social organization.

John Keegan's *A History of Warfare* takes a diametrically different approach. Technology is barely mentioned. Instead, Keegan seeks the keys to warfare within the human mind. With the opening sentence of the book, he announces his location within the wider currents of military and strategic thinking. "War," he writes, "is not the continuation of policy by other means" (p. 3). The book thus explicitly rejects, or at least attempts to transcend, Clausewitz. Keegan is driven to explain the powerful role that culture plays in determining how we understand most social phenomena, war included. "We all find it difficult," Keegan writes, "to stand far enough outside our own culture to perceive how it makes us, as individuals, what we are" (p. 22). According to Keegan, this constraint applies equally to Clausewitz:

> Good historian though he was, Clausewitz allowed the two institutions—state and regiment—that circumscribed his own perception of the world to dominate his thinking so narrowly that he denied himself the room to observe how different war might be in societies where both state and regiment were alien concepts. (p. 23)

By relying solely on European evidence, Clausewitz constructed a culture-specific philosophy of war. In *A History of Warfare*, Keegan attempts to overcome this limitation by examining non-European warfare from the Mamelukes and samurai though Easter Islanders and the Yanomamö tribe of South America. The notion that war was an extension of policy and that soldiers and sailors fought and died for national interests, Keegan contends, may have been what Clausewitz preferred, but it is not a universal and immutable principle. Even Clausewitz was unable to explain the type of war waged by Cossacks and other irregular forces. Despite the efforts of brilliant minds to adapt and update his theory, Clausewitz does not adequately account for much of the real or threatened armed violence of the late 20th century, whether revolutionary insurgency, nuclear deterrence, or counternarcotrafficking.

Like the Tofflers, Keegan is concerned with the control of war. He believes that much of recorded history has been shaped by the tension between mankind's drive for violence and the need to constrain it. But like those of the Tofflers, Keegan's proposals for limiting violence do not satisfy. The controls on war that have developed

in the Western world—whether legal proscriptions, deterrence, arms control, or the fog, friction, and rationality that Clausewitz discussed—have, as the history of the 20th century shows, proven inadequate. Thus Keegan feels that "future peacekeepers and peacemakers have much to learn from alternative military cultures" (p. 392). Unfortunately, the only answers he finds are "the principles of intellectual restraint" and "symbolic ritual." As the material and human costs of war are increasing, mankind may deliberately choose to abandon it. "Despite confusion and uncertainty," Keegan writes, "it seems just possible to glimpse the emerging outline of a world without war" (p. 58). This is an alluring idea, but writers since Plato have glimpsed societies without war, yet none have been able to guide us to them. Unlike his analysis of why and how men fight, Keegan offers little that is new or profound regarding why men might choose *not* to fight.

Writing from Israel, where the crack of gunfire more often forms the sound-track of daily life than it does in the English countryside, Martin van Creveld is less sanguine about the future. *The Transformation of War* is an explicit attempt to explain why and how men fight. In contrast to the Tofflers, van Creveld has thought deeply about why organized violence occurs. He writes, "War, far from being merely a means, has very often been considered an end—a highly attractive activity for which no other can provide an adequate substitute" (p. 218). Like Keegan, van Creveld begins by arguing that most contemporary strategic thought reflects the obsolete Clausewitzian "trinity" of the state, the army, and the people. Specifically, *On War* was based on three core ideas. First, war is waged by the state. Second, war tends toward unrestrained force. And, third, war is a means to an end—it should further state interests and policy. But, van Creveld argues, "trinitarian war is not War with a capital W but merely one of the many forms that war has assumed" (p. 57). His ambitious goal, then, is to provide a new, non-Clausewitzian framework for thinking about war.

He begins with the state. Modern states emerged in part because of their proficiency at war. Because they were able to protect their subjects from bandits and external enemies, states gained a degree of pragmatic support which eventually matured into legitimacy—the moral obligation to obey. But, van Creveld argues, modern states are not very good at protecting their citizens from low-intensity conflict, the dominant security threat of the late 20th century. Not only have the majority of armed struggles since World War II been low-intensity conflicts of one form or the other but, according to van Creveld, these have also been the bloodiest and most strategically significant. History bears this out: with the exception of the Six Days War, most of the major conventional wars over the past few decades have ended in stalemate or the *status quo ante bellum*—Korea, Iran-Iraq, 1973 Arab-Israeli, Desert Storm. On the other hand, many low-intensity conflicts have led to major changes in the internal or international distribution of power, whether in China, Vietnam, Algeria, or throughout southern Africa.

Van Creveld's conclusions run counter to much of the thinking within the US Army concerning the military force of the future. And, he feels, it is not simply armed forces that are growing obsolete, but also the world's basic political unit. Since the territorial state with a conventional army has proven unable to decisively defeat low-intensity conflict, it will fade into obsolescence. "The most important single demand that any political community must meet," he writes, "is the demand for protection" (p. 198). If the territorial state cannot protect its citizens, "then clearly it does not have a future in front of it." First to go will be the weak states of the Third

World, the last Western Europe and Japan. Even the United States may fall victim if proper preventive measures are not taken. Van Creveld writes:

> America's current economic decline must be halted; or else one day the crime that is rampant in the streets of New York and Washington, D.C., may develop into low-intensity conflict by coalescing along racial, religious, social, and political lines, and run completely out of control. (p. 196)

This line of thinking leads to a stark picture of a future where

> war will not be waged by armies but by groups whom we today call terrorists, guerrillas, bandits, and robbers, but who will undoubtedly hit on more formal titles to describe themselves. Their organizations are likely to be constructed on charismatic lines rather than institutional ones, and to be motivated less by "professionalism" than by fanatical, ideologically-based, loyalties. (p. 197)

Van Creveld is not arguing that future war will pit conventional, modern forces against guerrillas and terrorists; instead, as low-intensity conflict becomes the dominant form of armed violence, *all* armed forces will move toward a guerrilla and irregular configuration. This is a profoundly radical idea. Americans are used to thinking that as other nations and groups "progress" they become more like us. But van Creveld is on solid historical ground when he contends that "we" may become more like "them." Military innovation often has come from states on the periphery of the most civilized parts of the world. The early Romans in the Mediterranean, Arabs in the Middle East, Turks in Central Asia and Southeast Europe, Mongols in China, and the 20th-century Americans in the Atlantic world were peripheral powers able to adopt military innovations from more advanced armies and navies, thus forcing the developed states to change their own organization, strategy, and tactics. Since, as van Creveld notes, "war represents the most imitative activity known to man" (p. 195), it follows that the military forces of the developed states may be forced to become more like their enemies in order to survive. Early counterinsurgent theorists such as Roger Trinquier who argued that the West had to "fight fire with fire" may prove prophetic; Sarajevo, Gaza, Belfast, and east Los Angeles rather than Desert Storm may be war's future.

As the state and its conventional army become obsolete, so too will classical strategy defined as using battles or linked operations to attain objectives. Armed forces will "move away from today's large, expensive, powerful machines toward small, cheap gadgets capable of being manufactured in large numbers and used almost everywhere" (p. 210). One only has to consider the strategic effect of AK-47s, shoulder-held antiair missiles, and land mines during the past few decades for a hint of this. And conventional military forces themselves will "degenerate into police forces or, in case the struggle lasts for very long, mere armed gangs." War will be fought not to pursue national interests, but to kill enemy leaders, to convert opponents to one's religion, to obtain booty, or, sometimes, for simple entertainment. Thus the core of Clausewitz's philosophy of war—that states wage wars using armies in pursuit of political objectives—will disappear.

War and Anti-War, A History of Warfare, and The Transformation of War all have major flaws. The Tofflers, for instance, present more a sketch or survey than a sustained analysis. Their book is an MTV clip, where Keegan's and van Creveld's are

sonatas, perhaps symphonies. The popularity of the Tofflers' book in the US military is understandable, but worrisome. Furthermore, the Tofflers have had to bend history to fit their model of economic causality, most blatantly when they attribute the Napoleonic revolution in warfare to the industrial revolution. If anything, the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon, by mobilizing mass armies, sparked the industrial revolution, rather than the other way around. Perhaps more important, *War and Anti-War* never constructs a psychologically sophisticated notion of why people fight. With such an omission, any theory of "anti-war" is incomplete.

Van Creveld's book is much deeper, but also contains problems. Although it may seem a minor point, sloppy proofreading—"Carslyle Barracks," "Bohling Air Force Base"—cause the reader to approach other facts with skepticism. Van Creveld also suffers from bad timing. His publication date of 1991 indicates that the book was written before the end of the Cold War. While the Gulf War probably does not indicate any permanent alteration of the declining utility of conventional war, the negotiated end or petering out of long-standing low-intensity conflicts in Mozambique, Ethiopia, Guatemala, El Salvador, Peru, the Philippines, Israel, Northern Ireland, and elsewhere suggests that many strategy theorists (including van Creveld) overestimated the potential decisiveness of insurgency and terrorism. Of course low-intensity has been and will remain the most *common* type of organized violence simply because it is the cheapest. Its continued strategic *significance*, though, can be questioned. Van Creveld sometimes loses sight of the psychological dimension of strategic significance—what is important is what people believe is significant. In fact, the strategic significance of low-intensity conflict seems to have peaked in the 1960s and declined ever since. Van Creveld himself admits, "A degree of violent activity that even as late as the 1960s would have been considered outrageous is now accepted as an inevitable hazard of modern life" (p. 194). People in the midst of low-intensity conflicts, even severe ones like Bosnia and Lebanon, quickly come to accept their condition and go on about their lives. It is possible that low-intensity conflict was strategically significant in the decades after World War II simply because it was new. Today, the people of the world have grown accustomed to it. Conventional war, on the other hand, will, by its very expense, remain rare, and thus retain the potential for strategic significance.

The flaws in Keegan's book are more subtle simply because his contentions are well-couched, often implied rather than stated, and always surrounded with what might seem irrelevant historical vignettes. Many military professionals will find this frustrating. In addition, *A History of Warfare* is the most difficult of the three books to use as a basis for actual policies, programs, and strategies. One could take the works by the Tofflers or van Creveld and plan a future force including training, doctrine, and leader development. This is not true of the Keegan volume.

In works as ambitious as these, flaws are to be expected. Cogent philosophies never spring unblemished from one mind (or, in the case of the Tofflers, from two). Perhaps the diverse perspectives they offer can be synthesized. But whichever of the three proves to be the truest guide to future warfare, one of their shared premises—that we are in or on the verge of a great historic transformation—is probably true. The basic philosophy of war used by the US military remains Clausewitzian. If Keegan and van Creveld are correct about the obsolescence of the Clausewitzian approach, there could be extraordinarily dangerous times ahead as we prepare for unlikely types of conflict. Our armed forces are not configured for non-Clausewitzian war where the enemy is

motivated by hate, rage, boredom, the need for personal meaning and bonding, or fear rather than by interests and policy. Fundamental concepts of our military strategy such as deterrence and conflict resolution are often useless against such opponents. But those grappling with such ideas remain at the periphery of US military thinking (e.g., Peters, 1994). To move them to center stage, to debate and assess them, Keegan, van Creveld, and, to a lesser degree, the Tofflers, should be required reading for national security leaders in and out of uniform. On the vital issue of a 21st-century philosophy of war, it is time to let a hundred schools of thought bloom.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Stephen J. Cimbala, *Clausewitz and Escalation: Classical Perspectives on Nuclear Strategy* (London: Frank Cass, 1991).

Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1976).

Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: Free Press, 1991).

John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993).

Ralph Peters, "The New Warrior Class," *Parameters*, 24 (Summer 1994), 16-26.

Kenneth E. Sharpe, "The Military, the Drug War and Democracy in Latin America: What Would Clausewitz Tell Us?" in *Warriors in Peacetime: The Military and Democracy in Latin America*, ed. Gabriel Marcella (London: Frank Cass, 1994).

Gordon R. Sullivan and James M. Dubik, *War in the Information Age* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1994).

Harry G. Summers, Jr., *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1982).

Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993).

The Reviewer: Dr. Steven Metz is associate research professor of national security affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. He holds B.A. and M.A. degrees in international studies from the University of South Carolina and a Ph.D. in political science from Johns Hopkins University. Dr. Metz has served on the faculty at the Air War College, US Army Command and General Staff College, and several universities. He also has been an adviser to political organizations and campaigns. He is the author of *Eisenhower as Strategist: The Coherent Use of Military Power in War and Peace* and many articles on national security policy, military strategy, and world politics.

Review Essay

The Middle East and US Interests

NORVELL B. DEATKINE

A fter a brief period of euphoria following the 1990-91 Gulf War, the Middle East seems to have receded into a familiar cycle of communal and political violence, with one dramatic difference—the absence of a major role for Russia. Keeping in mind that US interests and objectives in the Middle East have been remarkably consistent

since 1948, the emphasis for the political-military operator, despite a lot of changing vocabulary, must be on the "how" of national policy rather than the "what." Questioning the "why," while sometimes necessary, generally leads to a swamp of domestic interests and concerns which ultimately frustrate more than enlighten.

American primary interests in the Middle East continue to be, in priority, support for Israel's sovereignty and security, and access to oil at reasonable prices. Other US regional concerns, which vary in significance from country to country, include instability, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the need for political and economic reform. Beneath all of these issues there is the conflict between ideologies—Islamism and "democratism"—the shape of which was described in Samuel Huntington's essay "The Clash of Civilizations."

In examining the first American interest in the Middle East—support for Israel—the question for policy executors has been what kind of Israel, and to what extent do Israeli and American interests coincide? The "why" question is entrenched so deeply in the mosaic of American domestic politics it is no longer openly challenged except by radical left and Muslim-Arab organizations—a not entirely healthy situation for either nation.

One could start to answer the question by reading a small book entitled *Riding The Tiger: The Middle East Challenge after the Cold War*, an anthology with some very perceptive chapters. While its focus is on the Persian Gulf, this book contains a number of articles that deal effectively with communal conflict, Islamic movements, and, of course, the issue *de rigeur*, the Arab-Israel conflict. Dr. Phebe Marr, one of the editors, traces US interests in the Gulf through the Cold War to the present, examining the validity of our policies and looking at ways we might accommodate trends and new realities in the Middle East. Dr. Marr sees new dangers in the accumulation of powerful weapons, the rise of dormant ethnic and sectarian conflicts, and demographic patterns of rapid population growth which further tax the statist economic structures of most Middle Eastern nations. The pressure relief valve of job migration from poorer to richer Middle Eastern countries has been disrupted by economic and political realities, and Europe is increasingly hostile to additional emigration to its Mediterranean littoral. The general ineffectiveness of Middle Eastern governments in confronting the economic challenges has led, in Dr. Marr's opinion, to a demand for political reform and has contributed to the growing power of Islamic political movements. Dr. Marr also sees some hopeful trends as well: pressure on those governments to permit more popular participation, a move from ideology to pragmatism, and a more pliable attitude toward Israel.

In his chapter of Dr. Marr's book, William Quandt describes American interest in the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. Acknowledging the reduced threat of a global nuclear confrontation because of the Soviet collapse and subsequent retreat from the Middle East, Quandt depicts continuing threats to US interests should the negotiations fail. One failure scenario he portrays is the erosion of Egyptian support for US policies. The most powerful nation in the Arab world, Egypt is vital to our influence in the area, both politically and militarily. Unfortunately, however, one of the few common areas of agreement between fundamentalist right and political left in Egypt is an antipathy to US policies, particularly regarding accommodation with Israel. (Raymond Baker outlines this symbiosis very well in *The Gulf War and the New World Order*.) Quandt goes on to depict other dangers resulting from the failure of the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations: resurgence of political extremism, possible

demise of pro-Western regimes, such as Jordan, the diversion of money from oil-rich nations to support hard-line Islamic movements (insurance money against the possibility of disruption of oil operations), and the chance of a fifth Arab-Israeli war using mass-destruction weapons. Any or all of these possibilities will directly affect American interests, not only in the Middle East, but throughout the Islamic world.

Prospects for the second major US interest in the region—access to oil at reasonable prices—are guarded in the short run, and very problematic in the long run. In a chapter in *The Persian Gulf after the Cold War*, David Winterford and Robert E. Looney examine Iraq's continuing bellicose claims on Kuwait, giving due consideration to Iraq's considerable military power, and the perception by some Gulf states of a long-term threat from Iran, an anxiety increased by Iran's military rebuilding efforts. The authors conclude that an oil crisis is not likely in the near term because of continued dissension within OPEC, tax and environmental constraints on consumption, the abundance of natural gas, the search for oil outside the Gulf, and the Gulf nations' increasing need for cash. The latter leads to high production rates and undercuts high-sounding proclamations of national production quotas. The conclusion contains several notes of caution, however, most notably the fact that all of the Gulf nations (with the exception of Iraq) are producing at near capacity. There is little room for error in their calculations or in ours.

William C. Ramsey takes the position in *Riding the Tiger* that Gulf oil will become the determinant in calculations of world energy supply, noting that 66 percent of the known oil reserves are located there. Within a few years only the Persian Gulf nations and Venezuela will retain the capability to increase production without large capital investment. No dramatic new oil finds elsewhere in the world will change this. From a 26 percent share of the world's output in 1991, the Persian Gulf will supply nearly 50 percent within five to ten years.

The definitive recent study of the oil issue is *Oil Security Retrospect and Prospect* from the Brookings Institution. Its authors analyze recent US history and proceed to "a modest exercise in peering into the world's oil future." They examine a number of trends, possibilities, and prophecies of doom, concluding that there is little prospect of an imminent shortage of oil. The authors define the risk for the United States in terms not of the availability of oil but of prices, concluding that the inelasticity of demand for oil would cause any production shortfall to produce a disproportionately large jump in oil prices. The US economy, built on the premise of cheap oil, would be in turmoil following such a price increase. Dr. Ramsey's essay in *Riding the Tiger* reinforces their conclusion, identifying the lack of political will in the United States to establish an energy security policy that would include conservation, efficiency, and filling the petroleum reserve as a prudent hedge against turmoil in the Middle East. Leon T. Hadar, writing about the European challenge to US hegemony in the Gulf in *The Persian Gulf after the Cold War*, makes the point that it was easier for the President to win congressional approval for deploying the military to the Gulf than it would be to impose on the public the economic sacrifices inherent in an energy security policy.

In the concluding chapter of *Riding the Tiger*, Dr. Marr combines US interests in Israel and oil with imperatives to curb proliferation of mass destruction weapons, limit the damage from instability, and promote political and economic reform in the region. She describes the economic and military aspects of a number of reasonable policy options and outlines a sensible policy toward Iraq. Dr. Marr also suggests options for limiting arms proliferation. As sound as the objectives and policy

options are, however, they do not really answer the tough questions for policymakers. It is fine to say we need to encourage economic integration, regional institutions, water allocation solutions, and deterrence rather than wars, but the most appropriate ways and means to meet those strategic ends remain as elusive as ever.

Recent historical works on the Middle East, particularly the avalanche of books on the Gulf War and its aftermath, illustrate, as no other recent event has, the gap between neoterist Middle East scholars and those involved with defining and carrying out national strategy. Many of the cognoscenti, embarrassingly wrong in their predictions of disaster during the war, have returned to the fray with a vengeance. Two recent books of that ilk are *The Gulf War and the New World Order* and *Iraq from Sumer to Saddam*. The latter purports to be a history of Iraq—some 5000 years—to which the author devotes one-third of the book, leading up to an analysis of the six-month 1990-91 Gulf crisis. Based on the premise that every ill of the Middle East is a result of a Western-introduced malady, author Geoff Simons finds malfeasance, greed, hypocrisy, duplicity, and downright bloodthirsty savagery wherever Americans go. His monotonous vituperative account of the war uses selective quotes from inexperienced journalists to paint a picture of American soldiers as high-tech killers exulting in the risk-free butchery of hapless Iraqi soldiers. The foreword by Tony Benn, a Labourite Member of Parliament, reminded me of the words of Anthony Crosland, the British Labourite leader, who noted in 1956 that "Anti-Americanism is an almost universal left-wing neurosis."

In *The Gulf War and the New World Order: International Relations of the Middle East*, the Ismaels, Tareq and wife Jacqueline, have put together an anthology which Dr. Ismael prefaces with a letter he wrote to the organizers of a recent symposium at the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at Georgetown University. Referring to the 1991 Gulf War, he wrote, "Nothing in my intellectual or professional experience had prepared me for the sheer savagery of unfolding events." The rest of the hand-wringing preface is laden with words and phrases such as "genocide," "jingoism," and "profiteering handmaidens." The Ismaels rounded up the usual suspects to write the usual things. Pressing all the keys on his deconstructionist-relativist word processing program, Dr. Richard Falk concluded that the Gulf War was racist ("white supremacy"), a class war ("the privileged north"), and of course colonialist ("settler conquests of indigenous people"). Ali Mazrui sees a sinister anti-Muslim conspiracy ("more than two-thirds of the casualties of US military activity since the Vietnam war were Muslims"). The collection does contain some useful, because balanced, chapters. Dr. Louis Cantori writes effectively on broad political trends in the Middle East. Raymond Baker provides insightful material on Egypt (mentioned above), and a concise overview of Turkey's role in the Gulf War is provided by Tozun Bahcheli. These two books are representative of many written with specific axes to grind in discussing the Gulf War. A balanced, truly scholarly book on the Gulf War run-up and its immediate aftermath has yet to be written.

The fundamental issues that define the strategic political-military terrain of the Middle East are Islamism and democratism, ideologies that create political tremors throughout the region. Neither is being well-defined by proponents or opponents. The US proponency of democracy as a "strategic as well as a moral interest" has become an embedded feature of an exportable American ideology, yet our documents rarely define democracy with any precision. We have to understand that just as we view Iran as exporting an ideology—a hybrid of Islamism—many Middle Easterners see us as exporting an ideology—democratism. In the words of the late Dr. Russell Kirk, a great

American thinker, we profess the inviolability of the principle of "one man, one vote," a totally secularized order, and hence can declare with confidence "that the American pattern could and should be imposed upon all the world."

That this view is presumptuous hardly needs mentioning. Acceptance of democracy, American style, would require a restructuring of many traditional societies, most notably a shift from a family-based social unit to an individualistic one. Any policy that requires a traditional society to be torn down to make it amenable to the introduction (some in the region would say imposition) of democratism needs to be reexamined. Nearly every recent anthology on the Middle East has a chapter on democracy, many written by scholars of Middle Eastern origin. It is indeed ironic that many of these writers have been deeply influenced by Michel Fouceault, whose deconstructionist views form the basis of the holy trinity of younger scholars: class, gender, and race. Not only do we fail to understand the inherent resistance in the region to values that we accept without question, but we find our ideology being sponsored by those who prize Fouceault's aberrant view of life and morality.

In *Riding the Tiger*, John Esposito surveys Islamic movements, democratization, and US foreign policy. He describes the commonalities of Islamic movements as alternatives to secular nationalism, capitalism, or Marxism; their all-encompassing nature, to include both individual and community, and their rejection of Westernization (modernity) without rejecting modernization. All such movements also insist upon the imposition of Islamic law, the Sharia, on the societies that they dominate. Dr. Esposito sees a continuing growth of activist Islam based upon the increasingly apparent failure of leadership and political systems to satisfy the most rudimentary aspirations of the people of the Middle East. Consequently, he writes, strong anti-Western feeling, particularly toward America, will continue to influence domestic and foreign policies in the region. Dr. Esposito believes that Islamic movements are not necessarily anti-American in a generic sense, but rather as a reaction to US policies in the region which are seen as anti-Muslim and anti-Arab. Our presence, whether military, business or cultural, is also resented. He directly contests the view of some Middle East historians, particularly Dr. Bernard Lewis, that the anti-Americanism is a symptom of a deep clash of cultures with religious overtones.

A debate continues between those who see Islam as intrinsically incompatible with democracy and those who see it as inherently democratic. In a promising new periodical of Middle Eastern affairs (*Middle East Quarterly*), Dr. Bernard Lewis defined democracy as a "system of constitutional and representative government, in which those who wield power can be dismissed and replaced without violence and by known rules and procedures universally understood and accepted." That seems to fit a bedouin political system in which tribal leaders are (or were) elected by general consensus and serve as first among equals. What prevents the transfer of such a system of values to an urban environment with a heterogeneous population?

An excellent reassessment of US-USSR-Egyptian relationships from 1945 to 1955 has recently been published. Conventional wisdom has held that Western and US mistakes in dealing with Nasser pushed him to the East. Not so says Dr. Rami Ginat in his book *The Soviet Union and Egypt, 1945-1955*. Dr Ginat shows that Soviet arms shipments and trade were under way as early as 1948. As Americans, like it or not, we were (and continue to be) seen as "the West," which proved to be heavy baggage for us to carry as we competed with the Soviets in the Middle East.

A must addition to a political-military library is Anthony Cordesman's *After the Storm: The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East*. In the book's 752 pages the author details Middle Eastern national armed forces in terms of organization, qualitative factors, arms sources, the military burden on the financial health of each nation, and a host of other trends and points for analysis. Weapons of mass destruction are also carefully assessed. The main purpose of the book, to focus on the military capabilities of each Middle Eastern and North African nation, will make it an excellent companion to Cordesman's three earlier volumes on *The Lessons of Modern War*.

Finally I would like to return to *The Persian Gulf after the Cold War* and Ahmad Hashim's concise and clear chapter, "Iraq in the Post-Cold War Persian Gulf Order." Hashim is one of the few writers on the Middle East in recent times whose firm grasp of political-military realities produces the sort of analysis seldom seen in academic circles. His article on Iraq in *Current History* (January 1992) is still one of the best available.

Policymakers should not lose sight of the fact that most Middle Eastern nations have aging or long-serving leaders. Replacement of King Hussein, King Hassan, and Hafez Assad will not be a simple process, even if peaceful. Thirteen of 26 Middle Eastern nations have rulers who have been in office longer than ten years. With the demise of these iron-fisted rulers, what next? Quite likely it will be another round of coups, followed by a succession of opportunistic leaders. Democracy will be the mantra used by both secularists and Islamists seeking to maintain or gain power. For the foreseeable future, however, most of the Middle East will remain an array of "tribes with flags" governed by family, clan, tribal, and religious affiliations.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

M. E. Ahrari and James Noyes, eds., *The Persian Gulf after the Cold War* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993).

Anthony H. Cordesman, *After the Storm* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993).

Edward R. Fried and Philip H. Trezise, *Oil Security: Retrospect and Prospect* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1993).

Rami Ginat, *The Soviet Union and Egypt, 1945-1955* (London: Frank Cass, 1993).

Tareq I. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael, eds., *The Gulf War and the New World Order: International Relations of the Middle East* (Gainesville: Univ. of Florida Press, 1994).

Bernard Lewis, "Why Turkey Is the Only Muslim Democracy," *Middle East Quarterly*, 1 (March 1994), 41-49.

Phebe Marr and William Lewis, eds., *Riding the Tiger: The Middle East Challenge after the Cold War* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993).

Geoff Simons, *Iraq: From Sumer to Saddam* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994).

The Reviewer: Colonel Norvell B. DeAtkine, USA Ret., is director of Middle East studies at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He also is an adjunct professor of Middle East studies and terrorism at Methodist College in Fayetteville. He is a 1959 graduate of the US Military Academy and earned a master's degree in Middle East studies at the American University in Beirut. He is also a graduate of the Army War College. His service included tours in Vietnam, Korea, and Germany. Colonel DeAtkine served eight years as an attaché and security assistance officer in Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt, and he was stationed in the United Arab Emirates with the British Trucial Oman Scouts. In 1970 he was confined for two weeks in the US Embassy in Amman, Jordan, during a PLO uprising; in 1981, as the Chief of Land Forces Section, Office of Military Cooperation, in Egypt, he was on the reviewing stand with Anwar Sadat when Sadat was assassinated.

Review Essay

On Castro and Cuba:
Rethinking the "Three Gs"

RUSSELL W. RAMSEY

Emperor Charles I of Spain sent his bold *conquistadores* (conquerors) to the Americas in the early 16th century. Hernan Cortez subdued the Aztecs of Mexico, Francisco Pizarro wreaked havoc on the Incas of Peru, Gonzalo Jimenez de Quesada outfought the Chibchas of Colombia, and Pedro de Valdivia hounded the Araucanians of Chile, all in pursuit of the "three Gs": gold, glory, and God.

Four centuries later, the newly imperial-minded United States sent its troops to Cuba, which the previous generation of North Americans had just helped liberate from the threadbare remnants of Spain's dying empire. These new-breed *conquistadores* were men of a different genre: novelist and adventurer Ernest Hemingway, Olympic super-swimmer and Tarzan film star Johnny Weissmuller, over-the-hill Hollywood swash-buckler Errol Flynn, and the mobster casino chieftain Meyer Lansky. These men turned Cuba into North America's offshore playground and brothel, in the years before the sexual revolution in the United States made expensively scummy entertainment domes-tically accessible. Driven by new motivations in a different age, they redefined the "three Gs": gambling, girls, and glitz.

Monarchs Charles I and Philip II of Spain went on, after their conquest of Indo-America, to transform the region culturally into a giant Catholic empire with an army of priests and friars. Their Iberian-Catholic handiwork lasted politically for three centuries of relatively peaceful empire, held together by remarkably few soldiers. Creole-led revolutions for independence between 1810 and 1830 produced modern Latin America, the world's largest and oldest block of independent, constitutional nations, leaving Spain in control of Puerto Rico and Cuba. US forces liberated Cuba in 1898, during a thunderous moment of naive idealism about exporting democracy. Cuba's reoccupation by the US neo-*conquistadores*, those proponents of the 20th century's "three Gs," created the conditions that allowed the illegitimate son of a wealthy Spanish immigrant to Cuba—one Fidel Castro—to become the primary thorn under the US national security blanket for 30 years. Never in his life a *campesino* (peasant), he became a global symbol of liberation, a romanticized champion of the poor. He overthrew a corrupt, inefficient army and replaced it with a revolutionary machine that challenged world powers on four continents. He outwitted US Presidents and Soviet Premiers with infuriating durability.

Ten important new works in the national security studies field examine the Cuban-US milieu during the Castro era. They are central to scholarship on the evolution of the US national security policy and strategy process between 1956 and

1991. But there is more at stake here than merely refighting the Cold War in the Caribbean. Fidel Castro virtually wrote the book on how a small power could play the superpowers against each other. While the world may not again organize itself into two militarily bristling supercamps, these books are excellent entries in a field often clouded by ideologically driven, murky scholarship. They offer reflections directly useful in the post-Cold War 1990s for US policy on Haiti, Panama, El Salvador, and Nicaragua; and they hold applications less geographically proximate for possible US roles in Bosnia, Cambodia, Iraq, Israel, North Korea, Rwanda, and Somalia.

Dozens of books purport to describe or explain the victory of Fidel Castro and his M-26 forces over Fulgencio Batista's regime in the late 1950s. The masterpiece in this genre is now Professor Thomas G. Paterson's *Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution*. Sparkling style and objectivity combine with sophisticated interpretation to answer satisfactorily, for the first time, the apparently unanswerable question: How did Castro win? Paterson's answer: Castro correctly identified the unseen legacy of shame and anti-US feeling among Cubans about the moral cesspool that sprang forth from the 20th-century version of the "three Gs." Then, while the US national security establishment, the Batista dictatorship, and the urban resistance to Batista conducted business during the period 1957-1959 with the organizational efficiency of the stars in a Three Stooges film, Castro built a disciplined power machine papered over with romantic liberationist innocence.

Professor Paterson's meticulous description of armed and violent challenges within Cuba, and the confused, clumsy responses to those challenges by Batista's forces and the US national security system is simply the best ever written. And this book emerged in 1994 when the US national security apparatus, supposedly 30 years more mature and sophisticated, was struggling desperately for solutions to comparable challenges in Bosnia, Haiti, Israel, Rwanda, and Somalia. There is no more Soviet Empire to swallow up revolutions gone awry in unstable developing countries, but the Three Stooges efficiency scenario seems to have peeked out from behind the US national security curtain again.

Once victorious, Fidel Castro led his revolution into the Soviet Union's camp, pounding the last coffin nails into the Monroe Doctrine. Triumphant at the botched 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion attempt by US-sponsored Cuban exiles, he was less clearly triumphant the following year after the 1962 missile crisis. Two new books now lay bare those chilling days when President John F. Kennedy directed his national security machinery personally, with mixed effectiveness.

Dino A. Brugioni was the chief electronic intelligence officer for the National Security Agency who unmasked the smuggling of strategic nuclear missiles and warheads into Cuba aboard Soviet cargo ships. His *Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis* is easily the best volume yet written on the complex world of technological intelligence and its interplay with the national security community. He offers the best insider description to date of what really went on in the Kennedy White House while the United States and the Soviet Union teetered at the brink of a global nuclear holocaust for a week. The book has obvious meaning for those charged with monitoring nuclear warhead development in Iraq and North Korea, and for those who track the inventory of Russia's still massive nuclear rocket array. It has even stronger meaning for those who receive technical intelligence estimates and convert them into national security decisions.

Scoffers at the notion that a nuclear war machine can be exported by clandestine means should study Anatoli I. Gribkov and William Y. Smith, *Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis.* Here, with sincerity and objectivity, the Soviet general (Gribkov) in charge of smuggling nearly a hundred strategic nuclear missiles into Cuba in the summer of 1962 reveals how it was done. A US Air Force general (Smith) responds with the military side of the national security decision process in 1962. And one ponders: If the Soviet Union almost succeeded in setting up a deliverable inventory of nuclear rockets in Cuba, 90 miles from US soil in a small country having a US base within it, what pariah regime in the 1990s is reading the same book with the purpose of avoiding the Soviets' mistakes that led to detection?

For a Soviet view of Fidel Castro's place in international relations, the new standard is Yuri Pavlov's *Soviet-Cuban Alliance: 1959-1991.* Ambassador Pavlov served the former USSR as senior diplomatic representative in Cuba, Costa Rica, and Chile; as a Latin American specialist in the Foreign Ministry, he played a key role during the Cuban missile crisis. He and his colleagues in the Soviet national security community sincerely believed that Fidel Castro was implementing a new and authentic form of socialism in Cuba and abroad. However, he also suggests that Castro became a "communist of convenience" in 1960 to bolster his regime against US invasion. In the epilogue, he shows his disillusionment with revolutionary socialism as evidence of violent repression and mass terror mounted in Cuba. Pavlov's final words of warning about the inherently antidemocratic nature of radical revolutionaries would not be out of place as required reading in US political science and history classrooms.

What of Fidel Castro, the man, and his place in world history? Jules Dubois (1959), Manuel Urrutia Lleo (1964), Herbert L. Matthews (1969), Ernest Halperin (1972), Carlos Franqui (1984), and Tad Szulc (1986) are some of the better-known biographers of Fidel Castro. In the apparent twilight of Castro's reign comes Robert E. Quirk's *Castro, A Biography,* a volume which eclipses all the others in objectivity, research, and scope; it is likely to stand as the definitive work until Fidel Castro no longer rules Cuba. With meticulous documentation, Professor Quirk captures the color of his subject while weaving a sophisticated fabric of the key events; and he avoids the crippling tendency of most Castro analysts to position his book somewhere on the liberal-conservative spectrum of US opinion. This volume, coupled with the Paterson study, opens avenues for conceptualizing and assessing Fidel Castro's enormous effect on US national security policy since late 1958.

And what is to be done as *fidelismo* (political credence in Fidel) wanes in Cuba? Georgetown University Professor Gillian Gunn has published the most specific answer in her 1993 work *Cuba in Transition: Options for U.S. Policy.* Easily the best analyst of Cuban military operations in Africa during the 1980s, she now offers a rational agenda of carrots and sticks by which to bring the Cuban people out of the revised "three Gs" syndrome so well explained by Professor Paterson, and into the range of possibilities in *Latin America in a New World* edited by Professor Abraham F. Lowenthal and Gregory F. Treverton. The Cuba policy entry in the latter is "Cuba in a New World" by Professor Jorge I. Dominguez. For a range of views on current Cuba topics, Professor Donald E. Schulz offers another book called *Cuba and the Future.* The papers in the Schulz volume are the outcome of a January 1992 symposium at the Strategic Studies Institute of the Army War College, and the essay called

"The Cuban Armed Forces in Transition" by Phyllis Greene Walker is a gem in the national security studies field.

For an independent yet complementary evaluation of the Cuban revolution and its recent adaptations to a changing world, Susan E. Eckstein's *Back From the Future: Cuba Under Castro* has balance and detail not found in other books. Her splendid 1994 analysis finds a Cuba not presented in political studies, a society that has evolved in ways that may reduce the passing of Fidel Castro to something non-catastrophic. Good but less unique is the eighth edition of Irving Louis Horowitz's interdisciplinary collection of essays, *Cuban Communism*. Jose Alonso's essay on the scapegoat execution of General Arnaldo Ochoa is strong, as is "The Politics of Psychiatry in Cuba" by Charles Brown and Armando Lago.

The US Army carried the institutional burden of working face-to-face with the Latin American military forces throughout the Cold War. Always there was the delicate balance to strike between fostering yet another repressive military regime and releasing a country to the Soviet Union's orbit. US Army leaders learned quickly from the mistakes committed in Fulgencio Batista's Cuba and moved on to a policy of selective equipping and quality training in the Spanish language. Despite the malignant and usually uninformed liberal-conservative dichotomy on US policy in Latin America, the region produced only one solid and enduring Marxist-Leninist regime during the Cold War, and that was Cuba. The books reviewed here suggest strongly that Fidel Castro's personal leadership coupled with the anti-US emotions rising from the revised "three Gs" agenda have more to say about Cold War Cuba than did Karl Marx.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Dino A. Brugioni, *Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Robert F. McCort, ed. (New York: Random House, 1991).

Jorge I. Dominguez, "Cuba in a New World," in Abraham F. Lowenthal and Gregory F. Treverton, *Latin America in a New World* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994).

Susan Eva Eckstein, *Back From the Future: Castro Under Cuba* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1994).

Anatoli I. Gribkov and William Y. Smith, *Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis*, ed. Alfred Friendly, Jr. (Chicago: Edition q, 1994).

Gillian Gunn, *Cuba in Transition: Options for U.S. Policy* (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1993).

Irving Louis Horowitz, ed., *Cuban Communism* (8th ed.; New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Press, 1994).

Thomas G. Paterson, *Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1994).

Yuri Pavlov, *Soviet-Cuban Alliance: 1959-1991* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Press, 1994).

Robert E. Quirk, *Castro, A Biography* (New York: Norton, 1993).

Donald E. Schulz, ed., *Cuba and the Future* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994).

The Reviewer: Lieutenant Colonel Russell W. Ramsey (USAR, Ret.), is Distinguished Resident Professor, US Army School of the Americas, Ft. Benning, Georgia. He is a graduate of the US Military Academy and holds a Ph.D. from the University of Florida. As a young Army captain in 1961, he wrote the curriculum for the first counterguerrilla course taught at the School of the Americas. In May 1961, as the new course was ready to begin, the young Captain Ramsey was surprised one night to hear Fidel Castro read his name during a four-hour radio harangue. Castro included Ramsey's name with a list of well-known organized crime figures, affirming that these men were "the new faculty who will train Latin American military men to murder the friends of the common people, another bloody plot by the US Army."

Book Reviews

Reviewed by Martin Blumenson, author of *The Patton Papers, 1885-1940* and *1940-45*, and of the recently published *The Battle of the Generals: The Untold Story of the Falaise Pocket.*

On the operational level, on the European side of World War II, the Anglo-American rivalry became evident in Tunisia. It continued through Sicily and Italy, reaching its climax in the 1944-45 campaigns of northwestern Europe. A result of the intramural contest for prominence in the coalition is the existence of two distinctly national views of how and what happened in the field. These quite different explanations of how and why the events of the conflict unfolded are with us today.

One interpretation, generally British, is pro-Monty and anti-Ike. It extols the military professionalism of Bernard L. Montgomery as the driving force to victory. Singlehandedly, despite personal flaws of character, Montgomery was responsible for Allied success. The theory denigrates Dwight D. Eisenhower as a military amateur who, mainly because of inexperience, knew neither how to formulate strategy nor how to fight and win battles, and, worst of all, was unable to grasp the meaning of Montgomery's plans.

The other point of view, largely American, holds Montgomery to have been overcautious, overbearing, and overrated. Self-delusional, he was not a team player. He always regarded the Americans as neophytes to the war, preferred the set-piece battle because he was too timid to strike with armored forces, and was constantly surprised by American mobility and speed in combat. He exacerbated the difficulties of suppressing national behavior in an alliance war. In contrast, Eisenhower was truly an Allied leader, made the Anglo-American wartime coalition work, and guided both nations, not one or the other but instead together, to ultimate triumph.

Military historians have been trying to reconcile the contradictory versions. But half a century after the war, publication of the two books here under review indicates a widening rift between the two factions. The authors of both books are squarely in the pro-Monty, anti-Ike camp.

David Montgomery, the Field Marshal's son, thought it might be interesting to retrace and describe the 27 consecutive sites where his father's tactical headquarters was located as it moved from Portsmouth, England, to Luneburg Heath, Germany, in the 1944-45 campaigns in northwestern Europe. This account, he believed, should be fleshed out with personal anecdotes, unpublished documentary materials, and historical analysis. He asked his friend Alistaire Horne to do the writing and promised to give him "complete freedom to criticize and to comment."

Horne accepted. The collaborators then decided to concentrate on the Battle of Normandy, starting with the preparations for the D-Day landings and ending on 1

September, when Montgomery's promotion to field marshal and demotion from Allied land forces commander occurred. Although they touch on Montgomery's life beforehand as well as on other events, notably Arnhem, the Bulge, and the German surrender, the Normandy narrative is full and fascinating, beautifully written. Despite Horne's characterization of Montgomery as manifesting "cruelty and arrogance," as David Montgomery remarks: "My father was the right man at the right time in the right place."

A circumstance hampering Montgomery's wartime actions, everyone now knows, was the exhaustion of Britain's manpower. Montgomery therefore needed to be prudent, conservative, and careful, even cautious in using his troop resources. But another condition affected Montgomery's leadership. Among the insights offered to explain Montgomery's conduct of operations is Horne's observation of the "flawed weapon" in Montgomery's hand.

The German soldiers, according to Horne, were better in leadership and military skill than the Americans, British, and Canadians, and so was their equipment, particularly their tanks and 88mm guns. Realizing the superiority far more clearly than his colleagues, Montgomery expected less of his troops, consequently asked for less, and tried to give them the advantage of his meticulous battle preparations. For example, although he hoped against hope to reach Falaise in Operation Goodwood, Montgomery anticipated and was apparently satisfied with far less decisive results. Hardly daring to make this belief public, Montgomery, the lonely leader, struggled in all of his battles to avoid, as he constantly stressed in his directives and other communications, setback, defeat, and disaster.

Nigel Hamilton acknowledges Montgomery's personal flaws—he was "arrogant, vain, boastful, boorish, and bigoted." Yet Hamilton writes to open the Preface to his book: "The contributions of Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery to Allied victory in World War II can never be overstated." Hamilton thus destroys at the outset any pretension of objectivity. His account is all Montgomery, all the way.

This volume is a condensation—and a very good and readable one—of Hamilton's massive three-volume biography of Montgomery that appeared in the 1980s. The materials, as well as the findings, are thus typical Hamilton, but the shortened length of the book emphasizes the savage judgments, both Montgomery's and Hamilton's (which are alike, for the biographer has accepted his subject's pronouncements uncritically), of Eisenhower and the Americans. Use of the words "shame," "dishonor," and "cowardice" in connection with Eisenhower, Omar N. Bradley, and other Americans is jarring, brutal, and uncalled for.

Hamilton here focuses on the battles of Alamein, Normandy, and the Bulge, and describes in loving detail how the German military authorities surrendered to Montgomery. The campaigns of Tunisia, Sicily, and southern Italy, as well as the battle of Arnhem and the failure to take the sea approaches to Antwerp, are barely touched upon.

Like some historians, Hamilton believes that the war should have ended in September or October 1944. According to Hamilton, the chances for concluding the struggle then, immediately after Normandy, vanished when Eisenhower replaced Montgomery as land forces commander. Instead of keeping the Allied armies concentrated in a single, heavy thrust north of the Ardennes, as Montgomery wished, Eisenhower dispersed his resources in his broad-front strategy. He thus, according to Hamilton, gave the Germans the opportunity to recover from their defeat in Normandy.

I too believe that the war should have ended in September or October 1944, but not because of what Hamilton says. My reason is the Allied failure to close the Falaise pocket—at Argentan-Falaise or at the Seine River or at both places—quickly and firmly enough to trap and eliminate the German forces in Normandy. The blame, in my opinion, devolves not only on Montgomery but on Eisenhower and Bradley also. All three were so intent on deciding where to execute the post-Overlord operations beyond the Seine River that they paid little attention to closing the jaws at Falaise or at the Seine. The bulk of the Germans—240,000 of them with 28,000 vehicles in the last ten days of August—escaped the trap, crossed the Seine River easily, defeated the attempt to seize the bridge too far at Arnhem, and participated in the Ardennes counteroffensive. Most of these units could have been eliminated west of the Seine River.

A word needs to be said of Montgomery's early strategy in Normandy, his repeated declarations of pulling the Germans on to the British and Canadian fronts in order to permit the Americans to make easier and faster progress on theirs. Any appreciation of ground warfare stresses the dictates of the terrain, what is possible in the territory on which troops operate. In Normandy just after the D-Day landings, the British and Canadians faced the Caen-Falaise plain, a broad, open stretch of ground that was the best place to fight. That was where the Germans were bound to commit the bulk of their forces. Both sides knew this before the invasion. And that was why the British and Canadians coming ashore had more tanks and artillery than the Americans.

The Americans were committed to an area of flooded fields and connecting causeways, of ubiquitous hedgerows and narrow roads and lanes, in short, a region made for defensive warfare, a place where the Germans did not have to put numerous troops. Through this difficult, virtually impassable terrain, bound to produce substantial casualties on offensive-minded units, through this country, Montgomery decreed, the Americans were to make the main Allied effort. To some extent, perhaps to a large extent, what dictated the strategy was hardly the terrain; on the contrary, it was the ability of the Americans—better than the British and Canadians—to sustain and absorb high numbers of wounded and dead.

Against the Americans, the Germans needed few man-made field fortifications; the ground itself was enough to impede advances. Against the British and Canadians in the Caen-Falaise plain, the Germans erected several lines of defense comprising a defense in depth. For not only did the territory favor mechanized offensive warfare; it also led to the important objectives of Paris and the Seine River.

No wonder the Germans deployed far more troops against the British and Canadians. Montgomery needed no particular strategy to attract them. The terrain itself, as well as its proximity to vital objectives, determined where the Germans committed the bulk of their forces.

Both books describe how Montgomery operated in the field, and wonderful pictures emerge of the young liaison officers who surrounded Montgomery and kept him abreast of developments at the front. The reader comes to know and to like John Poston, John Henderson, and the others who served Montgomery with loyalty, brilliance, and charm.

The two books also make small but annoying errors of fact. For example, Patton's I Armored Corps headquarters, which landed in Morocco in Operation Torch, expanded and became the Seventh US Army headquarters in Sicily, not, as is said, the

II US Corps. What is worse than annoying and hardly minor is the completely inaccurate treatment of George S. Patton, Jr. He is painted as a wildly headstrong, wilful, impulsive individual who did what he wished, unconstrained by military discipline or by the plans of his superiors. Nothing could be further from the truth. Patton was a thorough professional who understood and complied with the requirements of the chain of command. He grumbled and groaned in the privacy of his journal, but he meticulously obeyed the orders of those above him.

Well, who is ever going to reconcile the contradictory interpretations, discover the truth, and present a thesis acceptable to the citizens of both nations? Someone, I suspect, who comprehends the social institutions of both countries, a military historian with an American father and a British mother or a British father and an American mother, someone who has grown up and lived in both states, someone who is so torn by the conflicting views that he must, finally, get them together to satisfy the truth and to make it plausible to his readers on both sides of the Atlantic.

On Artillery. By Bruce I. Gudmundsson. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993. 176 pages. $16.95. **Reviewed by Lieutenant General Richard G. Trefry, USA Ret.**, Inspector General of the Army from 1977 to 1983.

Bruce Gudmundsson has done a great service for all professional soldiers. Here, in one book, is presented the background and development of Field Artillery in the past century. For those of us who are Field Artillerymen his book is a storehouse of information on how we got to be what we have been and are. For those who are not Field Artillerymen, his narrative will go far in explaining why the guns are so admired and feared by those who are subjected to them. (An early mentor once remarked "You can always tell how often a man has been shot at by the interest he takes in his artillery.")

The book begins with an analysis of the 1870-71 Franco-Prussian War. Gudmundsson states that two articles of faith emerged from that conflict. The first was that there was an overriding requirement to mass guns, that is, to put as many guns as possible in one location under one commander. The second was to silence the opposing artillery before the fighting between the ground-gaining arms began.

In essence, all doctrine, all technology, all tactics, and all missions of modern field artillery have evolved from those two considerations. Today we would call it, with deviations, the mission of support to the ground-gaining arms by fire and maneuver and counterbattery. Much of the book traces this evolution.

World War I saw the use of the howitzer versus the gun, and in a chapter entitled "Artillery Conquers, Infantry Occupies," we are skillfully led through some significant campaigns of that war, namely Artois, Champagne, Gorlice-Tarnow, and Verdun. The tactical problems of WWI, and the circumstances of positional or trench warfare, led to what the author refers to as "The Great Divorce," wherein the mortar and small indirect fire weapons were added to the infantry, while the big guns were employed in counterbattery, the achievement of surprise, and maintaining the momentum of the attack.

Gudmundsson devotes an entire chapter to the story of Lieutenant Colonel George Bruchmüller of the WWI German army, whom he considers the father of

modern artillery tactics and operating procedures. Despite a career in the Field Artillery, this reviewer must plead innocent of ever hearing anything about Bruchmüller. The book is worthwhile if only for the information regarding this soldier and his contributions to the art and science of the guns.

The chapter on WWII and the postwar artillery that brought us through the Cold War is interesting. The nuclear battlefield is discussed, but rather cursorily. Perhaps that is the way it was considered at the time, i.e. strictly from an operational or tactical standpoint. Surely, though, the capability of field artillery to fire nuclear warheads contributed to the deterrence that characterized the strategic concepts of the Cold War.

Finally, Gudmundsson believes that the future of artillery lies in technology. He ends his book with this statement:

> In a sense the fiber optic guided missile will turn the clock back to 1870. What is now done by surveyors, tables, charts, computers, weather stations, devices for measuring muzzle velocity, and the well-worn pencil of the artillery officer will be done by the flick of the wrist of a young man raised on video games. The techniques of artillery will have disappeared. All that will be left is tactics.

Maybe. One is reminded of a risposte a few decades ago when, in response to the question "Will television ever replace newspapers?" the wit replied, "No, it will cost too much to put in the bottom of the bird cage."

This is a good, informative book that everyone interested in battle should possess.

The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War. Edited by Williamson Murray, et al. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1994. 645 pages. $34.95. **Reviewed by Lieutenant General Dave R. Palmer, USA Ret.,** former Superintendent of the US Military Academy, West Point, N.Y.

Assessments of warfare have been around for as long as human beings have been recording the results of the more bellicose side of their nature. In those chronicles, however, the mention of strategy reaches back not even two full centuries. It entered the vocabulary of military history in the early 1800s and became a concept for study when Carl von Clausewitz wrote *On War*, shortly after the Napoleonic Wars ended. But strategy always has been an inherent part of the equation of war. To suppose that the concept did not exist before Clausewitz would be akin to suggesting there was no sex before Freud.

Just what it is, though, has proven difficult to define simply. Its complexities resist codification. Clausewitz himself used several different definitions, and writers ever since have struggled to pin it down precisely.

The editors of this book do not even try. Rather, they attempt to finesse the problem. In the first chapter (called, ironically, "On Strategy") we read that definitions go astray because "strategy is a process, a constant adaptation to shifting conditions and circumstances in a world where chance, uncertainty, and ambiguity dominate." Are we to believe, then, that because strategy is a process it cannot be defined? Hmmm.

The editors' unwillingness to provide at least their own view of a definition seems odd in a book with the term "strategy" in its title. That omission looms still more unusual when one finds that all of the subsequent chapters are replete with repeated uses of the word—in its various noun, adjective, and adverb forms. That ducking of so seemingly compelling a need is perhaps a reflection of the very real challenge in getting 19 scholars to agree on a single clear definition of anything, much less of so complex a subject.

But putting that matter aside, let us look at the book on its own terms. In 17 separate essays, plus introductory and concluding essays, it covers the making of strategy from the Peloponnesian Wars (431-404 B.C.) to the Cold War. The connecting theme throughout is that primarily five factors influence strategic planning: governmental systems, geography, history, culture, and economics. "By probing the full dimensions of those influences," the opening essay says, "this book will attempt to illuminate how they affect the *process* of strategy." (The italics are those of the authors.) The stated purpose of the book is to show how the five factors "have always profoundly affected the strategic process." Thus the title—*The Making of Strategy*.

The trio of editors and their contributors are to be commended for their ambitious undertaking. They have embarked upon a noble pursuit. Everyone interested in military history or the national defense needs always to have a deeper understanding of the way strategy is made—or ought to be made. And this book does provide that better understanding, whether one reads it from front to back or skips around from essay to essay.

Obviously, a work by 19 authors is prone to be uneven in style and quality. Such is the case here. Still, most of the chapters are good. Indeed, some of them are jewels worth having as stand-alone pieces. (Peter Maslowski's on the United States from 1783 to 1865 and Robert Doughty's on France between the World Wars come quickly to mind.)

The book is also quite uneven in its coverage of time. While the 17 essays bridge some 25 centuries, most are set in just the last two; in fact, ten of them fall partly or entirely in the 20th century. Maybe that is because the making of strategy has been more vivid since Clausewitz introduced us to the concept, or perhaps it is because most of the contributors are 20th-century historians. Reflecting back on the purpose of the book—to show how the five factors have "always profoundly affected the strategic process"—one has to question the imbalance in coverage. Certainly, if the word "always" is to be taken seriously, some other periods should have been covered. And it might not have been necessary to have included quite so much on the 20th century.

One final criticism, pertinent virtually throughout: the writers seem often to use the terms policy and strategy interchangeably. That may not be too surprising, considering that the book's avowed focus is on the process by which strategy (policy?) is made, rather than on strategy itself. But it nevertheless tends to be confusing, and is not entirely accurate.

In sum, this work is an admirable attempt to produce a worthwhile reference. In the end, though, the burden of having 19 creators leaves the whole less than the sum of the parts. Therefore, let the casual student beware. This work is for studying more than for reading.

Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America 1815-1945. By Christopher Bassford. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1994. 293 pages. $45.00. **Reviewed by Major Ralph Peters**, author of *Flames of Heaven*.

The US Army War College's bust of Carl von Clausewitz has been moved from a prominent, shrine-like alcove to an off-center auditorium entrance where it has a status somewhere between that of a Hummel figurine and a hat-rack. Clausewitz, as indestructible as Shakespeare, is apt to survive the slight—just as this lone philosopher of war has survived the peevish jealousies, whopping misinterpretations, and grunting disdain of generation after generation of second-rate soldiers and third-rate intellectuals. Dr. Christopher Bassford's remarkable and startlingly worthwhile book is about Clausewitz's fortunes—or misfortunes—in the English-speaking world, where the author of *Vom Kriege* has been quoted more often than read and read more often than understood. Bassford genuinely understands—and respects—Clausewitz, and he possesses the talent of mind and pen to communicate that understanding. Formerly Director of Studies in the Theory and Nature of War at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College and currently on the faculty of the US Army War College, Bassford is a treasure, and so is his book.

Bassford warns up front that "the reader who wants to gain a genuine understanding of Clausewitz cannot escape the task of actually reading *On War*." Then he proceeds to give a 25-page overview of the man and his works that is the best available in English. This is by way of introduction. The body of the book concerns those English and American officers, military writers, and theorists who collided with Clausewitz from the 19th century down to 1945, when the era of German strategic competition that had begun two centuries before with Frederick's invasion of Silesia came to an end in the ruins of Berlin. It is a chronicle of ineptitude.

Bassford is admirably objective, which must have been a challenge. Although both the British and American militaries and those who have surrounded them have had their other glories, those establishments usually showed poorly when confronted with Clausewitz. The problem, more often than not, was the one of which Bassford warns: in order to make something worthwhile of Clausewitz, you really do need to read him—and not just in a few staff college excerpts or in a greatly abridged translation. You not only need to read him, but you need to think about what he says, to let it stew, then to revisit him every few years, reexamining the ideas—for they are genuine ideas—in the light of experience. While Anglophone officers often have had plenty of experience, it has been the thinking part that has been their downfall. Not only are we unused to exploratory thought, we defensively take refuge in the superficially practical. Now a practical approach to war certainly has its advantages. In the realm of military theory, however, it makes us liable to be seduced by lists and sharply drawn formulae, things readily accessible and applicable, while Clausewitz is neither.

Clausewitz, while not so difficult as his reputation—and actually much easier to read in his native German, to my mind—is tough going compared to the work of a Keegan, in which afactual wishing passes for insight (Keegan, although not touched in this book, may be the most inaccurate critic of Clausewitz ever to put pen to paper). Clausewitz is the big leagues. In fact, he constitutes the only team in his

league. He is a giant, born of the Romanticism that flourished east of the Rhine, a thinker rational on the surface but actually profoundly intuitive and visionary, and a man so psychologically complex that we understand only those aspects of his character he wanted us to get—which is to say we have no understanding of the inner man at all. Having taken him seriously for well over a decade, I believe he purposely did not "finish" his masterwork, building in the ultimate literary defense mechanism: the reader and critic must always suppose what Clausewitz might have written, had he lived, and which weaknesses he might have strengthened or purged. Even his premature death of cholera was exactly right. Vast, unfinished works of superhuman ambition were an aspect of the high culture of his age, and Werther and Faust were as much a part of the *Zeitgeist* as was Napoleon: indeed, the fictions survived the fact. Until someone of unfashionable vanity and ambition undertakes an interdisciplinary study of the man behind the work, our understanding of the Clausewitzian vision is unlikely to deepen. In any case, this greatest of Prussians has always had and will always have his detractors, those who fault him for this part or that, but Clausewitz is greater than the sum of his parts. He is Promethean, and readers patient enough to read past the historical detritus are rewarded with insights into the essence of war that put this singular Prussian into the company of Hegel and Marx—men who saw the world so keenly that their visions changed it.

How did Clausewitz change the world? How much can we measure? That is a sub-theme of Bassford's, and the answer is that no keen measurement is possible. Clausewitz's thought, accurately received or misshapen, has become so pervasive even among officers who have not read a word of his work that, at the end of the day, even the smartest researcher can only put down his final period and say that *On War*'s influence is undeniable but inestimable.

Along with the understanding and explication of Clausewitz's ideas, Bassford is marvelously impressive when it comes to the breadth of his research. He seems to have read everything there is to read on his subject, to have understood it, put it in context, and summarized it so well it will not need doing ever again. As the author cuts his clear path through the jungle of Anglophone military theorizing—or just rambling—the reader incidentally gets an overview of who thought what when in the British and American professions of arms. From Wellington—elite, aloof, and criticism-proof—down to Liddell Hart, who was at least as pathetic as syphilitic, crumpled Nietsche sniveling about supermen in his Italian attic, the English had the most to say about Clausewitz, and they said it awkwardly (though with handsome accents, of course). Americans, such as Mahan, found a natural coincidence of views with Clausewitz, although they often failed to realize it. In the US Army, thinking was something that happened intermittently at dusty, sun-swept posts far from the intellectual centers of civilian society, and the thread of how a handful of largely unacknowledged officers prodded peers and fortunate students to think about war weaves an admirable tapestry. Bassford tells a great story of dutiful struggle and pigheadedness, of petty revenge and epiphany, and, ultimately, of how Anglophone armies that reluctantly read Clausewitz beat a German-speaking military that willfully read him wrong.

Read Clausewitz for an encounter with a great mind which, at its best, saw clearly through the fog of war. Read Christopher Bassford's masterful study to understand how lesser men saw only what they wanted to see. Then think about it.

1794: America, Its Army, and the Birth of the Nation. By Dave R. Palmer. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1994. 290 pages. $24.95 (paper). **Reviewed by Don Higginbotham**, University of North Carolina.

Dave R. Palmer has had ample opportunities to reflect on the meaning of the American military experience. A 1956 West Point graduate, he spent 35 years in the Army, including a tour as superintendent of the United States Military Academy, before retiring as a lieutenant general. The author of several solid books ranging from the War of Independence to the Vietnam conflict, Palmer in *1794* tackles what may well be his most ambitious scholarly undertaking, an examination of the nation's first postwar period in relation to the debate about its military needs.

For that time frame and indeed for our entire national history, Palmer had long pondered the phenomenon of deep-seated civilian anti-military sentiments at the same time that our armed forces have been unflinching in their commitment to civil control. If the American people have been less inclined to question the size and character of our military establishments in time of war—for understandable, pragmatic reasons—the debate has always resurfaced once the crisis is over. Palmer is undoubtedly correct in seeing the recurrence once more with the end of the Cold War. The age-old rhetoric has come back into play. What kind of armed forces, and how large should they be? What about financial costs, regulars versus reserve components as the bulwark, and the use of active duty troops for domestic purposes?

If the debates over things military are so ingrained in our history, some postwar eras have been more critical for security reasons than others. There were, for example, relatively few pressing concerns following our 19th-century wars, at least so far as the public was concerned. But the Revolution's outcome was different. The new nation existed in a hostile world. Both England and Spain hoped to see the American experiment in republicanism end in failure or in a nation that would remain permanently weak. The Indian tribes were restless and suspicious as settlers pressed westward. And frontiersmen themselves viewed the American government as being at one moment too weak to protect them and at the next moment too heavy-handed in its efforts to make them conform to federal law.

It took the United States roughly a dozen years to settle in some degree what would become the perpetual questions about an American defense establishment—from the end of the Revolutionary War, through the postwar Confederation years, through the writing and ratification of the Constitution, and into the second administration of President George Washington. It seems amazing, in retrospect, that the country survived with little or no military structure in place for so many years.

How did the changes come about, according to Palmer? First, the ideas for a national military system were eventually implemented from the experience of the Revolution formulated by George Washington in his 1783 "Sentiments on a Peace Establishment." In this, Washington was supported by other leaders with strong nationalist leanings such as Alexander Hamilton and Henry Knox. Second, these nationalists were able to incorporate much of their thinking into the Constitution. And third, the events of the Washington Administration—foreign dangers and domestic threats from Indians, Whiskey Rebels, and other disgruntled frontiersmen—gave nationalists in Congress the opportunity to implement in piecemeal fashion the military power embedded in the Constitution.

All of this is a story Palmer tells in clear, readable prose. His major points are well argued and rarely controversial. He demonstrates admirably the important roles of Henry Knox, Alexander Hamilton, Anthony Wayne, and Washington in creating and shaping our military fabric. As he admits, he has a large debt to other scholars who have paved his route through this slice of early American history. Probably for this reason, he describes his volume as a work of synthesis and analysis, which certainly justifies his decision not to use footnotes. Save for occasional differences in detail and emphasis, Palmer's book hardly goes beyond Richard H. Kohn's *Eagle and Sword: The Federalist and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1783-1802* (1975), except that Kohn carries his story through the Federalist Party era and ends with President Jefferson's creation of the Military Academy. Even so, I suspect Kohn would agree that by 1794 most of the military apparatus that would serve the country in the following century was in place: a regular army, a corps of artillery and engineers (with a cadet-training component that anticipated West Point), a ship-building program for a new navy, and federal laws for training the militia and making it easier for the President to employ the state forces in the service of the United States. Even the emerging Republican Party, or most of its responsible leadership, could accept these military institutions, however much they might then and later differ with the Federalists concerning their size and employment.

Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology. Edited by Richard D. Hooker, Jr. Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1993. 409 pages. $35.00. **Reviewed by Major Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., USMC**, author of the article "Elegant Irrelevance: Fourth Generation Warfare" in the Autumn 1993 issue of *Parameters*.

Richard Hooker has set himself a hard task in this collection of 21 essays: to display the state-of-the-art thinking on maneuver warfare. He has succeeded, and in assembling this wide-ranging and diverse grouping of thinkers he also has produced a monument to diverging, occasionally extreme, and often irreconcilable theories.

What is maneuver warfare? Perhaps the best summary definition of maneuver warfare is found in General John R. Galvin's introductory essay: "Maneuver warfare, as a concept, is a way of thinking about the purpose of engagements, battles, campaigns, one that asks the question, How can I seize and hold the initiative, stay ahead of my enemy's ability to think and act, dismantle this enemy, cause his collapse, take him apart?"

The authors represent all shades of maneuver theory, from the egregiously outspoken, dogmatic "maneuverists" who admit no god not clad in German field-gray, to the more insightful and balanced moderate thinkers, who ultimately hold the key to advancing the study of this useful body of thought. Maneuver theory must be broadened and explained in an American context if it is ever to escape the taint of gnosticism and the enduring perception that its prophets are unapologetic Germanophiles.

Weighing in with the lead essay is the self-designated initiator of the maneuver warfare debate, William S. Lind, a theorist on record with the view that the Gulf War was "a failure operationally." This despite the fact that, in his opinion, "Army and Marine Corps [forces], on the whole practiced maneuver warfare." In developing his largely anecdotal argument about the role of maneuver warfare in the

Gulf War, Lind nods approvingly at the "1st German Marine Division," while frowning at the insufficiently Prussian "2d French Marine Division." Readers will have to grapple with the meaning and context of this remarkable labeling themselves, because Lind provides no explanation for his sweeping generalization.

Bizarre and divisive characterizations like this aside, Lind frames the quintessential maneuver warfare argument: the battlefield is chaotic, "dominated by uncertainty, rapid and unexpected changes, and friction" (of course, one doesn't have to be a maneuver hard-liner to share this view). To overcome this, true practitioners of maneuver warfare eschew doctrinal concepts like synchronization and intelligence preparation of the battlefield, because, as Lind says, "the nature of war simply will not admit them." Instead, maneuverists succeed by relying on a holistic approach: "thriving on chaos," acting at speeds that increasingly dislocate the decision cycle of the opponent. Or so the argument goes. Readers will draw their own conclusions.

Luckily, there's much more to this anthology than didactic maneuver warfare hype. In particular, Major Robert Leonhard, Major John Antal, and Colonel James McDonough have contributed three essays which make it possible to discern the outlines of a maturing argument about the role of maneuver theory. Leonhard deals evenhandedly with the relationship between *directive control* and *detailed control*. Additionally, his study of the differences between the Soviet and German approaches to maneuver theory is of fundamental importance. Antal discusses the relationship of fire and maneuver with great subtlety and depth, and he makes a conscious attempt to extend his argument to levels of war above the tactical. In a second essay he outlines German command and control processes in World War II.

Colonel McDonough assesses the relationship between the self-styled "maneuverists" and their alleged doctrinal tong enemies, the "attritionists," in the following manner: "To assert there is a 'maneuverist school' with superior theoretical views is to imply there is a 'firepower school' (usually labeled a 'firepower-based attrition warfare school') with inherently inferior views. As Wass de Czege said in his defense of AirLand Battle at West Point in August 1982, it is a false dichotomy."

These writers inject a tone of reality into a body of literature that all too often has been personality-centered and has tended to adopt extreme positions. Such overexuberant arguments have had the effect of alienating many officers from the concepts themselves. One hopes that this book will be a first step toward a more evenhanded, less emotional discussion of these very important issues. When presented in a relatively balanced forum like this anthology, even the extreme arguments are useful, if only as stalking horses or referents for more complete and comprehensive ideas.

By incorporating extreme, conservative, and moderate arguments about maneuver warfare into a single anthology, Hooker has made a positive contribution to the literature. As Colonel McDonough writes: "No doubt the world is changing—and with it the techniques of warfare. But there is always a balance point. Error—and the concomitant potential for disaster—lurks on either side of it. To change too much can be as dangerous as not to change at all."

There are other essays in this book that have much to say. Dan Bolger's lively attack on the maneuver extremists is alone worth the price of the book, while Major Bruce Gudmundsson has a nice summary of maneuver warfare in the German tradition. Other essays deal thoroughly with the psychological dimension of maneuver theory, its strategic applicability, and case studies of various campaigns.

In reading these generally excellent essays, we would do well to remember Colonel McDonough's remarks about the balance point. While we should not hesitate to adopt the hard-earned lessons of other nations, our own style of war must ultimately reflect the peculiar strengths and weaknesses of the American military tradition. Where we end up with our doctrine and style of fighting must ultimately be a position of balance, sustainable and workable not only today, but tomorrow as well—on battlefields we can predict, and on battlefields we have yet to imagine.

The Marine Corps' Search for a Mission, 1880-1898. By Jack Shulimson. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1993. 274 pages. $35.00.

Mantle of Heroism: Tarawa and the Struggle for the Gilberts, November 1943. By Michael B. Graham. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1993. 360 pages. $24.95.

The Root: The Marines in Beirut August 1982-February 1984. By Eric Hammel. Pacifica, Calif.: rpt., Pacific Press, 1993. 448 pages. $17.95 (paper).

Reviewed by Colonel Craig E. Sooy, USMC, US Marine Corps Representative, US Army War College.

These publications provide detailed evaluations of three specific periods in Marine Corps history. Each represents a very different and distinct epoch in the evolution of the United States Marine Corps as a professional military organization.

The first, *The Marine Corps' Search for a Mission, 1880-1898*, is a fascinating look at one of those times when the Marine Corps struggled to exist. It describes a Marine Corps in the 1880s whose authorized end strength had been reduced to 2000 enlisted and 75 officers. The officer selection process depended primarily on political influence and patronage. There was such stagnation in officer promotions that an aging Marine Corps captain wrote the Secretary of the Navy requesting his support for legislation to permit promotion of all captains with more than 41 years of service. In addition, the enlisted recruiting system rarely produced a quality product, contributing to annual desertion rates approaching 25 percent. The book also describes a Marine Corps trying to maintain a mission aboard ship, and the resistance of many Navy officers who believed there was no place for the Corps in the modern "steel" Navy. By the turn of the century, however, primarily as a result of the perseverance of reform-minded Marine Corps officers, came the first glimpses of a future, highly professional Marine Corps—one clearly connected to the Navy, with a mission to secure advance naval bases and be a ready, deployable expeditionary force. Of particular interest to *Parameters* readers may be the important role that Colonel Emory Upton and a prominent New York lawyer, Elihu Root, played in the dramatic changes that occurred in the Marine Corps during this period.

The second book, *Mantle of Heroism*, describes a Marine Corps in all its glory—storming the beaches of Tarawa, locked in deadly combat against a mortal enemy. This is the stereotypical example of how the American people have grown to think of their Corps of Marines. If only it had been that simple! This book adroitly describes how even in the earliest stages of planning for the invasion of the Gilbert Islands the competition for resources was, to say the least, intense. The competition

for strategic priority between Nimitz's central Pacific campaign and MacArthur's western Pacific campaign determined the allocation of operational forces. The competition of will was fierce between Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly "Terrible" Turner, the Naval Amphibious Force Commander, and Major General Holland M. "Howlin' Mad" Smith, the Amphibious Assault Force Commander, concerning the assets required by the Marines for the invasion. This rivalry was so strong that Major General Smith would later write, "I sometimes wonder if we didn't have two enemies—the Japanese and certain brass hats in the Army and Navy."

The competition between Marine and Navy viewpoints on the operational requirements led Marines to believe that the Navy was stonewalling their requests and not taking the invasion of the Gilbert Islands seriously. How could we have been successful? The second half of the book answers that question as it expertly details the amphibious assault, the fight for a beachhead, and the final push to secure the island in one of the bloodiest amphibious assaults of World War II. With the use of diaries, letters, and memories of the Marines, sailors, and even the Japanese soldiers involved, we have a vivid picture of hardship and carnage on both sides. The individual stories and recollections are at times amazing, and certainly make worthwhile reading.

The third book under consideration, *The Root*, is centered around one of the most tragic events in the history of the United States Marines Corps. As the author points out, the bombing of the Marine Battalion Landing Team Headquarters building at the Beirut International Airport on 23 October 1983 is indelibly etched in many of our minds. More than 200 Marines lost their lives in one brief instant of horror. But Marines were in Beirut for 18 months; some had died before that fateful day, and others died after it. That is the real story in *The Root*.

Although the events leading to the explosion and its immediate aftermath are provided in great detail, the book also gives a detailed chronology of the Marine Corps' involvement on a day-to-day basis as peacemakers and peacekeepers assigned to a multinational force. The frustrations they experienced in dealing with the Israeli army, the Lebanese army, the Syrians, the PLO, and many others are told from the individual Marine's perspective and experiences. The hardships and dangers they endured while trying to adhere to a set of restrictive Rules of Engagement—which would not even allow them to load their weapons under most circumstances—will infuriate most readers. As the call to use military forces in the peacemaking and peacekeeping roles becomes more and more frequent, this book provides important insights into the many pitfalls of such endeavors. For those who favor the use of military forces for such missions and for those who may be tasked to carry them out, this book is a must read.

The author of each of these books has done a tremendous job in telling his story from the perspective of the individual Marine. Whether the subject is the Marines of the 1880s struggling to keep the Corps alive, the Marines of World War II's bloody island-hopping Pacific Campaign, or the Marines of the 1980s assigned to a multinational peacekeeping force, each book in its own way tells the story of their dedication, heroism, and sacrifice. The books are also tied together by the 100 years of Marine Corps history and tradition which they envelop, and the efforts of each generation of Marines to personify the Marine Corps motto, "Semper Fidelis."

Off the Press . . .

Addis, Elisabetta, et al., eds. *Women Soldiers: Images and Realities*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994. 184 pp. $18.95 (paper).

Alves, Dora, ed. *New Perspectives for US-Asia Pacific Security Strategy: The 1991 Pacific Symposium*. Washington: National Defense Univ. Press, 1992. 197 pp.

Andreopoulos, George J., and Harold E. Selesky, eds. *The Aftermath of Defeat: Societies, Armed Forces, and the Challenge of Recovery*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1994. 195 pp. $22.50.

Armstrong, Frank H. *Payoff Artillery-WWII*. South Burlington: Bull Run of Vermont, 1994. 194 pp. $21.00.

Armstrong, Richard N. *Red Army Tank Commanders: The Armored Guards*. Atglen, Pa.: Schiffer Publishing Ltd., 1994. 475 pp.

Atkinson, Rick. *Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War*. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1994. 575 pp. $13.95 (paper).

Baer, George W. *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990*. Stanford, Calif. Stanford Univ. Press, 1994. 553 pp. $49.50.

Bajpai, Kanti P., and Stephen P. Cohen, eds. *South Asia After the Cold War: International Perspectives*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994. 264 pp. $55.00.

Bellows, Michael D. *Asia in the 21st Century: Evolving Strategic Priorities*. Washington: National Defense Univ. Press, 1994. 281 pp.

Berger, Sid. *Breaching Fortress Europe: The Story of U.S. Engineers in Normandy on D-Day*. Dubuque, Ia.: Kendall/Hunt, 1994. 272 pp. $19.95.

Blank, Stephen J., and Earl H. Tilford, Jr., eds. *Does Russian Democracy Have a Future?* Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 1994. 162 pp.

Bonn, Keith E. *When the Odds Were Even: The Vosges Mountains Campaign, October 1944-January 1945*. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1994. 294 pp. $24.95.

Bradin, James W. *From Hot Air to Hellfire: The History of Army Attack Aviation*. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1994. 253 pp. $21.95.

Brennan, Joseph Gerard. *Foundations of Moral Obligation: The Stockdale Course*. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1994. 269 pp. $14.95 (paper).

Brungess, James R. *Setting the Context: Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses and Joint War Fighting in an Uncertain World*. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air Univ. Press, 1994. 225 pp.

Central Intelligence Agency. *The World Factbook: 1994-95*. McLean, Va.: Brassey's (US), 1994. 489 pp. $32.00.

Cimbala, Stephen J. *Military Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War*. University Park: Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, 1994. 307 pp. $16.95 (paper).

Clayton, Anthony. *The Wars of French Decolonization*. New York: Longman, 1994. 242 pp. $11.99 (paper).

Collins, John M. *Special Operations Forces: An Assessment*. Washington: National Defense Univ. Press, 1994. 189 pp.

Corn, David. *Blond Ghost: Ted Shackley and the CIA's Crusades*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994. 509 pp. $27.50.

Cosmas, Graham A. *An Army For Empire: The United States Army in The Spanish-American War*. Shippensburg, Pa.: White Mane Publishing Co., 1994. 366 pp. $27.95.

Davis, Paul K. *New Challenges for Defense Planning: Rethinking How Much Is Enough*. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1994. 769 pp.

Davis, Richard G. *Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe*. Washington: GPO, 1993. 808 pp.

de Chair, Somerset, ed. *Napoleon on Napoleon: An Autobiography of an Emperor*. London, Eng.: Cassell (Dist. in US by Sterling Publishing Co.), 1994. 288 pp. $19.95 (paper).

Delve, Ken. *D-Day: The Air Battle*. London, Eng.: Arms and Armour (Dist. in US by Sterling Publishing Co.) 1994. 144 pp. $17.95 (paper).

Donald F. Crosby, S. J. *Battlefield Chaplains: Catholic Priests In World War II*. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1994. 328 pp. $27.50.

Duiker, William J. *U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict in Indochina*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1994. 453 pp. $49.50.

Duncan, W. Raymond, and G. Paul Holman, Jr., eds. *Ethnic Nationalism and Regional Conflict: The Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994. 218 pp. $34.95.

Fry, John. *The Helsinki Process: Negotiating Security and Cooperation In Europe*. Washington: National Defense Univ. Press, 1993. 424 pp.

Garthoff, Raymond L. *The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War*. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1994. 834 pp. $19.95 (paper).

Golden, James R. *Economics and National Strategy in the Information Age: Global Networks, Technology Policy, and Cooperative Competition*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994. 301 pp. $59.95.

Goldhamer, Herbert. *The 1951 Korean Armistice Conference: A Personal Memoir*. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1994. 191 pp.

Graham, Norman A., ed. *Seeking Security and Development: The Impact of Military Spending and Arms Transfers*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1994. 295 pp. $40.00.

Griffith, Paddy. *Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army's Art of Attack, 1916-1918*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1994. 286 pp. $30.00.

Haass, Richard. *Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World*. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994. 255 pp.

Haglund, David G., et al., eds. *NATO's Eastern Dilemmas*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994. 231 pp. $44.95 (paper).

Hallahan, William H. *Misfire: The History of How America's Small Arms Have Failed Our Military*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1994. 580 pp. $30.00.

Harahan, Joseph P. *On-Site Inspections Under the INF Treaty*. Washington: The On-Site Inspection Agency 1903. 256 pp.

Haythornthwaite, Philip. *The English Civil War, 1642-1651: An Illustrated Military History*. New York: Sterling Publishing Co., 1994. 160 pp. $24.95.

Herring, George C. *LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War*. Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1994. 228 pp. $29.95.

Hopkins, Arthur T. *Unchained Reactions: Chernobyl, Glasnost, and Nuclear Deterrence*. Washington: National Defense Univ. Press, 1993. 153 pp.

Hutchison, Kevin Don. *World War II in the North Pacific: Chronology and Fact Book*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994. 288 pp. $65.00.

Jamieson, Perry D. *Crossing the Deadly Ground: United States Army Tactics, 1865-1899*. Tuscaloosa: Univ. of Alabama Press, 1994. 230 pp. $29.95.

Johnson, Hubert C. *Breakthrough! Tactics, Technology and the Search for Victory on the Western Front in World War I*. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1994, 336 pp.

Karp, Regina Cowen, ed. *Central and Eastern Europe: The Challenge of Transition*. Oxford, Eng.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1993. 336 pp. $49.95.

Katcher, Philip. *The Army of Robert E. Lee*. London, Eng.: Arms and Armour (Dist. in US by Sterling Publishing Co.), 1994. 320 pp. $29.95.

Kugler, Richard L. *Commitment To Purpose: How Alliance Partnership Won the Cold War*. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1993. 611 pp. $30.00.

Leonhard, Robert R. *Fighting by Minutes: Time and the Art of War*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994. 186 pp. $55.00.

Levin, Martin A., and Mary Bryna Sanger. *Making Government Work: How Entrepreneurial Executives Turn Bright Ideas Into Real Results*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1994. 333 pp. $24.95.

Levine, Alan J. *The Missile and Space Race*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994. 247 pp. $55.00.

Linden, Russell M. *Seamless Government: A Practical Guide to Re-Engineering in the Public Sector*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1994. 294 pp. $25.95.

Macdonald, Donald Stone. *U.S.-Korean Relations from Liberation to Self-Reliance: The Twenty-Year Record*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992. 364 pp. $48.50.

Magyar, Karl P., et al., eds. *Challenge and Response: Anticipating US Military Security Concerns*. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air Univ. Press, 1994. 431 pp.

Middlebrook, Martin. *Arnhem 1944: The Airborne Battle, 17-26 September*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994. 501 pp. $34.95.

Morelock, J. D., and Walter J. Boyne, ed. *The Army Times Book of Great Land Battles: From The Civil War to The Gulf War*. New York: Berkley Books, 1994, 331 pp. $28.95.

Newton, Steven H. *German Battle Tactics on the Russian Front 1941-1945*. Atglen, Pa.: Schiffer Publishing Ltd., 1994. 272 pp.

Nolan, Keith William. *The Magnificent Bastards: The Joint Army-Marine Defense of Dong Ha, 1968*. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1994. 380 pp. $24.95.

Reisman, W. Michael, and Chris T. Antoniou, eds. *The Laws of War: A Comprehensive Collection of Primary Documents on International Laws Governing Armed Conflict*. New York: Random House, 1994. 448 pp. $13.00 (paper).

Richards, Pamela Spence. *Scientific Information in Wartime: The Allied-German Rivalry, 1939-1945*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994. 177 pp. $49.95.

Rodriguez, Linda Alexander. *Rank and Privilege: The Military and Society in Latin America*. Wilmington, Del.: SR Books, 1994. 239 pp. $40.00.

Rostow, Eugene V. *A Breakfast for Bonaparte: US National Security Interests From the Heights of Abraham to the Nuclear Age*. Washington: National Defense Univ. Press, 1993. 507 pp.

Shalev, Aryeh. *The Israel-Syria Armistice Regime, 1949-1955*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994. 255 pp. $32.50.

Siccama, Jan Geert, and Theo van den Doel, eds. *Restructuring Armed Forces in East and West*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994. 141 pp. $36.95 (paper).

Smallwood, William L. *Strike Eagle: Flying the F-15E in the Gulf War*. McLean, Va.: Brassey's (US), 1994. 218 pp. $23.00.

Spick, Mike. *All-Weather Warriors: The Search for the Ultimate Fighter Aircraft*. London, Eng.: Arms and Armour (Dist. in US by Sterling Publishing Co.) 1994, 175 pp. $24.95.

Staaveren, Jacob Van. *Interdiction in Southern Laos, 1960-1968*. Washington: GPO, 1993. 360 pp.

Thomas, Ritchie, and Carl M. Becker. *An American Pursuit Pilot in France 1917-1919*. Shippensburg, Pa.: White Mane Publishing Co., 1994. 226 pp. $24.95.

Thompson, Fred, and L. R. Jones. *Reinventing the Pentagon: How the New Public Management Can Bring Institutional Renewal*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1994. 298 pp. $29.95.

Thompson, Leroy. *Ragged War: The Story of Unconventional and Counter-Revolutionary Warfare*. London: Arms and Armour (Dist. in US by Sterling Publishing Co.), 1994. 192 pp. $24.95.

Tsouras, Peter G. *Changing Orders: The Evolution of the World's Armies, 1945 to the Present*. New York: Facts on File, 1994. 352 pp. $40.00.

Tunstall, Graydon A., Jr. *Planning for War against Russia and Serbia: Austro-Hungarian and German Military Strategies, 1871-1914*. Highland Lakes, N.J.: Atlantic Research and Publications, 1993. 373 pp.

Van Creveld, Martin, et al. *Air Power and Maneuver Warfare*. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air Univ. Press, 1994. 268 pp.

Wark, Wesley K., ed. *Espionage: Past, Present, Future?* Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 1994. 159 pp. $12.50 (paper).

Watson, George M. *The Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, 1947-1965*. Washington: GPO, 1993. 390 pp.

Wholey, Joseph S., et al., eds. *Handbook of Practical Program Evaluation*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1994. 622 pp. $54.95.

Wilhelm, Alfred D., Jr. *The Chinese at the Negotiating Table*. Washington: National Defense Univ. Press, 1994. 311 pp.

Williams, Phil. *North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Volume 8*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1994. 283 pp. $65.95.

Winnefeld, James, et al. *A League of Airmen: U.S. Air Power in the Gulf War*. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1994. 335 pp. $15.00 (paper).

Wirsing, Robert G. *India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute: On Regional Conflict and Its Resolution*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994. pp. $45.00.

Wolfe, Martin. *Green Light! A Troop Carrier Squadron's War From Normandy to the Rhine*. Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press (reprinted), 1989. 498 pp.

Index, Volume XXIV, 1994

Articles

Review Essays

Book Reviews

Barrett, David M. *Uncertain Warriors: Lyndon Johnson and His Vietnam Advisers*. Autumn. 126-128. Daniel H. Simpson.

Bassford, Christopher. *Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America 1815-1945*. Winter. 148-149. Ralph Peters.

Beaumont, Roger A. *Joint Military Operations: A Short History*. Autumn. 145-146. James J. Cooke.

Binkin, Martin. *Who Will Fight the Next War? The Changing Face of the American Military*. Spring. 116-117. Frederic J. Brown.

Blacker, Coit D. *Hostage to Revolution: Gorbachev and Soviet Security Policy, 1985-1991*. Spring. 135-136. Stephen Blank.

Blackwill, Robert D., and Albert Carnesale, eds. *New Nuclear Nations: Consequences for U.S. Policy*. Autumn. 133-135. Michael R. Boldrick.

Bolger, Daniel P. *Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966-1969*. Summer. 125-127. Bevin Alexander.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century*. Spring. 121-122. Daniel H. Simpson.

Chandler, David P. *The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution Since 1945*. Spring. 129-131. Robert B. Adolph, Jr.

Chinworth, Michael W. *Inside Japan's Defense: Technology, Economics & Strategy*. Autumn. 138-139. Thomas L. Wilborn.

Connolly, Michael J. *Church Lands and Peasant Unrest in the Philippines: Agrarian Conflict in 20th-Century Luzon*. Autumn. 146-147. James C. Biedzynski.

Dawson, Joseph G., III, ed. *Commanders in Chief: Presidential Leadership in Modern Wars*. Autumn. 128-130. Richard G. Trefry.

Denoon, David B. H. *Real Reciprocity: Balancing U.S. Economic and Security Policy in the Pacific Basin*. Autumn. 135-138. Donald W. Boose, Jr.

Diehl, Paul F. *International Peacekeeping*. Spring. 131-132. Karl Farris.

Dunn, Lewis A., and Sharon A. Squassoni, eds. *Arms Control: What Next?* Autumn. 131-133. William F. Burns.

Durch, William J., et al., eds. *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*. Spring. 127-129. Norman E. Youngblood.

Ebbert, Jean, and Marie-Beth Hall. *Crossed Currents: Navy Women from WWI to Tailhook*. Autumn. 147-148. Lawrence Carroll Allin.

Flynn, George Q. *The Draft, 1940-1973*. Autumn. 139-141. John B. B. Trussell.

Graham, Michael B. *Mantle of Heroism: Tarawa and the Struggle for the Gilberts, November 1943*. Winter. 153-154. Craig E. Sooy.

Gray, Colin S. *House of Cards: Why Arms Control Must Fail*. Autumn. 131-133. William F. Burns.

Gudmundsson, Bruce I. *On Artillery*. Winter. 145-146. Richard G. Trefry.

Hamilton, Nigel. *Monty: The Battles of Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery*. Winter. 142-145. Martin Blumenson.

Hammel, Eric. *The Root: The Marines in Beirut August 1982-February 1984*. Winter. 153-154. Craig E. Sooy.

Hartlyn, Jonathan, et al., eds. *The United States and Latin America in the 1990s: Beyond the Cold War*. Summer. 133-136. Russell Ramsey.

Hofmann, George F. *Cold War Casualty: The Court-Martial of Major General Robert W. Grow*. Autumn. 143-144. Paul Brickner.

Hooker, Richard D., Jr. *Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology*. Winter. 151-153. Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr.

Horne, Alistair, with David Montgomery. *Monty, the Lonely Leader: 1944-1945*. Winter. 142-145. Martin Blumenson.

Hoyt, Edwin P. *Now Hear This: The Story of American Sailors in World War II*. Autumn. 147-148. Lawrence Carroll Allin.

Jablonsky, David. *Churchill, The Great Game and Total War*. Spring. 133-135. Stephen L. Bowman.

Keddell, Joseph P., Jr. *The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures*. Autumn. 135-138. Donald W. Boose, Jr.

Kjonnerod, L. Erik, ed. *Evolving U.S. Strategy for Latin America and the Caribbean*. Summer. 133-136. Russell Ramsey.

Levine, Alan J. *The Strategic Bombing of Germany, 1940-1945*. Summer. 131-132. Mark Clodfelter.

Lewis, Bernard. *Islam and the West*. Summer. 122-124. Norvell B. DeAtkine.

Lindsay, Franklin. *Beacons in the Night: With the OSS and Tito's Partisans in Wartime Yugoslavia*. Summer. 129-130. Michael Roskin.

Lucas, James. *Hitler's Mountain Troops*. Autumn. 141-142. Mark F. Cancian.

Macdonald, Peter. *Giap: The Victor in Vietnam*. Summer. 121-122. Douglas Pike.

Matthews, Ron, and Keisuke Matsuyama, eds. *Japan's Military Renaissance?* Autumn. 135-138. Donald W. Boose, Jr.

McNally, Jeffrey A. *The Adult Development of Career Army Officers*. Spring. 136-137. Philip M. Lewis.

Morris, Roy, Jr. *Sheridan: The Life and Wars of General Phil Sheridan*. Spring. 126-127. Joseph T. Glatthaar.

Murray, Williamson, et al., eds. *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War*. Winter. 146-147. Dave R. Palmer.

Nathan, James A., ed. *The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited*. Summer. 124-125. Dan Caldwell.

Navias, Martin. *Going Ballistic: The Build-up of Missiles in the Middle East*. Autumn. 133-135. Michael R. Boldrick.

Odom, William E. *America's Military Revolution: Strategy and Structure After the Cold War*. Spring. 119-121. Donn A. Starry.

Palmer, Dave R. *1794: America, Its Army, and the Birth of the Nation*. Winter. 150-151. Don Higginbotham.

Pappas, George S. *To the Point: The United States Military Academy, 1802-1902*. Summer. 119-121. Dave R. Palmer.

Porch, Douglas. *The French Foreign Legion: A Complete History of the Legendary Fighting Force*. Summer. 127-129. William T. Dean III.

Rowny, Edward L. *It Takes One to Tango*. Autumn. 131-133. William F. Burns.

Shulimson, Jack. *The Marine Corps' Search for a Mission, 1880-1898*. Winter. 153-154. Craig E. Sooy.

Shultz, Richard H., Jr., and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds. *The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War*. Spring. 132-133. Howard Barnard.

Van Creveld, Martin. *Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict*. Spring. 122-124. Colin S. Gray.

Subscription Order Form

Order Processing Code:
*5226

Please enter _____ subscription(s) to **PARAMETERS (PAR).** Each is $11.00 per year ($13.75 foreign). Price includes postage and handling.

_____ Total cost.

_____
Name (please print or type)

_____
Additional address/attention line

_____
Street Address

_____
City, State, ZIP Code

_____   _____
Daytime phone, including area code   Purchase Order No.

For privacy protection, check the box below:

☐ Do not make my name available to other mailers.

Method of Payment:

☐ Check enclosed payable to the Superintendent of Documents

☐ GPO Deposit Account ☐☐☐☐☐☐☐–☐

☐ Visa or MasterCard Account:

☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐

☐☐☐☐
Expiration Date

_____
Authorizing signature

Mail To: Superintendent of Documents, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954

Thank you for your order! Revised 10/94

To fax your order: **(202) 512-2233**
To order by phone: **(202) 783-3238**

From the Archives

Malthus *Recidivus*

In 1798, dour English economist and demographer Thomas Malthus launched a debate that continues to this day. He proclaimed that abject poverty was inevitable in the human condition, given that population, if unchecked, would grow according to geometrical progression, while food supplies would grow only according to arithmetical progression:

> If, setting out from a tolerably well-peopled country such as [those of Europe], we were to suppose that by great attention to agriculture, its produce could be permanently increased every 25 years by a quantity equal to that which it at present produces, it would be allowing a rate of increase decidedly beyond any probability of realization. The most sanguine cultivators could hardly expect that in the course of the next 200 years each farm in this country on an average would produce eight times as much food as it produces at present, and still less that this rate of increase could continue so that each farm would produce 20 times as much as at present in 500 years, and 40 times as much in 1000 years. Yet this would be an arithmetical progression and would fall short, beyond all comparison, of the natural increase of population in a geometrical progression, according to which the inhabitants of any country in 500 years, instead of increasing to 20 times, would increase to above a million times their present numbers.[1]

In the two centuries following Malthus's warning, it has been fashionable to dismiss him as a crude and hopelessly naive pseudo-scientist who failed to foresee the wondrous plenty promised by advances in agricultural technology. But the Green Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s has faded, and there are ominous straws in the wind.[2] In Malthus's time, a billion people inhabited the planet; 200 years later we are closing on six billion, with the last billion to be added in the final decade of this century. By the year 2030, we expect another three billion—the equivalent of adding another India during each of the next three decades. Meanwhile famine is predicted for the Horn of Africa, China faces a huge grain deficit in the next 40 years, and Worldwatch issues daily calamitous warnings that the underdeveloped world is losing the race to feed its people.

Perhaps the antiquated voice of Thomas Malthus speaks to us yet.

NOTES

1. Thomas Malthus, et al., *On Population: Three Essays* (New York: Mentor Books, 1960), p. 29. The essay, titled "A Summary View of the Principle of Population" (1830), distills Malthus's views on population as published between 1798 and 1824.

2. See, e.g., Jessica Mathews, "Malthus's Warning," *The Washington Post*, 7 June 1994, p. A19.

—Colonel Lloyd J. Matthews, USA Ret.